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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the introduction of modern management techniques into the 
Chinese public sector and in particular the effects of this on the labour process in 
the auto components sector. This research project, from the perspective of industrial 
sociology, not only seeks to examine how social relations mediate the 
implementation of new management techniques, but also focuses upon the impact 
of these techniques upon workers. 
There has been an enormous amount of academic research on the diffusion of 
modern management techniques, particularly lean production, in North American 
and European settings. In contrast, there is a lack of research on the introduction of 
lean production into developing countries, particularly China. This research project 
tries to fill this lacuna by providing many first-hand stories of how managers 
implemented lean production and how workers viewed the changing nature of their 
work. 
The thesis utilises both qualitative and quantitative research methods. A survey was 
conducted amongst 24 companies in 8 industries with 1,012 managers across 
Shanghai. Case studies were conducted in the several auto components companies, 
where 582 workers responded to questionnaires, and managers, workers and union 
officials were interviewed. Three fieldwork trips took place between August 1998 
and November 2000. 
It is seen that lean production has been implemented under pressure from joint 
venture component customers. The building of a harsh disciplinary regime and the 
elimination of labour through closing up the porosity of the working day have been 
integral parts of this process. It is evident that lean production has resulted in 
significant increases in work intensity and work-related stress. However, it is also 
found that workers have gradually accepted the new management techniques under 
the pressure of fierce market competition and their knowledge of massive lay offs 
elsewhere in the economy and by virtue of certain material advantages. 
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Introduction 
Chapter One: Globalisation of Management and the Economy 
Studies of the diffusion of global, modem management techniques have focused 
upon firms in North American and European settings within advanced capitalist 
society. These studies have addressed crucial questions about contemporary 
changes in work organisation and employment relations across the globe. The most 
influential of these was The Machine That Changed the World (1990), in which 
Womack, Jones and Roos claimed that lean production would become the standard 
global production system in the twenty first century. There is, however, little 
research on the significance of lean production which makes reference to 
developing societies, particularly China. 
China has undergone rapid changes as a result of reforms in the direction of a 
market economy and exposure to the world economy. The flow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) provides an opportunity for Chinese managers to access global 
modern management techniques which have been implemented in both developed 
and developing societies. One piece of research conducted by Taylor (1999) 
examines the extent to which Japanese management practices are applied in twenty 
Japanese manufacturing plants in China. This piece of research, however, puts the 
emphasis on production technology and management rather than the sociological 
dimension. 
This thesis explores how lean production was introduced and how it impacted 
upon employees in the state sector in China from a sociological perspective. This 
i 
thesis provides a first hand investigation of how managers, workers and the trade 
unions in Shanghai evaluated the changes and development that resulted from the 
implementation of lean production. It shows that the economic and social context in 
China influenced the views of workers on lean production. It draws upon industrial 
sociology and labour process debates by discussing how the implementation of lean 
production was implicated in the exercise of management prerogatives and the 
intensification of labour. 
The main objective of this chapter is to provide a brief economic, social and 
theoretical background to the research. It starts with an analysis of the impacts of 
increased FDI and economic reforms on management in Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (hereinafter referred to as SOEs); it then reviews the literature on global 
modern management techniques, with particular reference to the debates on lean 
production; finally, it outlines the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 China's Economic Transition in a Global Context 
China's recent economic performance has drawn attention from around the world. 
The growth rate of China's average annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 
9.8% from 1979 to 1997 and over 7% from 1998 to 2000 when the world economy 
grew slowly. Its overall economic strength was ranked seventh in the world in 
1999. At the same time, unbalanced development took place in different regions 
and different industrial sectors. Particularly, many SOEs suffered from heavy 
losses. Shanghai, with a population of 13 million, is the most important economic 
centre in China. In 1999, its GDP was RMB 403.5 billion, a 10.2% increase over 
2 
1998, and 3.1 percentage points higher than the national increase range (the 
exchange rate of RMB to the Pound is currently about 13: 1); its industrial value 
added reached RMB 175.9 billion, with 9.6% growth over 1998; its total profits 
went up to RMB 25.8 billion, which was 30% higher than in 1998 (Shanghai 
Economy Year Book, 2000: 16). Shanghai also experienced a radical industrial 
restructuring and asset reorganisation. It is a fact that China's economic growth, 
Shanghai's in particular, resulted from the economic reforms and the development 
of trade and investment relations with the rest of the world. 
1.1.1 FDI in China 
Since 1978 when China opened its doors to the world, it has actively attracted FDI 
to its economy whilst foreign capital searches for cheap labour, land and lower raw 
material costs within China. China is the largest recipient of FDI amongst 
developing countries and stands second only to USA as a global destination for 
FDI. About 300 out of the 500 top multi-national enterprises have become 
established in China, mostly in the form of joint-ventures. By the end of November 
2001, China had utilised a total of US$390.52 billion in actual FDI. According to 
official statistics, a total of 387,260 companies with foreign investment had been 
set up. FDI in China reached a historical high of US$45.5 billion in 1998, and 
averaged at about US$40 billion in the past two years following the Asian financial 
crisis. Furthermore, the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) 
estimated that FDI in China would total US$47 billion in 2001 (Xinhua News 
Agency, 4th, December, 2001). The rapid growth of FDI in China is likely to 
3 
continue and may even accelerate after China's entry into the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in December, 2001. 
Table 1.1 Industry Sectors and the Forms of FDI in Shanghai. 
Indicators No. of cases No. of cases Value Value 
(US$100 (US$100 
mil. ) mil. ) 
Year 1999 Cumulative Year 1999 Cumulative 
total by 1999 total by 1999 
Total 1,472 20,406 41.04 390.34 
By types of Foreign 817 5,643 19.29 108.33 
investment capital only 
Joint 399 10,661 15.11 184.07 
ventures 
Cooperative 255 4,114 4.84 81.05 
By Industry Primary 15 148 0.81 1.30 
Secondary 841 14,011 20.31 208.47 
Tertiary 616 6,591 20.55 184.28 
Source: Shanghai Economy Year Book, 2000: 326. 
Shanghai has become the most popular place for FDI since 1992 when the 
emphasis of Chinese economic development shifted from the four special economic 
zones. The growth of FDI was accelerating dramatically in recent years. Investors 
from 95 countries and regions had invested in Shanghai. Of the world's top 500 
enterprises, 256 had invested in Shanghai and 25 had set up regional headquarters 
there by the end of September 2001. Table 1.1 shows the industry sector and the 
form of FDI in Shanghai. In 1999, `foreign capital only' was a main type of 
investment in terms of number of cases and value. By 1999, Shanghai had received 
FDI $39 billion and the secondary industry accounted for half the total. 
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In discussing the impact of FDI on the transfer of managerial techniques, 
Child and Rodrigues (1996: 46) argued that FDI provided an extremely important 
potential vehicle for the transfer of managerial and organisational knowledge in 
developing economies, as well of course for the transfer of technology as ordinarily 
understood. Shanghai SOEs have seen their formerly unchallenged market position 
dramatically eroded by foreign competitors, with millions of people being made 
redundant. In order to survive in the market, management in SOEs is increasingly 
seeking to improve productivity by adopting global modern management 
techniques. 
1.1.2 State-owned Enterprise Reform 
China's economic reforms aim at responding to external global competition and 
shifting towards the market economy. China had a planned economy dominated by 
SOEs from 1949. The result of this economic model was a lack of competition and 
low productivity. The reform of SOEs has been a central issue of the economic 
reforms since the 1980s. One of the major thrusts of SOE reform was the 
enhancement of managerial authority, both from external bureaucratic superiors 
and from Party domination within the firm (Lee, 1999: 55). The introduction of the 
`director (manager) responsibility system' in 1984 ensured that management in 
SOEs were responsible for both the profits as well as the losses of their enterprises. 
Greater managerial power and authority were devolved as the means to enhance 
enterprise profitability. 
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A new Labour Law was enacted in 1995. In theory, it provides voluntary 
bilateral choices: managers gain a new licence to dismiss workers whilst workers 
enjoy a new freedom to switch jobs. However, in practice, labour contracts have 
accentuated managerial power at the expense of workers' interests (Lee, 1999: 55). 
It could also be seen that the exercise of management prerogatives might make it 
possible to introduce modem management techniques in order to pursue the goals 
of profit and productivity. However, employees were even more vulnerable than 
before in the face of a new management control system. The declining significance 
of the trade union and the Party branch inside SOEs exposed the glaring 
discrepancy between the formal advances made in the legal protection of workers' 
right and, in reality, the increased powerlessness of workers (Lee, 1999: 57). 
The change of ownership structure in SOEs by the injection of capital from 
private or foreign sources was another thrust of the reforms beginning in 1992. 
SOEs made a break-through in implementing the strategy of `take a firm grip on the 
large, let go of the small' (zhua da fang xiao). This means that large groups would 
be formed in `pillar industries' and `basic industries', with the state holding 
`controlling stakes' whilst allowing non-state equity participation in corporatised 
SOEs. It was held that only exceptional products and military enterprises should be 
operated solely by the state; whilst small SOEs could change their system of 
ownership through mergers and bankruptcies if they failed to survive. Despite the 
inevitability of cut-backs, the state economy still occupied a dominant position in 
total social assets. It controlled the arteries of, and played a leading role in, the 
national economy (Lau, 1999: 69). By 1996, state-owned assets accounted for 
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58.6% of total assets and 43.5% of industrial total outputs (cited in Zhang, 1999: 
50). 
In 1999, Shanghai SOEs implemented the strategy of `take a firm grip on the 
large, let go of the small' (zhua da fang xiao) to readjust state-owned economic 
structures, and the total volume of state-owned assets further increased by merging 
and `transforming debts into shares'. By the end of 1999, state-owned assets 
distributed in the high tech industries, the pillar industries (including the auto 
industry), and public infrastructure and trades reached RMB 128.9 billion, an 
increase of 13.4% over the previous year. State-owned assets in large enterprises 
(which have more than several thousand employees) accounted for 67.8% of the 
operational state-owned assets of SOEs and had increased 7.3 percentage points 
since the end of 1998 (Shanghai Economy Year Book, 2000: 28-29). The 
management in SOEs plays a more and more important role in improving 
competitive capability, and they have been increasingly able to access modem 
management techniques in an age of management globalisation. 
1.1.3 Management Globalisation 
Over the past decade, there has been a continual stream of innovation in 
management. These innovations include the development of new practices such as 
those embodied in lean production and individual techniques such as total quality 
management (TQM). They have commonly been seen as coming from Japan, but in 
reality have originated in many countries including the USA, Russia and UK, as 
well as Japan (Lindberg, Voss and Blackmon, 1998: 3). The globalisation of 
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competition has contributed to the diffusion of these global modern management 
techniques (GMMTs) around the world. 
Whilst modem management techniques have been mostly implemented in 
developed countries, there is a growing body of evidence that these techniques are 
being increasingly adopted in the developing world largely through the activities of 
multinationals (Humphrey, 1993; Posthuma, 1991; Kaplinsky, 1995). There are 
reports of the application of new management techniques in some developing 
countries. For example, in their research on white-goods manufacturing in Turkey, 
Nichols et al. (2002: 68; 81) have observed, `the velocity at which new ideas have 
been imported into Turkey has increased considerably over the last few decades'; 
`there is evidence of training, teams, and an interest in kaizen and suggestions from 
the shop floor in all of the plants'; and the `hard' rather than `soft' variants of TQM 
have been implemented there. It is also found that firms in Argentina have 
implemented techniques such as just-in-time (JIT), kanban, and TQM (Paladino et 
A, 1998: 46). Brazil is another case in point. It is reported that the diffusion of 
modem lean management practices increased in the early 1990s (Fleury et al., 
1998: 63). As a specific example, the production system has changed in a VW truck 
plant (Abreu, Beynon and Ramalho, 2000). Despite the uses of individual 
techniques in developing countries, it is argued that human resources, inter-firm 
cooperation and management are specific obstacles in the systemic application of 
Japanese management techniques (Kaplinsky, 1995: 57). 
Modern management techniques have been introduced into China for over 
two decades. In the beginning of the 80s, management in China was increasingly 
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encouraged to learn about modern management techniques in order to accelerate 
the modernisation process of its industry. The popularisation of TQM and 17 other 
managerial techniques was firstly put forward by the State Economy Committee in 
1984 (Rei, 1997: 219). Human resource management (HRM) was introduced into 
China in the late 1980s. The implementation of modern management techniques in 
China attracted the attention of foreign researchers. Of particular interest is HRM, 
related to three system reforms--the lifetime employment system, the wage system 
and the social insurance system. Some authors speculated that management 
techniques from more developed economies would be applied in the Chinese 
context (Shore et al., 1993; Tsang, 1994; Warner, 1996, Ding et al., 1997). For 
example, in Management in China during the Age of Reform (1994), Child points 
out that the Western management techniques are too culturally infused with 
Western values to yet be on the Chinese agenda for reforms. On the other hand, in 
The Management of Human Resources in Chinese Industry (1995), Warner 
suggests that human resource management in China may tend towards a more 
hybrid form combining Chinese management characteristics with either Western or 
Eastern practices. 
Lean production was spread into China in 1991 when the Chinese version of 
The Machine That Changed the World (Womack et al., 1990) was published. 
Several companies claim that they have implemented lean production techniques 
since 1993, but few studies of them can be found in any literature, and there is no 
published research in English that has sought to examine lean production in 
Chinese industry. 
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This thesis is set in the context of the Chinese economic reforms and 
increased FDI, and explores the implementation of lean production in the Shanghai 
auto industry. It hopes to throw some light on the implications of these processes 
for the labour process, work organisation and employment relationship. 
1.2 Research on Lean Production 
1.2.1 Origins of the Term 'Lean Production' 
The origin of the term `lean production' is found in the one of the most influential 
books in recent years, The Machine that Changed the World by Womack, Jones and 
Roos (1990), the authors of the International Motor Vehicle Programme. Their 
study lasted five years and cost $5 million, and it surveyed global vehicle assembly 
plants. It firstly reveals that the secret weapon of the Japanese, who had been able 
to move ahead of the rest of world in the global auto wars, is a management 
technique called lean production, as Womack et al. (1990: 225) contend: 
Lean production is a superior way for humans to make things. It provides 
better products in wider variety at lower cost. Equally important, it provides 
more challenging and fulfilling work for employees at every level, from the 
factory to headquarters. It follows that the whole world should adopt lean 
production, and as quickly as possible. 
The principles of lean production extend to the entire production system, 
including design, supply management, work organisation and markets. The 
following discussion, however, is limited to its production practices and system of 
work organisation. In general, `a properly organised lean-production system does 
indeed remove all slack--that's why it's lean' (Womack et al., 1990: 101) and lean 
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producers `set their sights explicitly on perfection: continually declining costs, zero 
defects, zero inventories, and endless product variety' (ibid.: 13). The slack 
mentioned above refer to unused work time, excess workers and excess inventories. 
In the production system, the `leanness' can be achieved by following the 
prescribed pathways: 
(1) JIT production and reduction of inventories. Lean production requires 
`keeping far less than half the needed inventory on site' (ibid.: 13), making small 
batches which eliminate the carrying cost of the huge inventories of finished parts 
required under mass production (ibid.: 53). It requires a smooth production, `the 
parts went on more smoothly and the work tasks were better balanced, so that every 
worker worked at about the same pace' (ibid.: 79). The accurate coordination of the 
flow of parts into each stage of the manufacturing process contributes to cost 
reductions. 
(2) Elimination of defects. Operators are required to `do it right the first time' 
and to find errors before they become defects on the production line. `Once a 
defective part had become embedded in a complex vehicle, an enormous amount of 
rectification work might be needed to fix it. And because the problem would not be 
discovered until the very end of the line, a large number of similarly defective 
vehicles would have been built before the problem was found' (ibid.: 56). 
(3) Minimising cost. `Cost comes first' (ibid.: 141), in order to achieve target 
costs, `both the assembler and the supplier use value engineering techniques to 
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break down the costs of each stage of production, identifying each factor that could 
lower the cost of each part' (ibid.: 148). 
Furthermore, Womack et al. indicate two key organisational features of the 
truly lean plant: 
It transfers the maximum number of tasks and responsibilities to those workers 
actually adding value to the car on the line, and it has in place a system for 
detecting defects that quickly traces every problem, once discovered, to its 
ultimate cause...... So in the end, it is the dynamic work team that emerges as 
the heart of the lean factory (emphasis in original, ibid.: 99). 
This means `indirect' labour (supervision, inspection, maintenance) is pared 
down and specialised job classifications are reduced or eliminated and replaced by 
teams of cross-trained production workers who rotate jobs and take on 
responsibilities for quality control, repair, housekeeping, and preventive 
maintenance. Workers in a lean production plant have the opportunity `to think 
actively, indeed proactively' to resolve workplace problems. This `creative 
tension, ' as Womack et al. call it, makes work in a lean production plant not only 
more challenging, but more `humanly fulfilling' (ibid.: 99-102). 
Having given the explanation of lean production as suggested by Womack et 
al., we look at the term lean production as used in a wider field. Lean production 
was pioneered within the Japanese car manufacturing sector, although not 
exclusively, by Toyota Motors (Womack et al., 1990: chapter 3), nevertheless, the 
term Toyota Production System (TPS) has been used by a considerable number of 
researchers (Schonberger, 1982; Monden, 1983; Shingo, 1988). Moreover, when 
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the Japanese economic miracle was investigated by Western countries in the 1980s, 
it led to its emulation around the world. There have been many different terms 
previously used to describe the same phenomenon or part of it, i. e. JIT, `flexible 
specialisation' (Piore and Sable, 1984), `Toyotism' (Dohse et al., 1985), `flexible 
firms' (Atkinson, 1987). For example, Voss and Robinson described JIT as an 
umbrella term to refer to a package of techniques, requiring enhanced 
responsiveness and, particularly, precise coordination of the resources involved in 
production. So far, lean production is seen as just one of these descriptions, for 
example, it is composed of various management practices associated with efficient 
material flows, improved quality and increased employee involvement systems 
(White and Prybutok, 2001: 113). 
However, several researchers indicate that the concept of lean production as 
codified by American researchers has been developed in several ways. Firstly, in 
terms of technological perspectives, the work of Womack et al. is conceptually and 
empirically `considerably more advanced than that of Voss and Robinson', `lean 
production is seen as a package, an interrelated and mutually supportive set of 
manufacturing practices capable of delivering Japanese levels of manufacturing 
performance anywhere in the world, if implemented correctly' (Oliver and 
Wilkinson, 1992: 10). 
Secondly, regarding the trend of globalisation of the economy, lean 
production is `the latest account of the progress towards globalisation in the auto 
sector and by extension, industry as a whole', so that `the concept of the 
Japanisation of Western industry is redundant'; `the lean production model claims 
13 
universal applicability, since its protagonists regard it as a technical development 
without any social or cultural preconditions...... ' (Stewart and Garrahan, 1997: 
225-228). This is seen an advantage compared to the Japanisation paradigm. 
Beginning in the UK in the late 1980s, Japanisation has been the dominant form 
within which developments in the auto industry have been judged. The original 
concept of Japanisation was introduced by Turnbull in 1986 when he referred to 
production and organisational changes at Lucas Electrical. The main change to 
production methods identified by Turnbull is a shift to flexible manufacturing 
utilising JIT production. One of his main suggestions is that the changes in 
manufacturing methods are creating pressures for changes in the social 
arrangements of production. Turnbull suggests that the success of Japanese 
management was dependent on a social organisation of the production process 
intended to make the workers feel obliged to contribute to the economic 
performance of the enterprise and to identify with its competitive success 
(Turnbull, 1986). 
Finally, the word `lean' is used in a broad sense. Rather than focussing on 
production (or manufacturing), `lean' is regularly associated with the much broader 
area of management (Benders and Bijsterveld, 2000) and management is seen as 
part of the production process. 
Therefore, lean production is used throughout this piece of work to describe 
both new work organisation, as Womack et al. defined it, which claims to 
systematically relate to superior productivity and quality, and its concrete 
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production techniques including: JIT, kanban, team working, continuous 
improvement (kaizen) and so on. 
1.2.2 Debates on Lean Production at Work 
1.2.2.1 Transferability 
Lean production is unambiguously described by its proponents as universally 
adoptable, `applicable anywhere by anyone', and lean production can be 
transplanted successfully to new environments (Womack et al., 1990: 9; 84). 
This has evoked enormous academic debates on the transferability of lean 
production from a variety of perspectives. The transferability of lean production is 
associated with the different social and economic environments between Japan and 
other countries, because lean production stems from Japanese car manufacturing. 
For example, some authors point out that Womack et al. ignore different market 
environments when they come to their conclusions. Williams et al. (1992) argue 
that it is an erroneous view which takes for granted the omnipotence of 
management in its ability to control the business environment. Berggren (1995: 89) 
notes the importance of understanding the complex relations between management 
practices and market dynamics. He indicates that Womack et al. erroneously 
attributed stable production expansion and lack of cyclicality in Japanese markets 
to the production system, and completely overlooked the importance of macro 
economic factors. 
Both advocates and critics of lean production have focused on its social 
embeddedness (Florida and Kenney, 1991,1993; Elger and Smith, 1994; Graham, 
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1994; Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). Some of the strongest proponents are Kenney 
and Florida. They support the view of Womack et al. that Japanese organisational 
practices constitute a new form of lean production toward which firms all over the 
world are converging (Florida and Kenney, 1993: 383). They insist that not only is 
the Western emulation of Japanese management necessary in terms of advancing 
industrial efficiency but it is also an inevitable outcome of the capitalist dynamic of 
technological and organisational progress. They conceptualise the new model of 
Japanese work organisation and production within a framework of `innovation- 
mediated production', with general applicability, characterised by the active 
mobilisation of the knowledge and intelligence of all employees. Their research 
suggests that management has been successful in transferring the Japanese model to 
the US. They argue that large, resource-rich, powerful organisations have sufficient 
resources to transform their environments to suit the organisation's needs. 
However, despite the fact that the analysis of Florida and Kenney gives much 
greater attention to the social relations between capital and labour, some 
researchers point out its weakness. Elger and Smith (1994: 4) argue that `their 
characterisation of innovation-mediated production collapses together the social 
relations of the research and development process and those of the much more 
constrained exercise of initiative in shop floor improvements'. Babson (1995: 14) 
indicates that Kenney and Florida `seem to be describing an idea type rather than an 
actual production system' (emphasis in original). Graham (1994: 124) indicates that 
because the aialysis of Florida and Kenney `is one sided and top down, the 
dynamics of how those structures operate, when mediated by the workforce, is 
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missing'. The lack of empirical evidence of the relationship between engineers and 
production workers is another weakness of Florida and Kenney's work. 
In analysing the universalistic model, Oliver and Wilkinson give a less 
critical comment on lean production in their influential book The Japanisation of 
British Industry (1992). According to Elger and Smith (1994: 7), on the one hand, 
they emphasise that lean production does require very specific social conditions, of 
the sort provided by the Japanese social structure, for them to work, because of the 
levels of worker commitment they require and their potential vulnerability to 
disruption by both workers and suppliers. On the other hand, they argue that 
Japanese production paradigms could successfully be adopted through the 
construction of `functionally equivalent' workplaces and labour market institutions 
which would sustain Japanese manufacturing systems with little compromise in 
different national settings. By assessing the limitations to the authors' 
methodology, Danford (1999: 6) points out `rather than rely on quantitative 
analysis to construct a facile functionalist fit between different sets of management 
practices we need to examine exactly how such innovations function on the shop- 
floor'. 
Whilst some of these scholars emphasis the theoretical approaches necessary 
to construct a lean production paradigm and to substantiate the process of 
management globalisation, many others focus on case studies of Japanese 
transplants in North America and Europe (Milkman, 1991,1997; Garrahan and 
Stewart, 1992; Babson, 1995; Rinehart, Huxley and Robertson, 1997; Danford, 
1999; Delbridge, 1998). Their case studies do not support the universal view 
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because of the different social and economic circumstances, such as industrial 
relations, sector conditions, market dynamics and corporate strategies in different 
countries although most countries do have some examples, at least, of `new' 
management practice. 
So far, however, there is no research on the transformation of lean production 
into China. Several important questions arise: to what degree has Chinese 
management adopted lean production techniques in order to improve competitive 
capability in the market economy? How has lean production been implemented in 
the public sector where people have different ideological, behavioural and skill 
characteristics from those in the developed capitalist countries? How does the 
Chinese economic and social environment affect the transfer of lean production? 
1.2.2.2 Management Prerogative 
The most obvious point of contention is whether management prerogative remains 
present in the labour process under lean production. Proponents of lean production 
present it as a new cooperative work force participation-based model. Team 
working and Kaizen are, in this view, mechanisms contributing to workers' 
participation. Womack et al. suggest that the `team at the heart of plant' is a 
company-wide team culture premised on the concept of egalitarianism. At the same 
time, lean production `transfers the maximum number of tasks and responsibilities 
to those workers actually adding value to the car on the line', in turn, workers 
commit themselves to continuously improving productivity and quality (Womack et 
al., 1990: 99-102). Kenney and Florida (1993: 16) take a step further and suggest 
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that the `underlying organisational feature' of lean production is the `self-managing 
work team'. Moreover, MacDuffie (1995) notes that the logic of production under 
the lean system necessarily empowers workers by placing them at the centre of 
factory operations. 
These advocates challenge the predominant Marxist analysis of advanced 
capitalist society. Their studies are theoretically opposed to the work of Braverman 
(1974) and Gramsci (1970). In analysing the production of surplus value, 
Braverman in his Labour and Monopoly Capital (1974) points to the imperative of 
direct management control under scientific management. As he observes, 
management separated conception from execution and used `this monopoly over 
knowledge to control each step of the labour process and its mode of execution' 
(Braverman, 1974: 114; 119). `Gramsci (1970) formulated the concept of 
hegemony to help understand the dramatic changes in the shape and character of 
power in advanced capitalist societies since the early twentieth century.... Gramsci 
defined hegemony as the rule by an alliance of class factions based on a subtle 
mixture of coercion and consent. Class power, he argued, was always backed by 
coercive instruments, but had increasingly become masked and fortified by 
methods of securing the consent of the underclasses to the ruling group's world 
view' (Yanarella and Green, 1996: 4). Similarly, Burawoy (1985) characterises the 
Japanese factory system as a form of `hegemonic despotism'. 
Whilst proponents of lean production tend to obscure management 
prerogatives in the labour process, critics have argued that `the social relations of 
production that surround them rely on the assertion of managerial prerogatives to 
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the detriment of the workforce, which is even further subordinated than it was 
under previous manufacturing regimes' (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 10). In 
discussing Toyota's advantage, Dohse et al. (1985: 141) conclude that the labour 
process under Japanese production management `is simply the practice of the 
organisational principles of Fordism under conditions in which management 
prerogatives are largely unlimited'. 
A number of quantitative and qualitative research studies, contrary to the 
views of Womack et al., demonstrate the existence of management prerogative, in a 
new form of management control, at the point of production under the lean 
production regime. From their point of view, team working is a new form of control 
which relieves management of this direct responsibility by imposing the 
supervisory functions on workers. Graham (1996: 72; 74) points out that this 
control involves `an active campaign to create a company-wide team culture 
premised on the concept of egalitarianism' and the `pressure existed because of the 
team structure'. Garrahan and Stewart (1992) find that peer pressure on team 
members, through `neighbour checks', is one of the conventional control methods 
in Nissan's English factories; and direct control is exerted through the team concept 
by the team leader. Direct control is (effected) through the detailed supervision of 
workers, constant pressure to meet production goals and the implementation of 
management directives (Robertson et al., 1992). One of the team leader's 
responsibilities is to monitor team members' quality of work performance, 
`including the identification of individual responsibility for errors', as Delbridge 
(1998: 52; 29) observes, `each operator marks their work with a colour-coded paint 
to indicate who has personal responsibility'. 
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In the case of Mazda at Flat Rock, a transplant in the United States, 
management's direct control over work has been protected by a collective 
bargaining agreement. Under this agreement, team members can not alter their 
work pace without supervisory approval (Babson, 1996: 84). 
Dohse et al., (1985: 142) criticise the fact that worker `participation occurs in 
a controlled context in which the topics, goals, and forms of articulation are, for 
practical purposes, limited to company interests'. Some critics indicate that 
managers employ participation strategies because they reduce conflict and 
encourage commitment by engendering feelings of involvement on the part of 
employees without challenging managerial prerogatives (Hardy and Leiba- 
O'Sullivan, 1998; Harley, 1999). Graham's (1996) research of US--Subaru-Isuzu, 
examines how worker participation in the team culture began with the selection 
process, continued through orientation and training, and was ultimately played out 
on the shop floor. She reveals, however, the contradiction between the company's 
egalitarian philosophy and the realities of the team concept: the responsibility of 
team membership often forces workers to push themselves to the limit in order to 
keep up. This `represents an extension of management control on the shop floor, 
rather than an increase in worker participation and autonomy' (Graham, 1996: 80). 
With the same critical perspective, some authors use the word `hegemonic' 
from Gramsci's hegemonic analysis to explore the operation of lean production in 
Japanese transplants and joint ventures (for example, Dassbach, 1996; Yanarella, 
1996). They argue that lean production processes are permeated by hegemonic 
management control mechanisms, involving them in kaizen processes to 
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appropriate their intellectual capacities and shop floor knowledge as well. Workers 
are encouraged to suggest improvements or modifications to their work routines but 
this `pseudo-participation' occurs within an environment that is rigidly and 
autocratically controlled by management. Individuals cannot innovate on their own 
initiative. Management and team leaders decide which work procedures will be 
modified and how they will be modified, and all changes must be cleared by several 
layers of management before they are implemented (Dassbach, 1996: 24). 
Furthermore, some critics assert that, in essence, the existence of 
management prerogative is because of the fundamental clash of interests and 
imbalance of power between managers and employees. Workers' capacity to make 
decisions is limited, leaving them only free enough to participate in escalating their 
own exploitation (Berggen et al., 1991; Dohse et al., 1985; Parker and Slaughter, 
1988; Turnbull, 1988). 
Others have described cases where the individualising and fragmenting 
consequences of lean production's hegemonic processes upon workers have been 
able to continue with impunity unobstructed by union mediation (Yanarella and 
Green, 1996: 12). For management, ideally, the kaizen process is a means of 
instilling in the workforce a sense of empowerment, an attitude that can reduce 
workers' likelihood of resisting (Rinehart et al., 1994: 156). Graham (1994,1996) 
gives examples of collective and individual spontaneous worker resistance in a non- 
union plant. 
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Unlike developed countries, China had experienced a planned economy 
where the `organised dependency' of workers on their work unit was described in 
Walder's conceptualisation of communist neo-traditionalism. Under such 
`managerial paternalism', Chinese workers enjoyed life-time employment and 
egalitarian principles of remuneration (Mok and He, 1999: 68). China's economic 
reforms, however, broke the `iron rice bowl' and enhanced managerial authority 
(this will be discussed in the next chapter). Management now has power to dismiss 
workers and to decide workers' pay. Workers have found themselves in a 
disadvantageous position in terms of their status in the society. There is, inevitably, 
a trend of decreasing `organised dependency' and an increasing worker dependence 
on managers (You, 1998). This thesis makes a contribution to the debate by 
examining if there is management prerogative when managers implement lean 
production and if managers intend to achieve high profits with a mixture of 
coercion and consent. 
1.2.2.3 Intensification of Labour 
Whilst Womack et al. saw lean production to be a superior technique, they did not 
mention its impact on workers or the quality of working life. Danford (1996: 4) 
indicates that the interests of labour are not the central concern of Womack et al. 's 
research, `the interests of capital are, and in particular, the labour productivity gains 
that might accrue to Western manufacturing firms by adopting the Toyota lean 
production model'. This is echoed by other authors. For example, Stewart (1997: 
229) indicates that the lean production paradigm failed to offer a useful description 
of recent management changes (including the impact of these on employees) or a 
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realistic prescription of what could be done to engineer changes. Milkman (1997: 
15) also indicates that none of the considerable resources supporting the research of 
Womack et al. was used to investigate blue-collar workers' own evaluations of the 
lean production system. 
Kenney and Florida (1988) clearly break with Dohse and his colleagues, who 
explain Japanese success in terms of the super-exploitation of labour. They argue, 
instead, that the objective of JIT is to increase productivity through `increased 
technological efficiency' rather than the exploitation of labour (1988: 136). 
According to Womack et al., lean production requires `half the human effort in the 
factory' compared to traditional mass production. Moreover, kaizen will eliminate 
waste motion and fill idle time and it should, therefore, be possible to make work 
less hard. They are heralding lean production as promoting a significant 
improvement in the quality of working life. 
These claims, however, have been challenged by several authors (Oliver and 
Wilkinson, 1992; Garrahan and Stewart, 1992; Robertson et al., 1997; Graham, 
1995; Berggen, 1995; Danford, 1999) who hold the view that lean production has a 
negative impact on workers, including the intensification of labour, and it is an 
inevitable outcome of management prerogatives. According to Elger and Smith 
(1994: 86), the `management prerogative is used ruthlessly to maintain long hours 
and intensify the work pace in an industrial relations system where there is virtually 
no possibility of individual or collective worker dissent or resistance'. Parker and 
Slaughter argue that workers mainly `participate' in the intensification of their own 
exploitation, mobilising their detailed knowledge of the labour process to help 
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management speed up production and eliminate wasteful work practices (cited in 
Milkman, 1991: 70). Berggren (1992) also points out that `the rhythm and pace of 
work on the assembly line is more inexorable under the Japanese management 
system than it ever was before' (cited in Rinehart et al., 1996: 118). Babson (1996: 
89) reports on a survey of Mazda workers who claim that lean production and 
Kaizen demand more effort, not less; and three out of every four respondents 
reported their workload as being `heavy'. 
Critics give several reasons why lean production makes workers more 
exhausted. Firstly, the work intensity is the direct result of the system and the 
organisation of work it specifies: no buffer inventories, detailed work methods 
closely calibrated to the real work situation, level production, rapid response to any 
breakdowns and error-proofing of the process (Adler, 1995: 213). Moreover, `the 
transfer of indirect production activities to workers without increasing the time 
allocated intensifies work and leads to savings in indirect production personnel' 
(Dorhse et al., 1985: 130). In his case study in an auto components factory in South 
Wales, Danford (1998: 417) observes, `team members moved from machine to 
machine rather than "owning" a single machine. They became involved with 
inspecting and testing their work, ordering materials and inputting information into 
the plant's computerised stores system'. 
Kaizen, particularly, is a means to continually increase work tasks and to 
close up the pores of the working day, ideally to the point where workers operate 
for sixty seconds in every minute. Through the kaizen process workers are expected 
to come up with ideas for eliminating non-value-added labour. Kaizen may result in 
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great efficiency without additional labour input, but any idle time created by kaizen 
can then be filled up with other tasks. Kaizen does not translate into lighter 
workloads, instead, kaizen causes heavy work. 
Moreover, kaizen involves `lean staff, namely, a reduction of the size of the 
workforce. The purpose of kaizen is to remove wasted human effort in order to save 
labour costs. Research by Rinehart et al. indicates that lean staffing was 
exacerbated by CAMI's (CAMI, a GM-Suzuki joint venture in Canada) penchant 
for continuous improvement. `Kaizen dictated the continuous increases in line 
speed without adding workers' (Rinehart et al., 1996: 112). The reductions in the 
workforce resulted in work of remaining workers being made harder and faster. If a 
worker was absent, there were no replacements. Instead, his or her team members 
had to either work faster or, if they were working at their limits, had to work longer 
to meet the quotas (Dassbach, 1996: 27). 
Parker and Slaughter argue that lean production is designed to obligate 
workers to intensified labour in a system called `management by stress'. Under this 
system, workers are stressed because any failure in the process is immediately 
exposed and magnified (Parker and Slaughter, 1995: 44); workers worry about their 
job security as well: whilst the temporary workers fear layoff, the core workers `do 
have to worry about a permanent plant closing' (ibid.: 49); so `stress becomes a 
vital management tool both for monitoring and for forcing all personnel to keep up' 
(ibid.: 44). In the end, `individuals also have good reason to fear that they will not 
be able to survive the intensified work pace' (ibid.: 49). 
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Milkman, in her recent book Farewell to the Factory (1997), studies auto 
workers in the late twentieth century where new model lean production was 
applied. She discloses that few GM-Linden workers who left the factory are 
nostalgic, in large part because they mostly yearned to escape the relentless and 
dehumanising rhythms of the assembly line (Milkman, 1997: 12). 
Intensified labour leads to an increase in injuries and negative impacts on the 
health of workers. Accidents are common because the heightened tempo of 
production causes workers to rush around the factory and take unnecessary risks. 
The survey conducted by Babson shows that 73% of Mazda workers said they 
would be injured or worn out before they reached retirement if they sustained their 
present work intensity. It concludes that, compared to earlier mass production, `lean 
production is at least as dangerous to the health and safety of production workers, if 
not more so (Babson, 1996: 90). 
Some commentators have criticised the lean production system, pointing out 
the ways in which lean production can increase the pace and pressures of work, but 
there has been little effort to document systematically the views of ordinary 
workers (Milkman, 1997: 15). Milkman seeks `to put workers' own experiences 
and voices at the centre' (Milkman, 1997: 191). 
A number of questions arise about Chinese workers. Do they perceive lean 
production to heighten work intensity and stress? How does Chinese management 
utilise lean production techniques to control the pace of work? What are the 
specific social processes in China that affect workers' ability to accept intensified 
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work? What are workers' viewpoints on the impact of lean production on their 
health and safety? If Chinese workers suffer from hard work, what can trade unions 
do to protect the interests of workers? 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis reports the findings from my survey and a case study carried out in the 
Shanghai public sector. The general goal of the research is to contribute to an 
understanding of the implications of economic globalisation for management, 
workers and their unions. In particular, it is concerned with management's 
knowledge of modem management techniques in Shanghai industries, and the 
changes taking place in the auto industry where managers have implemented 
modern management techniques, especially, lean production. It considers the 
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impact of lean production on workers employed in the auto industry in China. 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part one investigates how the 
globalisation of the economy and of management techniques impacts upon 
Shanghai managers in the public sector, in terms of their social characteristics, their 
situations and their knowledge of such techniques. Firstly, it examines managers' 
ages, gender, social origins and education levels and provides a foundation to look 
at how these factors have affected managers' knowledge of modem management 
techniques. Secondly, it analyses how managers are affected by economic reforms, 
payment system reform and employment system reform, in order to advance an 
understanding of the economic and social context. Finally, it explores the extent to 
which managers have knowledge of modern management techniques. It also 
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examines the sources of their knowledge and finds out how economic and social 
factors have affected managers' abilities to receive and disseminate knowledge. 
Chapter 2 seeks to examine how social relations mediate the implementation 
of new management techniques by describing managers' social characteristics 
including managers' origins and backgrounds. It also explores the managers' 
situations in the process of economic globalisation. My survey involving 24 
companies and 1,012 managers indicates the changing trends in terms of 
management's power, pay and job security. A summary of the research 
methodology employed is provided in Appendix A. 
Chapter 3 investigates managers' knowledge of modem management 
techniques and their views on these techniques and it seeks to answer these 
questions: what do managers know of such management techniques? What 
channels make it possible for managers to access international developments in 
management theory and practice? How do managers view modem management 
knowledge? 
Part two concentrates on the case study of the Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corporation (Group) (hereinafter referred to as SAIC), with particular reference to 
eight component suppliers and one bus factory. The case study provides insights 
into lean production practices and its impacts on workers in the auto industry. 
Firstly, it examines the reasons why management in SAIC introduced lean 
production. Secondly, it examines how lean production was implemented. Finally, 
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it analyses how lean production impacted on the labour process, work organisation 
and employment relations. 
Chapter 4 is an introduction to the company--SAIC and its components 
companies. It establishes the context of the introduction of lean production in SAIC 
and components companies in particular, and the Chinese auto industry in general. 
It will show that the component suppliers were under pressure to implement lean 
production following its implementation in a core car manufacturing enterprise, 
which is a joint-venture company. The chapter also outlines the process and 
characteristics of the emulation of lean production. 
Chapter 5 looks at the application of lean production in the production 
process. It describes how managers build up their lean production systems; where 
their ideas came from; and what they did. It discusses the underlying reasons for the 
introduction of lean production. It also provides an initial account of how managers 
and workers viewed the resultant changes. The initial attempt of management was 
to increase productivity through increased technological efficiency and decreased 
inventories. However, this necessarily involved stricter management control. 
Chapter 6 uses survey data to disclose, in detail, how the application of lean 
production heightened work intensity and work related stress. It will be seen that 
most workers reported that their jobs made them work very hard, one quarter of 
workers thought they never seemed to have enough time to get their job done and 
two-fifths of workers worried a lot about their work outside working hours. There 
is also a comparison between the views of Chinese workers and British workers, 
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utilising data from the British 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS 
98). This chapter documents how some specific management techniques in labour 
utilisation and work pace control resulted in the intensification of labour. Finally, 
the chapter assesses the both positive and negative impact of lean production on 
workers' health and safety. 
Chapter 7 addresses the changes taking place in work organisation, with an 
emphasis on the application of team working and kaizen. This chapter focuses 
attention on contested worker participation, new types of management control, and 
workers' skill levels. Workers' different views on team working, kaizen and 
training are reported. It reveals how the economy and society in China affected 
workers' perceptions of the changes in organisation. 
Chapter 8 examines the role of the trade unions in both national and 
enterprise level. The Chinese labour market has been deregulated and management 
autonomy has provided managers a free hand to deal with labour, ACFTU impose 
changes to act on behalf of workers' interests. However, unions in the enterprise 
level are facing problems to make changes. Workers saw unions as part of 
management, they also complained that unions failed to have any effective impact 
on management decision making, particularly in workers' pay levels and layoffs. 
The conclusion attempts to draw together the threads of the previous chapters, 
and suggests that this case can be seen as characteristics of the emergence of lean 
production in a developing country--China. 
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Part One 
Survey of Managers in Shanghai Public Sector 
Chapter Two 
Managers' Situation during the Economic Transition 
This chapter presents a portrait of the managers' situation in the public sector across 
Shanghai. It investigates key sociological variables including managers' ages, 
gender, social origins and education levels. This chapter explores changes taking 
place during the economic transition in terms of managers' power, payment and job 
security, drawing on an investigation into the views of managers amongst 24 
companies in 8 industries of Shanghai. It looks at how managers' perceptions of 
pay and job security varied in different age groups and job levels, in order to 
advance an understanding of the complex processes that lay behind their social 
polarisation. 
2.1 Social Characteristics of Managers 
My survey data indicate that management entry into a managerial position was 
more likely through promotion (68%) than recruitment from outside the enterprises 
(11 %). The dominant way of recent promotion was `appointment' which was made 
by both executive and Party members in the company. In addition, a few managers 
(9%) were elected and, rarely, transferred from other companies. The economic 
transition led to changes to the constitution of managers in SOEs. The closing or 
downsizing of SOEs caused a decline in the number of managers in general. The 
shift of former managers in SOEs to non-public sectors also entailed personnel 
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changes in the individual company, so it is necessary to give a picture of the social 
characteristics of managers in Shanghai SOEs. 
2.1.1 Age and Job Level 
It is essential to have some knowledge of when particular events occurred in order 
to provide the necessary explanatory information with which to contextualise the 
findings (Davies, 1994). At the time the research took place (1999), managers were 
divided into three age categories: up to the age of 35, aged between 36 and 50 
inclusive, aged 51 and upwards. Age stratification in this way not only considered 
the different stages of life course, but more importantly, it reflected the influences 
of social development in China. I looked at cohorts with different experiences of the 
Cultural Revolution, which took place from 1966 to 1976 in China. 
Table 2.1 shows the age range of each group at selected years. During the 
Cultural Revolution, the youngest managers, aged up to 35, were up to 12 years old 
and had not entered secondary school. So they were the least affected by the 
Cultural Revolution. They had more opportunities to access good education and 
obtained their first jobs after the economic reforms which started in 1977. They are 
now moving towards the most productive stage of their life course. Managers in the 
middle age group, aged between 36 and 50, were teenagers and youths when the 
Cultural Revolution ended. Some of them lost opportunities to study in universities 
in their 20s. They are now in the most productive stage of their life course. 
Members of the third group, who are aged 51 and above, had experienced the 
Cultural Revolution when they were aged 18 upwards, living in the hard period 
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when the country suffered great difficulty. They were moving from employment 
into retirement in 1999 (when the survey was conducted) and are especially 
vulnerable at a time of economic transition. Amongst the survey sample, around 
half the managers (52%) were found to be in the middle age group. The youngest 
managers (29%) constituted the next largest group and the oldest managers 
accounted for 19%. In general, the average age of managers is 42, the youngest one 
is 20 years old and the oldest one is aged 64. 
Table 2.1 The Age Range of Each Cohort at Selected Years. 
Birth year Age at 1966 Age at 1976 Age at 1999 
Later than 1963 
1949--1963 
Earlier than 1949 
Up to 2 
3-47 
18 and above 
Up to 12 
13--27 
28 and above 
Up to 35 
36-50 
51 and above 
Managers in industry can be stratified by different administrational levels, 
namely junior, middle and senior managers. Studies of management in these 
different levels have revealed different characteristics. For example, one study 
suggests that middle managers are feeling pressured from above and below; 
employees are now more questioning of middle managers' decisions and their 
activities are placed under greater scrutiny from senior managers (Wilkinson et al., 
1993). Middle and junior managers may feel themselves to be excluded from 
`management' (Scase and Goffee, 1989). In this research, junior managers refer to 
those who are at the entry level of the managerial hierarchy according to the cadre 
administration system in China. Middle managers refer to those who are responsible 
for management at departmental level and are ready for the senior level after several 
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years. Senior managers refer to those who are at the top of the hierarchy and engage 
in the overall planning and running of the whole company. In the survey sample, 
middle managers constitute the largest group, which is 48% of the total, compared 
with junior managers (40%) and senior managers (12%). 
Table 2.2 Distribution of Managers at Different Levels by Age Group. 
Junior (%) Middle (%) Senior (%) 
<36 46 19 8 
36--50 46 54 66 
>50 8 27 26 
Total N=1,012 
From Table 2.2, it can be seen that there is a remarkable disparity in 
managerial position across age groups. Most senior managers (66%) are in the 
middle age group. It is less likely that junior managers are aged over 50 (8%) or that 
senior managers are under the age of 36 (8%). Amongst middle managers, middle 
aged managers (54%) are almost three times as common as the younger groups 
(19%) and double the number of older managers. 
2.1.2 Birth Place and Gender 
Those SOE managers in Shanghai who were locally born in Shanghai (81%) 
outnumber those from other cities. The second largest group (14%) is from the six 
provinces in the HuaDong area, which is made up of the nearest provinces to 
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Shanghai such as Jiangsu and Zejiang. Only 4% of managers come from other 
areas. For example, the director of Chem-11 was born in Jiang xi. 
Regarding managers' gender overall, the proportion of male managers (75%) 
is treble that of female managers (25%). The percentage of female managers is 
related to the nature of the industry. About one quarter of female managers (24%) 
are working in the textile industry which, in China, is a female occupation. Very 
few female managers (around 1%) work in the transportation industry. 
Table 2.3 Managers' Distribution by Gender. 
Male (%) Female (%) 
Age <36 25 40 
36--50 52 52 
>50 23 8 
Job level Junior 34 59 
Middle 52 35 
Senior 14 6 
Total N=1012 
Table 2.3 provides evidence that female managers in the youngest group 
(40%) make up five times the number of those in the oldest group (8%). However, 
the proportion of middle aged female managers (amongst female managers) is the 
same as that of middle aged male managers (amongst male managers). This may be 
explained by the fact that more women with high qualifications have been promoted 
1 Each enterprise visited was given a code that is composed of the shortened name of an industrial 
section and a number which represents an enterprise in this section. These industrial sections are 
Automotive, Electric, Chemical, Public services, Construction, Textile, Light industry, and 
Transportation. The first case in the chemical industry is coded as Chem-1. 
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to managerial positions since the development of the Chinese economy and society. 
It seems that more women occupy junior level managerial positions (59%) 
(amongst female managers) than men (35%) (amongst male managers). By contrast, 
fewer women (6%) (amongst female managers) make up senior manager's positions 
than men (14%) (amongst male managers). 
2.1.3 Father's and Spouse's Occupations 
Table 2.4 illustrates that managers' fathers are less likely to have professional jobs 
(16%) than their spouses (27%). By contrast, the ratio of managers whose fathers 
are manual workers (41%) is higher than those managers whose spouses are manual 
workers (26%). Managers may receive more help in establishing networks from 
their spouses than they do from their fathers. It seems that the occupations of 
managers' fathers do not have a strong relationship with the managers' careers 
because 41% of managers' fathers are manual workers, accounting for the largest 
group. 
Table 2.4 Occupational Distribution of Managers' Spouses and Fathers. 
Unit: % 
Worker Professional Cadre Clerk Peasant Others 
Father 41 16 16 17 46 
(n=901) 
Spouse 26 27 18 21 08 
(n=758) 
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It is known that peasants comprise 80% of the Chinese population. However, 
only 4% of managers come from peasant families. Because the government has set 
up the `urban residence registration system' (hu kou) to limit peasants' access to 
urban areas, only those sons or daughters of peasants that have graduated from 
universities can work in Shanghai SOEs. 
A comparison of father's occupations is made between managers at different 
age groups, as presented in Table 2.5. Younger managers (32%) are less likely to 
have fathers in manual work than those in the middle age group (46%). This reflects 
the fact that the occupational inheritance of jobs (ding ti) from parents to offspring 
was phased out in the 80s. Few young managers were recruited in the old 
employment system. 
Table 2.5 The Father's Occupations of Managers by Age group and Job Level. 
Unit: % 
Age Job level 
<36 36--50 >50 Junior Middle Senior 
Worker 32 46 40 39 40 46 
Professional 25 13 14 17 17 11 
Cadre 18 16 11 17 15 18 
Clerk 10 18 22 16 16 23 
Peasant 9 1 6 5 4 1 
Others 6 6 7 6 8 1 
Total N=901 
It seems that manager's careers are not closely related to their social origin. 
The fact that a manager's father is a manual worker has not been a barrier to being a 
senior manager. There is high proportion of senior managers (46%) whose fathers 
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are workers, compared to middle managers (40%) and junior managers (39%). By 
contrast, there are lower proportion of senior managers (11%) who came from 
families with fathers who are professionals, when compared with middle managers 
(17%) and junior managers (17%). 
The managers originating from the working class are conscious of their 
disadvantaged backgrounds and experience difficulties in their career 
developments, as Huang stated: 
I was born in Shanghai in 1960. My father is a worker. I got my job cutting 
rubber in a chemical firm in 1980. After ten years of simple operation and 
extreme efforts, I got a chance to enter a managerial position (a middle 
manager in Chem-1). 
2.1.4 Educational Background 
It has been considered that the educational background of managers is an important 
social feature. According to China's education systems, elementary and secondary 
schooling lasts 10 to 12 years. A student in a polytechnic college normally spends 
three years to gain a diploma. A student in a university can get a first degree after 
four or five years' successful study. In general, managers who have diplomas (46%) 
are more prevalent than those who have first degrees (22%). Few are postgraduates 
(2%) and nearly three out of ten managers have never been to college or university. 
The difference in educational level of managers in the three age groups may 
mirror the changes in manager's qualifications. It is found that younger managers 
40 
have a better education than the rest of the groups. It can be observed in Table 2.6 
that the youngest managers (42%) who possess a first degree number more than 
three times those of middle age managers (11%) and about twice those of older 
managers (23%). The proportion of managers with secondary school education 
drops from 35% in the middle age group to 17% in the youngest group. Entry into a 
managerial position has been linked to educational qualifications. The piece of 
paper--a qualification certificate is increasingly seen as being important. 
Table 2.6 Schooling of Managers by Age Group and Job Level. 
Unit: % 
Age Job level 
<36 36--50 >50 Junior Middle Senior 
Secondary school 17 35 31 36 24 25 
College 36 53 44 42 48 57 
University 42 11 23 21 25 15 
Postgraduate school 512133 
Total N=1,004 
On the other hand, it appears that older managers have slightly better 
educations than middle aged managers because there are twice as many older 
managers who have first degrees (23%) than middle aged managers (11%). This 
may be explained by the fact that older managers probably gained their first degree 
before the Cultural Revolution during which universities closed or stopped 
recruiting students. After a decade of chaos, universities have returned to normal 
since 1977. Education at college and university has been increasingly supported by 
the government. Middle aged managers suffered mostly from this loss. When 
managers were asked `how did the Cultural Revolution affect you, 80% of middle 
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aged managers pointed to their education levels. Some managers obtained 
qualifications later through arduous part-time study whilst working. Director Hong 
stated his experience as follows: 
I graduated from secondary school during the Cultural Revolution and I had 
no chance to go to University. I know, having a degree is a big advantage. I 
went on to take a part-time diploma course in Law in the TV University (dian 
da, an equivalent of the Open University in the UK) from 1985 to 1988. From 
last year, I have been studying the Market Economy for a master degree whilst 
I am at my post. It will last for three years (in Publ-1,45 years old). 
Huang, a middle manager in Chem-1,38 years old, told his story: 
I went to a primary school in 1967 and graduated from a high school in 1978. 
I did a part-time diploma course in Enterprise Management in a technology 
college from 1985 to 1988. You know, in those days, I went straight to the 
college when I finished my job. It took me two hours by bicycle. I have been 
studying for a first degree in Economic Management since 1995 part time as 
well. 
Looking at managers at the three job levels, three out of four senior managers 
and middle managers have a diploma, at least, from a polytechnic college. This 
means that a degree is insisted upon when selecting a senior or middle manager. 
The work experience of candidates and work-related training they received is also 
considerable. However, 36% of junior managers only attended secondary school. 
This might be because those less qualified managers have been promoted more 
slowly. 
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Most candidates for promotion or recruitment require the minimum of a 
degree in the relevant discipline. About three out of five managers in all three levels 
have studied a technology related discipline. In this sample, these disciplines are 
mechanical engineering, electrical and electronic studies, automation and computer 
skills, chemistry and textile studies. About one-third of managers studied for 
management at universities. Only a very small proportion of managers studied the 
social sciences (5%). 
2.1.5 Work Experience 
In the survey sample, two-fifths of managers worked in the production department 
including the shop floor; 13% of managers were in the research department; 
followed by managers who were in the department of personnel (10%); 
administration (9%) and finance (9%). The length of time spent in their present 
company and their mobility makes up the features of manager's careers. It is 
evident that the majority of movement still take place within the public sector. Few 
managers had been to the countryside (5%) or were members of the military (2%). 
A small number of managers (6%) had even worked in joint-venture companies. 
Less than 1% of managers worked in foreign funded or private companies. 
The evidence from Table 2.7 shows there is mobility between companies. The 
percentage of managers who worked more than 30 years (31%) is higher than that 
of managers who had more than 30 years' service in their present company (19%). 
By contrast, the percentage of the managers who had less than 11 years' service 
(21%) is lower than that of managers who had less than 11 years' service in their 
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present company (31%). Whilst some mobility of managers was due to individual 
factors, some movement between companies resulted from the restructuring of 
companies. 
Table 2.7 Length of Working Life and Length of Time in Present Company. 
Number of years Length of working life Length of time in present 
(%) (n=1,011) company (%) (n=1,008) 
10 and below 21 31 
11 to 20 19 31 
21 to 30 29 19 
31 and above 31 19 
To sum up, although the educational level of managers in the Shanghai public 
sector is not high overall, there has been a considerable change in the manager's 
educational levels. Those male managers who come from working families and 
possessed at least a diploma are dominant in Shanghai SOEs. In spite of their social 
origins, these managers are undertaking the most difficult tasks to sustain the state 
economic base. 
2.2 Determinants of Managerial Power during the Economic 
Reforms 
2.2.1 `Director (Manager) Responsibility System' in Its Historical Context 
In 1984, the introduction of the `director (manager) responsibility system' 
(chanzhang jinli fuzhezhi) granted managers significant powers to run enterprises in 
the market economy. Doubtlessly, this resulted in the changes in the system of 
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enterprise leadership. Under the previous `director responsibility system under the 
leadership of the Party', Party committees had great power to make decisions on 
key production and personnel affairs. Directors (managers) were mere executors of 
the decisions made by the committees. Workers' Congresses, for which trade 
unions acted as agents, also enjoyed some rights of approval over management 
policy. Key relationships under the `director responsibility system under the 
leadership of the Party' are outlined in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Key Relationships under the `Director Responsibility System under 
the Leadership of the Party'. 









Key: --+ indicates an authority link; "-. "' º indicates similar links but of a weak or unclear 
kind. CPC=Communist Party of China; ACFTU=All-China Federation of Trade Unions. 
Source: adapted from Child, 1994: Figure 4.2. 
Under the `director (manager) responsibility system', directors (managers) 
play a dominant role in running enterprises, the Party committee no longer serves as 
the leading organ in enterprises. Party committees actively assist directors in their 
authority and supervise the implementation of government policies. According to 
the Enterprise Law of 1988, the Workers' Congress is the highest legitimate body 
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within a state owned enterprise and has limited power in relation to management, 
including receiving reports from directors and discussing general strategic issues. In 
practice, however, the Workers' Congress hardly ever oversees directors, and their 
decisions may be rejected by management. The unions, under the leader of the 
Party, are not perceived as an independent political force within enterprises and 
have became weaker due to the decline of the Party's role. Key relationships under 
this system are shown in Figure 2.2. 
















Key: -a indicates an authority link; -4 """" º indicates reciprocal links of authority or 
influence;. ". "'. º indicates similar links but of a weak or unclear kind. CPC=Communist 
Party of China; ACFTU=All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Source: adapted from 
Child, 1994: Figure 4.3. 
In 1993, the central government and the CPC decided to establish a `modem 
enterprise system' (xian dai qi ye zhi du), namely, the corporate system (gong si 
zhi), in an attempt to restructure property rights in SOEs, through transferring the 
existing assets into shares, absorbing investments to increase the capital and 
46 
Party 10, rnmmittan 
reorganising enterprises into limited company and limited share companies 
(Shanghai Economy Year Book, 1995: 28). The Corporate Law, issued in 1993, is 
the legal basis for setting up companies in China. Figure 2.3 illustrates the key 
relationships in corporatised SOEs'. The new management system was called the 
`general managers responsibility system under the leadership of the board of 
directors' in some corporatised SOEs. 
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Key: -- indicates an authority link; .... º indicates reciprocal links of authority or 
influence. ......... indicates similar links but of a weak or unclear kind. CPC=Communist 
Party of China; ACFTU=A11-China Federation of Trade Unions. 
Strictly speaking, when SOEs are corporatised with diversified equity ownership, they should no 
longer be regarded as SOEs. However, because the state hold the majority, I shall employ terms such 
as 'corporatised SOEs' and SOEs in the later chapters. 
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According to the Corporate Law, the power of decision making comes from 
shareholders. The policy making body is the meeting of the board of directors who 
are voted upon by shareholder's meetings, the executive body is the management 
team headed by the general manager who is appointed by the board of directors, and 
the supervisory body is the supervisory committee. It is clear that although 
managers play essential roles, they are theoretically subject to the shareholders. But 
little change occurred over several years and the process of establishment of the 
corporate system was slow. 
2.2.2 Management Power under the `Modern Enterprise System' 
In Shanghai, the `modern enterprise system' was formally launched in November 
1994 and its framework was initially shaped in 1997. Amongst 250 pilot enterprises 
in the modem enterprise system, 243 were transformed into the company-system, 
accounting for 97% and amongst the 2,725 enterprises affiliated to them, 79% 
completed the transformation. Shanghai approved 102 founder's joint-stock 
companies, 5 listed companies and 1,923 companies with limited liability 
(Shanghai Economy Year Book, 1998: 30). The municipal administration office of 
state-owned assets was set up to be responsible for state-owned assets. 
In theory, management power in a corporatised company is limited. In reality, 
however, management power is valid to a large extent in a corporatised company. 
Three main reasons for this are identified as below. Firstly, the board of directors 
and supervisory committee have not fully utilised their roles. According to official 
reports in 1997, amongst 200 enterprises which were carrying out the experiment of 
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the `modern enterprise system' in Shanghai, 26% of the enterprises had neither a 
board of directors nor a supervisory committee. For those enterprises with a 
supervisory committee, 54% of the committees had not held even one meeting; 
42% of them had not examined financial statement; 61 % of them had not submitted 
their supervisory reports and 63% of them had not made the duties of their members 
clear. In the enterprises with a board of directors, 38% of general managers were 
not nominated by the chairman of the meeting of board, and 32% of general 
managers were not appointed by the chairman of board of directors. It is also 
observed that corporatised SOEs were still `run as before by supervisory 
departments instead of shareholders' meetings' (Lau, 2000: 60). Although many 
SOEs had been formally transformed into the corporate system, in reality it was 
difficult to find a company that operated in line with the Corporate Law (Jin, 1997: 
223). 
The second possible reason for the lack of implementation is that chairmen of 
boards of directors have no strong motivation to enhance the value of state property. 
For corporatised large and medium-sized SOEs in China, state equity still 
comprises the overwhelming majority, that is, various property rights of ownership 
remain in the hands of state organs. A chairman of a board of directors is appointed 
as a legal-person representative to administrate property rather than as an owner. 
Furthermore, managers can make decisions, not only on managerial 
operations as before, but also on dealing with property because most of them are 
members of the board. Because of the government policy of `taking a firm grip on 
the large, let the small go', more and more state equities are brought together by 
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merging and restructuring. Hence, a manager may run an enterprise with more and 
more equities than in the past. 
At the time of survey, when the `modern enterprise system' had only recently 
been introduced, it was impossible to investigate its operation and to reveal 
significant shifts in practice. My research shows that general managers or directors 
still had unique power on many grounds in corporatised SOEs. Middle manager Xu 
in Publ-1 told me that he and other middle managers only followed what the general 
manager said. The manager Wang on the shop floor of Text-1 indicated that the 
`director (manager) responsibility system' was still applied in the sub-companies or 
works where general managers checked and assessed the performance of middle 
managers. Director Fu in Chem-1 was called `the number one in the firm' because 
he had great power to make decisions. Chen in Elec-2 gave a detailed explanation: 
In our company, both the chairman of board and the general manager were 
appointed by higher level officials, this is not in line with the Corporate Law. 
The development of the company directly depends upon the general manager. 
The shareholder meeting is only a formal ritual. In those SOEs which have not 
been transferred to diversified equity ownership companies, directors still 
play a dominant role (the head of the enterprise management office). 
2.2.3 Views on the `Director (Manager) Responsibility System' 
The survey (see Figure 2.4) clearly shows that senior managers (83%) were more 
satisfied with the reforms in decision making than middle (70%) and junior 
managers (52%). Senior managers complained less than others. This indicates that 
senior managers enjoyed great managerial power in corporatised SOEs. 
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0 no change 
Table 2.8 Managers' Views on the `Director Responsibility System' and Views 
on Changes in Decision Making by Age Group. 
Unit: % 
Viable Views <36 36--50 >50 
Decision --.. _................ _. _.............. .. . _.. --..... _ ............. making Better 
_... _ ..... --. _...... ---. _. _.. _. _. 65 _... -. _. __. _-__-......... _... __.. __.... _.. 69 .. _. _... _..... _.. _.......... _.. _.. ----.. __.. _...... _....... _... 60 
(n=669) Worse 8 12 23 
No change 27 19 17 
DRS Very reasonable 39 38 32 
(n=891) Basically 54 59 63 
reasonable 
Unreasonable 7 3 5 
This is in line with the result which found that middle aged managers who felt 
more involved in decision making (69%) numbered more than those managers in 
the youngest (65°A) or oldest (60%) (see Table 2.8). It reflected the fact that 66°/0 of 
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senior managers are in the middle age group. In general, there is no big difference 
between managers in the three age groups (see Table 2.8). 
Figure 2.5 provides evidence that more than 92% of managers at different 
levels expressed positive opinions on the `director (manager) responsibility system'. 
It is also found that senior managers were more likely to rate it `reasonable' because 
43% of them answered that the `director (ºnanager) responsibility system' was `very 
reasonable' and 4% answered `unreasonable'. These positive ratings were lower 
amongst junior managers (33% and 8% respectively). 


























The extent to which the Party influences managerial decision-making varies 
between companies. The Party is still playing an important role in economic affairs 
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in some SOEs where the Party secretary is also the chairman of the board. In my 
survey sample, there are at least eight companies where Party secretaries are 
chairmen of the board. It is an easy way to carry out managerial control, as director 
Fu in Chem-1 put it: 
I think there is no difference between the Party and administration in my 
holding company where the Chairman of the board is a Party secretary. In my 
firm, although I have the right to make important decisions independently, I 
always discuss these issues with the Party secretary in advance. 
In other cases, the power of many party secretaries in enterprises was greatly 
reduced after the introduction of the `director (manager) responsibility system'. As 
Party secretary Wu in Cons-3 indicated: 
The 'director (manager) responsibility system' has resulted in a significant 
increase in director's power over decision making and a decline in the 
influence enjoyed by Party secretaries. The Party committee in enterprises 
still supervises directors to carry out the Party's policies, but it is no longer 
the unique force dominant in economic work as it was before the reforms. 
The party secretary at Text-1 admitted that the Party committee implemented the 
director's decisions. Jiang, who was a former manager in 1995, stated how he dealt 
with the shift in his position: 
When I was no longer a manager I felt the loss deeply. I tried to understand 
the change. Now I can fully support the manager. In fact, the most important 
thing is to increase the productivity of our company. We will benefit if the 
enterprise is successful. So it would be useless to see power as very important 
(the Party secretary in Publ-1). 
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Whilst some management power remains in the new enterprise system, most 
managers are particularly worried about the corruption caused by reduced 
accountability when supervision has not worked well. A middle manager Xu in 
Cons-3 pointed out: 
The director or senior manager is responsible for the enterprise. He has to 
restrain himself and be honest in performing his official duties. Some 
managers and directors abuse their power. Indeed, it is difficult to supervise 
them. 
During the period of my first fieldwork trip (1998), 1 went to a textile firm, 
which had a 70 year history and a famous brand of product. It changed from a 
profit-making firm to a loss-making one dramatically within four years. One of the 
main reasons was that the former director was arrested because of corruption. He 
gave permission to a township level enterprise for utilising the famous brand of his 
firm, in return, he accepted RMB 100,000. As a result, the poor quality of the 
township level enterprise ruined the brand production of the textile firm. The same 
thing occurred in a Steel and Iron Company, where the former director put the 
company budget into his pocket. 
The scholars I interviewed were also concerned about the supervision of 
managers. Professor Li indicated that asset stripping was a common problem in 
SOEs. State property to the value of 100 billion a year has been lost on average 
since the 1980s. One of the most serious factors was that managers and officials 
used state assets for personal gain. In some instances managers mismanaged state 
assets in a bid, made illegal sales of state assets or undervalued state assets even in 
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legal sales. Professor Feng, of the Chinese Workers' Movement College (CWMC), 
which is a major training base of the ACFTU for senior union leaders, emphasised 
that Workers' Congresses in SOEs should exercise their role of supervision: 
After the Cultural Revolution, some senior managers spontaneously pursued 
their own interests. They wanted to get compensation for their losses during 
the Cultural Revolution. Workers' congresses in SOEs should supervise 
managers. However, the trade unions cannot exercise their power 
independently (Feng, 1998). 
Professor Zhang in Shanghai gave his opinion about the shareholder meeting: 
Shareholders' meetings in corporatised SOEs are theoretically able to exercise 
their role of supervision by voting for the board of directors and general 
managers. In practice, managements act as agents of the state to run 
enterprises, it is easy to create `inter-personal control'. Some shareholders 
have no motivation to supervise assessment criterion for good enterprise 
management (Zhang, 1999). 
Previous research carried out by Laaksonen shows that power was greatly 
centralised in the hands of top management of enterprises, this phenomenon was 
illustrated in the great power distance between top and middle management in 
China (cited in Warner, 1995: 150). During my fieldwork, my main impression was 
that some middle and junior managers did not regard themselves as managers 
because they had too little power to demonstrate their status. Senior managers had 
much greater power than that of middle and junior managers in both personal and 
economic affairs, as Fu pointed out: 
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The increased difference between managers is an inevitable trend. The key 
reason is that managers at different levels have different responsibilities and 
power. Directors are deeply aware of their superiority and power (the director 
of Chem-1). 
To sum up, the `director (manager) responsibility system' provides the 
foundation for the new management regime and makes it possible for management 
prerogatives to be exercised over labour. Management came to have much greater 
power, not only to modify production technology and work organisation, but also to 
recruit, promote, reward and dismiss employees. Management prerogatives have 
not been limited to carrying out the `modern enterprise system'. Employees remain 
vulnerable to economic and social changes. 
2.3 Disparity of Pay amongst Managers 
2.3.1 The Reform of the Payment System 
A number of researchers have drawn attention to changes in the payment system in 
China during the economic reforms (Child, 1994; Mark, 1995; Warner, 1995). In 
the pre-reform era, characterised as `organised dependence' (Walder, 1986), 
employees were highly dependent upon their work units (danweis), and the payment 
system was based on unified planning made by the government. All people had to 
share an equally but relatively low wage `eating out of a big rice pot' (daguofan) 
(Leung, 1994). As Warner (1997: 577) noted: 
We see strong egalitarianism: minimal reward differentials within categories 
of worker, largely based on age, length of service and political loyalty; 
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minimal differentials between categories (factory boss and workers, for 
example); a rigid eight-grade wage system (sixteen for cadres)...... 
Some researchers have found that the pay differential between managers at 
different levels was no more than threefold (Gen, 1998: 43), with the absolute value 
small, i. e. about several hundreds RMB units. 
A series of payment structure reforms, which started in the mid-1980s, have 
taken place in the past two decades. The aim was to motive employees by gradually 
moving to a performance based system. Deng Xiao Ping (1984) had previously 
called for distribution according to the quantity and quality of an individual's work 
including performance, technical level and actual contribution. The `floating 
payment system' (fudong gongzi zhi) was then widely adopted in SOEs. This 
payment system was based on the previous system and started to relate to collective 
or individual performance. In particular, this system involved total enterprise 
payroll contracts with the government, linking to the fulfilment of a predetermined 
enterprise performance indicator such as profit, sales or a measure of output. 
Management's power over individual payment was limited. The introduction of the 
`director (managers) responsibility system' granted enterprise management more 
power in determining an individual employee's pay. The `structural payment 
system' (jieguo gongzi zhi), which broke from the planned payment system and 
established a closer connection between pay and individual performance, was 
launched in late 1984. It comprised four main elements: basic pay (jichu gongzi), 
post pay (zhiwu gongzi), seniority supplements (gonglingjintie) and bonus (Jiang 
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fin). It should be noted that this payment system reform tried to give all employees, 
rather than managers in particular, more incentive. 
In 1992, the `post-plus-skill' (gangji gongzi zhi) model was adopted. It shifted 
away from an age and service related pay structure to a job evaluated system. 
Individual pay was thus adjusted in the light of the individual's performance rating, 
as measured by core skills for each grade and position within the pay scale. 
Accordingly, managers with a good performance could get higher pay. In fact, there 
was some evidence that managers did not apply the new payment system because a 
large income gap would discourage other employees (Li, 1992: 172). Pay disparity 
become acute amongst different occupational groups in the 1990s (Mok, 1995). 
When the economic reforms progressed, although some SOEs had improved 
their performance, the majority still faced the problem of low efficiency. It was 
believed that the crux was that top managers were not given sufficient incentives 
due to low income as compared with those in non-state-owned enterprises. Here, 
top manager refers to the managers at the top executive level. It may be general 
managers in corporatised SOEs or legal representatives in SOEs. 
In 1993, the `annual salary system' (nian xin zhi) was introduced in order to 
motivate top managers. Accordingly, top managers' salaries were separated from 
employees' salaries and were linked to their responsibility, risk and economic 
efficiency in one year. Local governments practiced the new payment system in 
various ways. In 1994, the State Council issued the `contract administration rules', 
which made the provision that top managers' incomes must be less than three times 
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the employees' average salaries. In practice, some top managers' incomes exceeded 
the limit set by the government. By contrast, some general managers had not 
applied the `annual salary system' because they feared it would undermine 
employee motivation and commitment. 
Bonuses are another important component of the Chinese motivation system. 
Starting in 1979, enterprises were able to generate large bonuses which were linked 
to their total annual salary bill. In 1985, the norm for an enterprise's annual total of 
bonus payments was raised to four months of the year's salary bill. Within this 
restriction on the total allocation to the bonuses, managers could decide the amount 
of bonuses for their employees according to their performance. For example, 
production workers received bonuses according to output, quality and timekeeping. 
Although many Chinese enterprises increased their bonuses dramatically in the late 
1980s, the differential between managers and workers and even between managers 
was not large. Due to poor performance, subsidies and bonuses were taken away 
from loss making SOEs. 
2.3.2 The Polarisation of Managers' Pay 
There is a varying payment structure in different companies. The most popular 
payment structure is the `post-plus-skill' system although different companies adopt 
different amounts in respect of post and grade. For example, there are 5 main grades 
amongst workers in Chem-1 and 8 main grades for workers in Publ-1. However, 
Text-1 uses `hidden pay' which means that the wage and bonus of an employee are 
decided directly and separately from the director and are not known by others. 
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Another exception is Elec-3, where the length of service is added to the payment 
structure because there are many old workers who have very long service but 
relatively low skill, and post and skill are the other two elements. In particular, the 
payment structure of auto companies is the `post + performance + seniority (gang 
wei + xiao yi + gong lin)'. 
Table 2.9 Average Annual Pay in Selected Shanghai SOEs. 
Employee's Middle Top manager's Employee's 
Companies average manager's pay pay plus 
bonus average 
pay bonus 
Auto-1 24,000 36,000 100,000 5,000-12,000 
Auto-4 23,000 36,000 80,000 10,000 
Elec-1 12,000 18,000 60,000 14,000-20,000 
Elec-3 11,000 15,000 100,000 varies 
Chem-1 15,000 16,000 80,000 6,000-14,400 
Publ-1 12,000 14,000-30,000 100,000 400--3,000 
Cons-3 25,000 25,000-80,000 100,000 
Text-1 10,200 12,000 * 0- 3,000 
Tran-1 12,000 12,000-21,600 36,000 0 
Tran-2 6,000 10,000 * 0 
Note: * missing data. 
Table 2.9 shows the difference in overall average salary levels in the ten 
companies, which is based upon interviews with top managers or middle managers 
in these companies and does not precisely represent their payment structure. Table 
2.9 indicates that top managers were paid RMB 36,000 to RMB 100,000 which is 
more than 3 times the average wage of employees. The ratio of middle managers' 
wage to the average wage varies from 1.2: 1 to 3: 1. The pay differentials between 
industries are strongly associated with the performance of companies. The average 
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wage of employees in SOEs in Shanghai in 1997 was RMB 11,733 and the 
proportion of bonus to total wage was 29% (Shanghai Economy Year Book, 1998: 
304). In addition to their wages, all employees in auto companies have fringe 
benefits, supplementary old-age pension insurance and a supplementary housing 
accumulation fund (this will be discussed in Chapter 8). 
Several conditions are suggested by the following discussion: (1) Income 
disparity is apparently enlarged between top managers and other management in the 
same SOE. Top manager's pay in the companies that carry out the `annual salary 
system'(nina xin zhi) is higher than those in the companies that do not apply the 
`annual salary system'. (2) The income of middle contracted managers is higher 
than those who have not signed contracts with the companies. (3) A gap is 
enlarging in SOEs across industrial sectors which show different performance. 
2.3.3 The Factors Influencing Differences in Managers' Pay 
2.3.3.1 The `Annual Salary System' and Top Managers' Income 
The polarisation of managers' incomes results from the payment system. In order to 
set up mechanisms of `interest risk' for top managers, the Shanghai municipal 
government has, since 1993, encouraged some enterprises to apply the `annual 
salary system' (nina xin zhi). In 1998, the government suggested that excellent top 
managers might be rewarded a certain amount of enterprise forward shares, 
supplementary pension or compensation for taking a risk. The aim is to link the 
interest of top managers to the fate of enterprises. In my survey sample, 40% of 
Shanghai companies have applied the `annual salary system' (nina xin zhi) whilst 
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15.5% of total companies at the national level have done the same. The director of 
Publ-1 explained: 
Under the `annual salary system' (nian xin zhi), I signed a contract with the 
upper administration, which includes targets and duties such as safety, 
accident rates, employee training, service quality, vehicle maintenance and 
profits and so on. The upper administration determines my salary level which 
links up with the company's equity, my responsibility, business risks and 
work achievement. My salary is comprised of a basic salary which is 3 times 
as much as an employee's salary, and bonuses vary according to my 
performance. It will be recalculated after the assessment at the end of year. 
This payment system encourages me to work hard in order to improve the 
performance of the company. 
His annual salary including bonus was about RMB 100,000 in 1998 whilst the 
average wages of employees, at that time, was RMB 10,000. It is 10 times the 
employee's average wage. Of the RMB 100,000,60% is made up of bonuses. The 
director of Chem-1 told me that his pay was related to his successful management. 
He received RMB 40,000 salary and RMB 40,000 bonus in 1998. This top 
manager's real salary was higher than employees in his firm expected. In some 
cases, for example, in Elec-3, employees knew that their top manager would get a 
salary of RMB 100,000 if the company fulfilled the quotas. The `annual salary 
system' was applied in both profit-making and loss-making companies. In Tran-2, 
general manager Chen received an annual salary because he reduced company 
losses as per his contract. Three out of 24 companies had workers who were in 
arrears of pay. 
62 
In China, some top managers may have a `grey income' (hui se shuo ru), 
which includes bribes, gifts, bonuses and other fringe benefits such as banquets and 
weekend trips squandering company monies. Normally, a top manager can freely 
spend the company's budget at least RMB 100,000 a year. 
2.3.3.2 Internal Contractual System and Middle Managers' Pay 
The greatest difference amongst middle managers arises from the application of the 
`internal contract system'. Some middle managers have been removed from the 
regular payment system and placed on individual employment contracts in which 
performance based pay constitutes a substantial proportion of overall remuneration. 
Managers in workshops are encouraged to work hard to fulfil higher production 
quotas. In Publ-1, driving team managers, who signed a contract, earned at least 
RMB 20,000 a year whilst most middle managers received RMB 14,000. A 38 year 
old female manager got the highest income including wages and bonuses of RMB 
40,000 a year. As a rare case, the salary of a project manager in Cons-3 is 
approximately RMB 80,000 a year when his performance is good. The income of 
other middle managers and junior managers without contracts with the enterprise is 
determined by their positions and skills. 
2.3.3.3 The Performance of the Company and the Average Wage of Employees 
It is evident that manager's pay varies with company economic efficiency or the 
ability to hit specified targets, which may not be the same thing. Below is 
supplementary information about the average monthly pay of employees. For 
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example, in Auto-2, a company with high profits, the average monthly pay of 
employees is about RMB 1,500 and incorporated bonuses amount to an average of 
around RMB 1,500. In Ligh-3, a company with average profits, the average monthly 
pay is approximately RMB 1,250. However, in Tran-4, a company with low profits, 
the pay is about RMB 800. In Publ-1, pay increases as the company gradually 
makes profits. Ye was happy about this: 
I was paid RMB 900 a month last year. This year I get RMB 1,400 a month 
because my company has made profits. That is good. A middle manager with 
a deputy position gets RMB 1,200 a month and a junior manager has only 
RMB 900 (a middle manager in Publ-1). 
Managers in SOEs with financial difficulties are experiencing reductions in 
wages and welfare benefits. SOEs with poor economic performance find it difficult 
to pay their employees the basic salary. The `off-duty' (xia gong) employees in 
Shanghai--some of whom are managers--receive less than RMB 300 subsidy a 
month (there are other subsidies in individual companies), an amount that is totally 
inadequate for even basic necessities. 
In those companies in which I conducted interviews, the lowest payment that 
middle managers and junior managers received was RMB 6,500 a year which is 
about £500. In addition, they did not get their monthly salary on time. They had to 
be on waiting lists to reimburse their medical costs. 
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2.3.4 Managers' Perceptions of Their Pay 
Managers' perception of their pay is related to the organisation and individual 
background. In analysing the dimensions of pay evaluation, a comparison is made 
between different backgrounds and with age and job levels in particular. 
Figure 2.6 indicates that 334 managers accounting for 33% at all levels felt 
their pay was not reasonable. Judged on this basis, there were no big differences 
amongst managers in the three job level categories. However, individuals expressed 
their strong feeling about their pay when they were interviewed. It is evident that 
senior managers were more satisfied than others. Director Fu of Chem-1 showed his 
satisfaction: 
In my opinion, the rewards for top managers in state-owned companies are not 
lower than that in the joint-venture company where I had been. I am happy 
with my pay. On the other hand, I feel pressure to achieve profit targets. I am 
not sure if I can get the same amount of profit next year because I have found 
some hidden problems in production. The middle and junior managers just 
received basic pay for living. There is not enough money for them to cope 
with unexpected incidents. 
A middle manager in Tran-2, a company that had shown major losses, complained 
about his lower pay: 
My salary is only RMB 500 per month. What can I do with this little money? 
Our pay has not been increased for three years. It means that our real wage 
value has decreased 20 per cent if we consider inflation. I don't worry about 
my job. I prefer to be laid off and find a new job. I hesitate to stay or leave. It 
is difficult for me to struggle out of my situation. 
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Generally speaking, middle managers in our firm get lower pay than the 
others because we are suffering from a loss. So it is understandable why we 
complain about our poor pay (a middle manager in Text-I ). 
A junior manager in the same company was resentful of his poor pay: 
I am ashamed because I cannot afford a basic life for my family. My wife and 
I have not bought new clothes for several years. I cannot afford the RMB 400 
tuition fee for my daughter who is studying at a high school. I have to rely on 




From Table 2.10, it can be seen that women were less likely to rate their 
salary `unreasonable' although there was small difference between the genders. The 
youngest managers (40%) were found to be mostly dissatisfied with their pay. This 
was in accordance with the fact that the less their service, then the less satisfaction 
managers felt with their pay. This was because few managers (3%) in the youngest 
group were senior managers who might apply for the `annual salary system' (nina 
xin zhi) and only one third of them were middle managers who had opportunities to 
sign contracts and gain more salary when they achieved targets. A majority of the 
youngest managers (65%) were in junior managerial position and received low pay. 
A marked association was also evident with managers' schooling. Managers who 
had studied at universities were more likely to view their pay as `unreasonable' 
(55% of them being in the youngest group). 
Table 2.10 Managers' Views on Their Pay by Different Backgrounds. 
Unit: % 
Very reasonable Reasonable Unreasonable 
Gender Male 8 58 34 
(n= 879) Female 9 62 29 
Age <36 11 49 40 
(n= 879) 36--50 8 62 30 
>50 5 65 30 
Educational level Secondary school 9 61 30 
(n=872) College 8 62 30 
University 9 49 42 
Postgraduate school 5 65 30 
Length of service < 10 years 14 44 42 
(n=878) 11--20 years 8 56 36 
21--30 years 8 60 32 
>30 years 5 69 26 
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2.4 Elimination of Job Security 
2.4.1 Background to Reform of the Employment System 
Before the reform of the employment system, all employees in SOEs benefited from 
lifetime employment, known as the `iron-rice bowl' (tie fan wan), and concomitant 
`cradle to grave' welfare. Employees were allocated work by a local labour bureau 
and were then permanently attached to the organisation. There were two separate 
employment systems. Ordinary workers and entry level staff members were in the 
`labour management system' and cadres (gan bu) were in the `personnel 
management system'. The term `cadre' refers to administrative staff (managers, 
supervisors, party officials, etc) and professional personnel (technicians, engineers, 
etc). Cadre enjoyed the benefits of the `iron chair' which guaranteed tenure in 
managerial positions. This sort of employment system was associated with 
problems of over-staffing, lack of motivation and stagnation of productivity. 
To resolve these problems, the government carried out an employment system 
reform from the mid-1980s onwards. In 1986, the State Council implemented a 
`labour contract system' (laodong hetong zhi) for SOEs, which places new state 
sector workers on fixed-term contracts, without the job security formerly 
guaranteed to permanent workers (Philion, 1998: 526). SOE workers were the first 
to be plagued by unemployment because they would lose their jobs if the contracts 
were not renewed. By 1992, this procedure was extended in pilot enterprises to all 
their employees including cadres, it was known as the `all employee contract 
system' (quanyuan hetong zhi). There was strong competition for managerial 
positions. This was a signal that managerial jobs could no longer be taken for 
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granted. Although directors in SOEs gained more powers over hiring and firing 
employees to improve their competitive capacity, they `avoided firing a worker in 
order to preserve harmony in labour relations' (Child, 1994: 163). 
The Labour Law was implemented in 1995, which allowed for short term 
contracts of one to five years and long term contracts of 5 or more years, and fully 
legitimised redundancies for the first time. `In recent years, all SOEs, including 
corporatised ones, have been rigorously shedding surplus labour and cutting welfare 
benefits' (Lau, 2000: 60). Redundancies took place frequently partly due to the 
companies' strategy of cutting costs to improve efficiency; partly due to the 
companies' failure to outstrip competition; and partly due to the government's 
strategy to restructure industries. Mergers and bankruptcies of SOEs caused 
massive redundancies. 
There are two kinds of redundant employees. One is an `off duty' (xia gang) 
employee who still keeps their labour relations with their former units and can get 
subsidies and benefits from them. `Xia gang literally means "waiting for a post". It 
has strict legal restrictions, which avoid actual redundancy in the short run, in order 
to discourage employers from hiring and firing labour at will. Nevertheless, the 
reality is that, once a person has been selected for xia gang she rarely gets her old 
job back, and often ends up redundant after a few years (currently set at three 
years)' (Taylor, 2002: 270). The other is a dismissed employee who no longer has a 
relationship with their former unit and does not receive fringe benefits from them 
when their contracts are terminated or when the enterprises are bankrupted. A 
specific program is the voluntary redundancy programme (in USA, the equivalence 
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would be a `buyout'). Dismissed employees who are voluntarily released from their 
labour contracts, and no longer former unit employees, receive economic 
compensation which is called severance pay. 
In 1997,303,000 Shanghai workers leaving their working posts entered the 
reemployment service centres which helped to arrange employment for redundant 
employees. Amongst them, 205,000 workers were laid off, roughly the same level 
as in the previous year (Shanghai Economy Year Book, 1998: 258). Employees in 
the textile industry have reduced to 280,000 from 550,000 since 1992. Some 10,000 
employees in public service companies were off duties. Some off duty employees 
were managers. The employment system reform has inevitably impacted upon 
managers' job security. 
2.4.2 How Redundancy Impacts on Managers 
Redundancies occurred in the all companies in which I conducted my survey. In the 
very profitable firm Chem-1,160 employees were made to take early retirement in 
1998. They got a basic wage of about RMB 250 and RMB 500 subsidies monthly 
from their company. In five automobile companies, early retirement also applied. In 
Elec-2,750 employees have been removed. Publ-1 has trimmed 1,200 employees 
and 3,400 employees lost their jobs due to the bankruptcy of a textile firm. In Cons- 
3, the labour force declined from 7,000 employees in 1992 to 3,600 by 1998. In 
Elec-1, over 100 employees were shed. A driving team manager in Publ-1 described 
the redundancy as `the Cultural Revolution which affected every family'. It was a 
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fact that amongst nine senior managers in Elec-2, each family had a member being 
laid off. 
How have managers in SOEs been affected? Managers no longer enjoy the 
benefits of the `iron chair' (tian jiao yi), a secure job irrespective of their work 
performance. Every employee could go up and go down under the policy of `letting 
the superior win out through fair competition'. Managers and workers suffered from 
the same fate during the reforms, as Xu described: 
The `iron chair' has had a leg cut off. Nobody can sit steadily. He will fall 
down if his body cannot keep balanced (a middle manager in Cons-3). 
The party secretary Wu in the same firm agreed with him: 
The concept of the `cadre' is no longer important. Everyone belongs to the 
Human Resource Centre and signs a contract with it. A manager will be 
removed if his/her performance is poor. 
2.4.2.1 Removal from Former Managerial Positions 
In some cases, downsizing started with managerial positions. About 20% of 
managers in Elect-2 were removed from their positions in 1996. Around 40% of 
managers at Tran-2 were cut, followed by the layoff of workers. 180 managerial 
officers of Publ-1 left their positions before the workers were laid off. In contrast, 
Cons-3 firstly removed peasant contractual workers; then the fixed contract 
workers; and finally the managerial staff. In Tran-3,107 cadres were shifted after 
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workers were notified of redundancy. The personnel manager in Publ-1 gave some 
examples: 
Our restructuring of management started from the senior level. Two out of 
four vice general managers left firstly. Some middle managers shifted from 
chief position to deputy position. In a driving team, half the middle managers 
and junior managers were cut. 180 managerial officials left their positions due 
to restructuring. 
Managers leaving their former positions were normally shifted to lower managerial 
positions or left managerial positions to be ordinary workers. During the reductions, 
each manager had to go through a selection process to decide who would stay and 
who would have to go, as Ye recalled: 
I gained this managerial position, the chief of the Administration office, 
through strong competition. You see, I and two other people applied for it. 
They had strong backgrounds with 10 years of experience. The result was that 
I won and others were moved to the lower positions (a middle manager in 
Publ-1). 
2.4.2.2 Redundancies 
Managers had experienced redundancy during the economic restructuring. They 
went to parts of the service sector (san chan), such as food services, transportation, 
domestic services, retailing; or they joined technology development business 
companies; or they hunted jobs in the labour market by themselves. Older 
redundant managers were normally asked to take early retirement. They received 
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subsidies from their former units and will get a pension when they reach retirement 
age. The personnel manager of Publ-1 gave the details: 
According to the rule in our company, female workers retire at 50 and female 
cadres retire at 55. During our adjustment, two 50-year-old women were 
shifted from their managerial positions to workers' positions and then retired. 
In particular, a large number of managers became redundant when their 
enterprises declared bankruptcy or were merged. In Shanghai, 27 enterprises were 
bankrupted, involving 54,704 staff and workers; and 75 enterprises were merged 
affecting 50,944 employees in 1997 (Shanghai Economy Year Book, 1998: 37). In 
1996, Text-5 announced bankruptcy due to the company's major losses. Managers 
were shocked when they heard of this but they had to face reality. Its 3,400 
employees including 30 middle managers and 150 other managerial staff left, 
except for 20 people who stayed to liquidate the company equity. A 35-year-old 
woman, who was a personnel administration officer, left the company despite the 
fact that her husband was in a critical physical condition. She was later in great 
distress. Another women manager, who was once awarded a medal, finally got a 
service job in a TV station. The former chairman tried to mentor employees and to 
help them to look for jobs. She reported the employees' situation to municipal 
leaders and got help for these former employees. 
A few managers took voluntary redundancy. They received compensation 
which varied according to their service length. In Chem-1, the compensation is 
about RMB 1,000 per service year. For example, a worker having worked for 35 
years will obtain RMB 35,000. In Cons-3, some employees who left in 1995 
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obtained RMB 20,000 compensation. It is complained that the amount of 
compensation is too small. 
2.4.3 Managers' Perceptions of Changes on Job Security 
From Figure 2.7, it is evident that over half the managers (56%) claimed that their 
job security got worse after the reforms. There is a slight difference between 
managers at different job levels, with 58% of junior managers feeling `worse'. This 
might be because junior managers were in the lower levels of the management 
hierarchy and might be easily moved. Conversely, 32% of middle managers felt 
their job to be secure, which is higher than the others by 7 percentage points. This 
may be explained by the fact that middle managers, with more skills and work 
experience, are less likely to be made redundant. 

























It seems that women were less likely to feel secure than men (see Table 2.11). 
Indeed, women felt most vulnerable during the labour saving reforms. There is no 
great difference between the three age groups. The percentage of middle aged 
managers who answered `better' (30%) is slightly more than the others (25% 
younger, 28% older). This may indicate that all managers at different ages are 
almost equally feeling uncertain. In line with this, there are small differences 
between managers who have different lengths of service. The longer the service, 
then the more the managers felt they have some job security. There is a possible 
explanation that those managers who had relatively low seniority felt more insecure 
and those managers who had long service and were approaching the end of their 
careers were less worried about their jobs than those with longer to work before 
retirement. It shows that the lower the education level, then the more managers felt 
their job security to be `worse'. Those managers who graduated from secondary 
schools reported that their jobs were more insecure than others. However, the 
percentage of managers who came from postgraduate schools and believed their job 
security to be better (18%) was lower than other group managers. This might be 
because those postgraduate managers knew more about the threat to their jobs. 
Each manager I interviewed felt that job security had diminished. Hong, who 
led the restructuring programme, expressed his feelings: 
Employees felt that the market economy was very cruel. The reform asked us 
to pay for it. Redundancy was a tough decision I needed to make. I tried to be 
very logical and make decisions with the bottom line in mind. I tried to spread 
the pain around as evenly as possible (the director in Publ-1). 
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Ma, who had experienced the whole process of bankruptcy, talked about the 
managers' situation: 
Bankruptcy was inevitable in some enterprises. All unemployed people 
including managers were suffering from a big trauma especially when the 
social labour market was not well developed. It is hard for them to find jobs 
(the former chairman in Text-5). 
Table 2.11 Managers' Perceptions of Changes on Job Security by Different 
Backgrounds. 
Unit: % 
Better Worse No change 
Gender Male 30 54 16 
(n= 733) Female 23 62 15 
Age <36 26 55 19 
(n= 733) 36--50 30 57 13 
>50 28 53 19 
Educational level Secondary school 31 58 11 
(n=727) College 25 57 18 
University 33 51 16 
Postgraduate school 18 53 29 
Length of service < 10 years 24 61 15 
(n=732) 11--20 years 28 53 19 
21--30 years 28 58 14 
>30 years 31 53 16 
A middle manager Ye in Publ-1 commented: 
The word `redundancy' is easier said than done. Redundancy was a 
particularly painful and unpleasant experience to managers. It was a challenge 
for managers to accept this great adjustment. The top managers communicated 
frequently with employees and ensured the selection process was fair, honest 
and open. 
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During the process of restructuring, some managers felt lost and were under great 
pressure. A middle manager, who had experienced displacement from Publ-1, 
candidly told his story: 
I am about 60 year old and have worked in Publ-1 for 35 years. In 1996, I was 
asked to move away from my managerial position to the newly established 
`technology development company' and to be responsible for its profit and 
loss. I had a very hard time admitting this was happening to me. As you know, 
I graduated from a university and contributed to the company. I refused at the 
beginning and accepted it later because I had no choice. The market economy 
had no mercy. 
Redundant managers have been forced into long-term unemployment or into 
poorly paid jobs and suffered a radical decline in their standards of living. Some 
managers who were made redundant directly expressed their resentment. The 
former chairman Ma in Text-5 recalled: 
One of the former directors, who lost his job, is angry because of what 
happened to him. Now he is working as a chief of a neighbouring 
administration committee with a monthly salary of RMB 420, excluding RMB 
200 from our former unit. He complains that his daughter could not get 
medical cost reimbursed from our enterprise. 
There were redundant managers who had struggled to hunt for jobs in the glutted 
job market. A woman who was a lower level manager in Text-5 told her story: 
My firm was bankrupted in 1996. I obtained a job in a railway company as a 
conductor half a year later. Unfortunately, I lost that job. Then I attended 
training courses and was recruited as a manager in a supermarket. I was 
dismissed again. How difficult it was for me to get a job! No one knew my 
poor situation. Crying was not useful. I have a managerial post in a 
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supermarket now. I still do not know with certainty about my future but I am 
not scared of frustration. 
Redundancy appeared to create a sharpened sense of accountability amongst 
the managers who remained. The survivors had increased work tasks and flexibility. 
They were unprepared for the changes that resulted from redundancy. Redundancy 
had a negative impact on the survivors who worried about their futures. A middle 
manager Huang in Chem-1 notes: 
Normally, male managers retire at the age of 60 and female managers retire at 
55. According to our new company rules, they should retire in advance at 57 
and 52, respectively. It was terrible to hear this. I would lose lots of money if I 
retired earlier. This definitely affects my life. 
Top executives have a relatively higher job security than other managers. 
They may be transferred from one firm to another, but are rarely dismissed because 
they normally progress to a relatively high administrative grade. Similar to their 
counterparts in government, they are less likely to worry about their job security. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has investigated managers' backgrounds in Shanghai SOEs. As far as 
basic characteristics are concerned, it found that around two-fifths of managers 
come from a family where the father is a manual worker. Most senior managers are 
found in the middle age groups. Men are more likely to be managers than women. 
Most managers have studied in colleges. A few of them are postgraduates. 
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This chapter shows the differences between different cohorts of managers. 
The Cultural Revolution has had a long term impact on the composition of 
managers in China today. There is an increased proportion of young managers who 
have better education, and a decreased proportion of middle aged managers, some 
of them lost opportunities to study in universities in their 20s during the Cultural 
Revolution. This is because education level is an important factor which influences 
career development in today's environment of market competition. 
The Cultural Revolution also has implications for the possible career 
development of managers at different ages. There is an increasing tendency for 
relatively well-educated young people to enter managerial positions earlier than 
other age groups. Middle aged managers, some of whom returned to university after 
the Cultural Revolution, constitute the majority of senior managers. They 
experienced hardships which the young managers did not experience, so they well 
understand Chinese society and have high career motivation. Two thirds of old 
managers are in middle managerial positions. Their career developments were 
interrupted by the Cultural Revolution and they are now facing difficulties with 
their promotion prospects. 
Generally, this chapter has explored the consequences of economic reforms 
for Shanghai managers. It has found that the `director (manager) responsibility 
system' enhances management authority, provides the foundation for the new 
management regimes and makes it possible to exercise managerial prerogatives 
over labour. It also found that managerial prerogatives have not been limited by the 
emergence of the `modern enterprise system'. 
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Economic reforms and employment system reforms have impacted on all 
employees including managers. It is evident that the payment structure is more 
likely to link individual and enterprise performance and pay disparity is apparently 
increased between different companies with different performances, and even 
between different level managers in the same SOE, government policy had a strong 
influence on the increased gap in managers' pay. Doubtless, the difference in pay 
between top managers and workers is becoming larger. It seems likely that this will 
cause the resentment of workers and conflicts in employment relations. 
This chapter shows that the degree of job security has fallen abruptly in all 
SOEs.. Managers, as well as other employees, are affected by redundancy. Most 
SOEs are experiencing a restructuring of the workforce because they are forced to 
be more competitive with private companies. A series of reforms in the market 
economy have impacted on managers' situations. It is undeniable that the situation 
of Shanghai workers is even worse than that of these managers. 
The globalisation of the economy, in combination with China's economic 
reform, has provided opportunities for management to utilise new management 
techniques such as lean production. This will be discussed in the later chapters. 
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Chapter Three 
Managers and Global Modern Management Techniques 
The diffusion process of management knowledge has long been a sociological 
issue. The sociology of management knowledge has aimed at an explanation of the 
processes of diffusion and institutionalisation of management knowledge, from 
academic constructs to social ideas (Alvarez, 1996: 80). Recently sociology of work 
has paid great attention to the high number of faddish episodes in the popularisation 
of management knowledge. The diffusion of management ideas requires the 
interplay of various social processes: triggering economic and political events; the 
actions of social actors--producers, carriers, advocates; and audiences; and the 
consumption of ideas--made possible by their resources (for instance, cultural 
legitimacy and organisational resources) (Alvarez, 1996: 93). 
The globalisation of management towards the end of the twentieth century, 
together with an accelerating rate of technological change, means new challenges 
for existing management knowledge (Clegg and Palmer, 1996: 4). Chinese 
managers have been challenged to learn new techniques in response to new changes 
taking place in the world. In this chapter, I shall look at the extent to which 
managers in SOEs have knowledge of global modern management techniques 
(GMMTs); I also examine the sources of their knowledge and find out how the 
economic social environment and individual factors have influenced Chinese 
managers to receive and disseminate management knowledge. 
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3.1 Managers' Knowledge of Modern Management Techniques 
3.1.1 Socio-Economic Conditions and Management Strategies 
Table 3.1 summarises management strategies and socio-economic environments in 
China. It presents the background to the introduction of GMMTs in order to 
understand the extent to which managers have knowledge of these techniques. 
Economic reforms, aimed at changing strategies and outcomes in the planned 
economy, led to the development of new management strategies and the 
introduction of GMMTs. TQM and IS09000 have been introduced since the 1980s 
and HRM and cost reduction techniques have been implemented since the 1990s. 








1980s reform and openness 
towards the market- 
economy 
1990s development of 
economy 
Strategy Outcome 
traditional strategy poor quality 
plan and control high waste 
poor supplier relations low productivity 
emergent strategy slow diffusion overall 
competition in national 
market 
investments in machinery 
training 
TQM 
cost and quality focus simple structural- 
IS09000 adjustment 
down-sizing some diffusion 
HRM 
The People's Republic of China was established in 1949 and was isolated 
from the West until 1979. During this period of time, government officials regarded 
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socialism and capitalism as two opposed systems. They not only had set this firmly 
in their minds, but had also led the people to accept this. Furthermore, loyalty to the 
party was the key criterion for a manager, rather than knowledge or skills as seen 
from a Western viewpoint (Zhuang and Whitehill, 1989: 61-62). The Chinese 
political system and ideology prevented China from adopting any Western values or 
practices at that time. Looking at the economic system, China practiced a rigid 
central-command economy for three decades. The government bureaux made all 
decisions concerning products, prices and distribution. They `set production targets 
for each enterprise, distributed its products, allocated supplies and equipment, 
assigned personnel, took over profits and covered losses' (Fan, 1998: 204). The 
proportions of those in work with job security were at high levels, but productivity 
was very low. In many enterprises, the planned economy resulted in massive waste 
and poor quality of products and low competitive capacity. 
China's economic reforms started in 1979. The aim was to decentralise the 
system of governance, to introduce market principles, and to open up trade and 
investment relations with the rest of the world (Child, 1994: 1). In the early days of 
the economic reforms, when Western technologies were introduced into Chinese 
enterprises, there was control over the transfer of undesirable foreign ideas and 
practices. Later, the positive attitudes of Chinese politicians made the introduction 
of GMMTs into China politically possible. Deng Xiao Ping, who was a leader of 
China's economic reforms, openly proclaimed that a cat was good as long as it 
caught the mice (economic development) regardless of whether it was black 
(capitalism) or white (socialism). He reiterates the idea that socialism means 
eliminating poverty; Pauperism is not socialism and far from communism; The 
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superiority of the socialist system lies in its ability to improve the people's material 
and cultural life. In so saying, Deng Xiao Ping advocated adopting good things 
from capitalism, including advanced and scientific management ideas and 
techniques. As the reforms progressed, managers in SOEs began to realise the need 
to learn about foreign management techniques, as Fan (1998: 208) indicated: 
Like a non-swimmer being suddenly plunged into the `sea of the market' by 
the forces of reform, Chinese managers became bewildered and rushed in a 
desperate search for new management concepts and techniques as their 
previous knowhow had become increasingly obsolete and inadequate in the 
new market place. They are very keen to learn management knowhow from 
the West, and interest in experimenting with new management approaches has 
greatly increased during the past decade or so. 
With the further reform of SOEs, managers in SOEs paid great attention to 
the reforms of ownership in order to survive. It is argued that the restructuring of 
ownership is no substitute for good enterprise management and the most important 
thing is to strengthen enterprise management (Rei, 1997). Rei is a professor in the 
Management School of Shanghai FuDan University and he intends to introduce a 
set of books about new management techniques. He indicates that the general level 
of enterprise management in China is lower compared to developed countries 
although some excellent SOEs are well managed (Rei, 1997: 2). In analysing the 
reasons for this, Rei points out (1997: 2) that there has been a lack of research on 
management theory and little popularisation of modern management knowledge; 
and managers in SOEs are not familiar with modem management techniques even if 
they intend to manage in scientific ways. Another official survey which collected 
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data from 2,585 SOEs suffering losses in 1994 concluded that 82% of these firms 
were due to poor management (Jin, 1997: 371). 
3.1.2 Managers' Knowledge of GMMTs 
Evidence was drawn from a survey I carried out in 1999, in which I provided 
Shanghai managers with a checklist in an effort to establish which modern 
management techniques they were familiar with. Their responses are shown in 
Table 3.2. 
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Not at all 
familiar 
Missing 
Kaizen 3 7 20 30 27 43 
LP 6 19 25 50 15 35 
QCs 6 19 25 50 13 37 
Team 9 30 27 66 6 28 
JIT 4 12 23 39 23 38 
BPR 2 7 26 35 21 44 
FP 3 12 30 45 15 40 
TQM 17 42 29 88 2 10 
HRM 8 27 34 69 6 25 
Total N=1,012 LP=Lean Production, QCs=Quality Circles, JIT=Just-in-Time, 
BPR=Business Process Reengineering, FP=Flexible Production, TQM=Total Quality 
Management, HRM=Human Resource Management. 
Before saying anything else, it is necessary to explain the missing responses 
in Table 3.2, the percentage of which varies from 10% to 44%. Few respondents 
refused to answer my questionnaires and my interpretation is that these missing 
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responses might be an indication of a lack of knowledge of these techniques and an 
unwillingness to declare this. Some evidence supports this assumption. When I 
collected questionnaires in Cons-l, middle manager Chen who helped me in this 
survey said: `most modern management techniques are new to me, so it is not 
surprising that other managers are not familiar with them either. I am sorry for 
missing answers in some questionnaires. ' In Publ-1, administration official Ye 
expressed the same view: `it is difficult for us to answer some questions because we 
have heard little about these management techniques. That is why some of the 
managers left empty spaces in some places on the questionnaires'. On the other 
hand, some managers frankly admitted that they had no knowledge of these new 
management techniques. A middle manager in Cons-2 expressed his feelings that he 
was very depressed because he knew so little of modern management techniques. 
When taking missing responses into account, together with the proportion of 
managers who answered `not at all', it is found that the level of manager knowledge 
was relatively low because only 50% of managers claimed to know five of nine 
management techniques and less than 30% were familiar with all techniques. 
Moreover, the proportion of managers who were very familiar with the management 
techniques was very low, varying from 2% (BPR) to 17% (TQM). 
Table 3.2 represents the extent to which managers claimed that they were 
familiar with GMMTs. By the degree of familiarity, the top three techniques are (1) 
total quality management (88% for any degree of familiarity) (2) human resource 
management (69%); (3) team working (66%). The middle three techniques are QCs 
(50%), lean production (50%) and flexible production (45%). The bottom three 
techniques are JIT (39%), business process re-engineering (BPR, 35%) and Kaizen 
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(continuous improvement, 30%). Research conducted amongst Turkish managers in 
the white-goods industry (Nichols et al., 2002: 71) suggests that over nine out of ten 
claimed to be familiar with TQM, Quality Circles (QCs) and Team Working; seven 
out of ten with JIT, Kaizen and Flexible Production; six out of ten with Lean 
Production and five out of ten with BPR. Both Chinese managers and Turkish 
managers were more likely to be familiar with TQM, QCs and Team Working 
whilst they were least likely to be familiar with BPR. 
Some differences existed between managers in the two countries in terms of 
the extent to which they were familiar with these management techniques. Overall, 
there was a higher proportion of Turkish managers who were familiar with these 
management techniques. There are two possible explanations. Firstly, the velocity 
at which new management techniques were imported into Turkey increased 
considerably in the last few decades (Nichols et al., 2002: 69). Secondly, the 
Turkish firms were all private and often joint ventures, resulting in strong market 
competition, which had accelerated the diffusion of GMMTs. By contrast, Chinese 
managers embarked on a learning process through which the dynamic for 
improvement was mostly passed down from above rather than diffused by their own 
actions and those of their employees. Top management did not always recognise the 
increased competitive pressures on management during the period of globalisation. 
Research conducted by the State Council Entrepreneurs Investigation System 
(1999: 144) found that only 3.2% of top managers in Chinese SOEs were very 
familiar with management knowledge, this demonstrates that top managers in SOEs 
had insufficient knowledge to manage effectively and could not achieve good 
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performances. According to my survey, the proportion of managers who were very 
familiar with new management techniques was low. This affected the 
implementation of new management techniques in China. 
3.1.3 Factors Affecting the Level of Managers' Knowledge of GMMTs 
Having outlined the general picture of managers' knowledge of GMMTs, I shall 
focus on the factors linked to this. My surveys results will be analysed to find out 
which factors have affected managers' knowledge of GMMTs. 
3.1.3.1 Date of Origin 
During my fieldwork in Shanghai in 1999,1 saw the book Lean Thinking (Womack 
and Jones, 1996) in an English version, which I had not seen in the UK. The authors 
of this book were co-authors of the book The Machine that Changed the World 
(1990), in which they claimed how companies could dramatically improve their 
performance through the Lean Production approach pioneered by Toyota. Lean 
Thinking extended these ideas and claimed to provide a new way of thinking to 
banish waste and create wealth for the corporation. The book Lean Thinking was 
translated into Chinese and published in 1999. This demonstrates that new 
management techniques could quickly spread from the West to China. Some 
Chinese scholars and business groups have tried to introduce Western management 
knowledge into China and to bridge the gap with Western countries. 
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It might be thought that the earlier management techniques emerge, the more 
managers know about them. This is true for the case of BPR. It was known by only 
a few managers because it was a relatively new term even in the Western countries 
by the beginning of the 90s. However, in the case of TQM and QCs, this viewpoint 
is only partly true. TQM originated from USA and was developed in Japan and 
became popular at the end of the 70s in the West. It spread to China at the 
beginning of 80s by the advocacy of the government. However, although QCs were 
introduced into China at almost the same time, they were only known by around 
50% of managers. 
We may observe some differences between HRM and lean production. Both 
HRM and lean production were introduced into China in the 1990s, but Chinese 
managers were more familiar with HRM than with lean production. HRM 
originated in the United States and began to make headway in the UK in the latter 
part of the 1980s. HRM was applied by management in Chinese SOEs. For 
example, the personnel department was displaced by a human resource department 
in some enterprises. Also there was some research on the relationship between the 
`three system reforms' (the lifetime employment system, the wage system and the 
social insurance system) in SOEs and the application of HRM. My survey suggests 
that over two thirds of managers claimed that they were familiar with it. On the 
other hand, lean production was developed by Toyota during the 1950s and refined 
during the 1970s. The book The Machine that Changed the World which described 
lean production was published in America in 1990 and was translated into Chinese 
in 1991. At the same time, the Department of Mechanical Industry and The China 
Association of Enterprises Management called for the application of lean 
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production under a competitive environment. However, lean production has only 
been applied by a few enterprises (mostly in the automobile industry) which have 
made substantial efforts to improve their performance. Chinese managers have not 
universally recognised the importance of this technique. 
There is some evidence that the earlier the management techniques emerge, 
then the more Chinese managers know about them, but this is by no means a rigid 
rule. Other factors affecting managers' knowledge of GMMTs will also be 
considered in the following sections. 
3.1.3.2 Type of Industry 
My research looks at the different situations of managers in both the manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing sectors. In the survey sample, 5 out of 8 industries were in 
the manufacturing sector. There were the automotive, electric, chemical, textile, and 
light industries. The non-manufacturing industries included public service, 
construction and transportation. 19 out of the 24 companies were within the 
manufacturing sectors. 
Table 3.3 indicates that manager's knowledge is strongly related to their types 
of industry. The difference between manufacturing and non-manufacturing is 
remarkable. In general, managers in the manufacturing sector knew more 
management techniques than those in the non-manufacturing sector. The difference 
ranged from 5% (TQM), to 31% (lean production), with an average of 17%. The 
smallest difference (5%) between managers in two sectors existed in their 
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knowledge of TQM because all industries were asked by the government to apply 
this technique in the1980s. 
Table 3.3 Any Degree of Familiarity with GMMTs by Managers in the 
Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing Sector. 
Unit: 
Techniques Manufacturing Non-manufacturing Difference 
Kaizen 34 11 23 
Lean production 55 24 31 
QCs 54 34 20 
Team working 69 52 17 
JIT 44 15 29 
BPR 38 24 14 
Flexible production 48 31 17 
TQM 89 84 5 
HRM 71 59 12 
Total N= 1,012 
Table 3.4 Managers' Knowledge of Lean Production in the Different Sectors. 
Unit: % 
Manufacturing Any familiarity Non-manufacturing Any familiarity 
Auto 98 Construction 31 
Chemical 52 Transportation 22 
Electric 43 Public services 20 
Textile 38 
Light Industry 34 
Total N=1,012 
The biggest gap is found in the case of lean production (Table 3.4). The 
proportion of managers in the manufacturing sector who were familiar with it 
ranged from 98% (automobile industry) to 34% (light industry) whilst the 
proportion of managers in the non-manufacturing sector, who were familiar with it, 
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ranged from 31% (construction) to 20% (public services). One of the reasons for 
this difference was that lean production was typically related to the supply of 
materials and demand for finished goods in the manufacturing sector, and the non- 
manufacturing sector did not have material flows and assembly operations. 
It is certain that to some extent the nature of an industry determines the 
necessity for learning about GMMTs. However, comparing manufacturing to non- 
manufacturing, two common points can be seen from the Table 3.3. Firstly, in both 
the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, TQM, HRM and team working 
were ranked in the top three of managers' knowledge of GMMTs. Secondly, even 
in the manufacturing sector, including the automotive industry which had practiced 
lean production, less than 52% of managers knew about it. This might be affected 
by other factors which I shall discuss below. 
3.1.3.3 Organisational Performance 
A general level of knowledge of GMMTs by managers in a company was clearly 
related to the company's economic performance. It appeared that managers in the 
profitable companies were more likely to have knowledge of GMMTs, whilst 
managers in the companies that had financial problems were less likely to have 
knowledge of GMMTs. In the case of lean production knowledge, see Table 3.4, 
managers in the auto industry and chemical industry that had high profits knew 
more about lean production than those managers in the textile industry, 
transportation and public services that had poor performance. At least two 
considerations are relevant here. Firstly, the companies that performed well might 
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benefit from the implementation of new management techniques and would 
encourage managers to learn more. Secondly, such profitable companies were able 
to provide financial support for training or investment because implementing a new 
management technique was very costly. The situation of some organisations that 
had poor economic performances was quite different. In their environment, 
managers gave priority to the sale of goods and making profits. They feared failure 
in implementing new techniques which could make their situation even worse, as a 
young senior manager explained: 
My company is facing particularly acute difficulties. The most urgent thing 
for me is to sell products and to pay the wage bill of employees. I have not 
sorted these out so it is impossible for me to learn about lean production. 
This manager said his priority was to sell products and he did not think that lean 
production could be used to improve performance. This also happened in other 
companies, as Jiang admitted: 
To be honest, we have been struggling to cope with economic survival and to 
keep employees calm. We have thought little about learning Western 
management techniques despite the fact that it would broaden my vision if I 
did (the party secretary in Publ-1). 
Li, the head of the administration office in Cons-3 commented: 
Compared with developed countries, we fall behind too much in enterprise 
management. It is a pity that most managers have not understood that they 
need to learn modern management knowledge in order to survive. 
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3.1.3.4 Job Levels 
Form Table 3.5, it is seen that the proportion of junior managers who knew about 
the listed management techniques was always lower when compared to the other 
two groups. In six of the nine cases, senior managers had more management 
knowledge than the other two groups. By contrast, the percentages (34%, 52%, 
41%) of middle managers who knew about Kaizen, lean production and JIT were 
only a little higher than the percentages (31%, 49%, 37%) of senior managers who 
knew about them. One reason was that lean production was extensively applied in 
the auto industry, with 19% of middle managers in total and 3% of senior managers 
in total in the sample being in this industry. 
Table 3.5 Familiarity of Managers at Different Levels with GMMTs. 
Senior (%) Middle (%) Junior (%) 
Kaizen 31 34 23 
Lean production 49 52 42 
QCs 60 50 47 
Team working 74 67 63 
JIT 37 41 36 
BPR 41 39 29 
Flexible production 50 46 41 
TQM 92 90 83 
HRM 76 72 64 
Total N=1,012 
Types of job are linked to knowledge of management techniques. Top 
managers had responsibility for investment, production systems, organisational 
development and management practices and the like. As a result, senior managers 
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might have such knowledge for many reasons. Managers in the production 
department were more familiar with management techniques about production 
processes and quality management than others. Regarding Flexible Production, my 
survey suggests that, amongst managers who claimed familiarity, the proportion of 
managers in the production departments (49%) was higher than that of managers in 
the research departments (15%) and those who worked in the personnel 
departments (10`%)). Similarly, 90% of managers in personnel departments claimed 
that they knew about IIRM, whilst only about 60% of managers in accounting 
departments claimed to have heard of it (Figure 3.1). This might be explained by 
the fact that the aim of new management techniques was directly targeted at 
improving work performance. Managers might attend training courses offered by 
the organisation or learnt about GMMTs by virtue of their individual initiative. 
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3.1.3.5 Individual Characteristics 
There is some significant evidence that the individual characteristics of managers 
are strongly associated with managers' levels of familiarity with modern 
management techniques. I investigated these factors such as managers' ages, 
educational levels and the disciplines they studied at university. 
Table 3.6 Distribution of Managers' Familiarity with GMMTs by Age Group. 
Techniques (%) 35 and below 36 to 50 51 and above 
Kaizen 34 28 26 
Lean production 59 45 47 
QCs 58 46 50 
Team working 80 62 56 
JIT 59 34 33 
BPR 40 34 31 
Flexible production 50 44 37 
TQM 88 88 86 
HRM 73 69 64 
Total N=1,012 
Looking at Table 3.6, the youngest managers were most familiar with 
GMMTs in all cases although there was only a small differential between them and 
other age managers in some cases. The biggest gap was 26% in terms of JIT and the 
smallest one was 2% related to TQM. The younger the managers were, the more 
they were in favour of Western values and assimilated new knowledge, and the less 
they were constrained by old traditions. Also young people had more chances to 
learn about GMMTs because some companies saw young managers to be trainable 
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and to have a potentially inexhaustible enthusiasm for learning. The middle 
manager Xu in Cons-3 indicated a recent phenomenon: 
Apart from the youngest managers, most of them had more or less experience 
of the Cultural Revolution when they did not go to university in their 20s. 
Although some of them got qualifications with part time study, they could not 
be compared with those young managers who graduated from formal 
universities. By the way, some middle aged and old managers were promoted 
from workers. They have had little chance to get training in house. 
Some middle-aged and old managers have made efforts to learn GMMTs in 
order to improve their company's operational performance. In Elet-2, manager 
Chen, who was in his 40s, learnt nine listed modern management techniques by 
himself. 






College University Postgraduate 
school 
Kaizen 26 27 36 30 
LP 45 47 58 65 
QCs 46 49 56 80 
Team 59 67 73 90 
JIT 35 35 49 50 
BPR 30 34 42 65 
FP 43 44 48 70 
TQM 83 89 88 100 
HRM 63 71 74 85 
Total N=1,012 LP=Lean Production, FP=Flexible Production 
As highlighted in Table 3.7, the educational level of managers is identified as 
an important factor which influences the managers' knowledge of GMMTs. 
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Normally postgraduate managers knew more about GMMTs than managers with 
only graduate status. In terms of BPR, postgraduate managers (65%) were over 
twice as likely to claim to be familiar with it as those managers (30%) who only 
attended secondary school. However, it is a fact that even postgraduate managers 
have had little knowledge of some new management knowledge. For example, 
seven out of ten postgraduate managers did not know about Kaizen and one third 
had not learnt about lean production, JIT and BPR. Others managers were yet less 
well informed. 
3.2 Sources of Knowledge about GMMTs 
3.2.1 Survey Results 
Table 3.8 summarises in detail the sources of managers' knowledge of nine modern 
management techniques. It reveals the following facts: current company practice or 
company training were likely to be the main source of knowledge of TQM (96%), 
Team work (69%) and HRM (63%), these were the leading techniques and were 
most likely to be known by Shanghai managers. Overall, company practice 
constituted the most popular source of knowledge of seven out of nine listed 
techniques. In contrast, the mass media or books constituted the main source of 
knowledge of BPR and Flexible Production. On average, university education and 
`others' methods were less likely to be the source of knowledge of GMMTs. For 
example, very few managers knew about Kaizen from universities (2%). 
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Table 3.8 Source of Knowledge about GMMTs for those Shanghai Managers 
who Claim Familiarity. 
Techniques Company Training Mass Education Books Others 
(Row %)* practice media 
Kaizen 16 10 8 2 14 3 
(n=492) 
LP 35 24 11 5 22 3 
(n=614) 
QCs 33 24 12 6 23 3 
(n=579) 
Team 46 23 17 8 24 5 
(n=670) 
JIT 29 11 9 3 17 2 
(n=593) 
BPR 11 12 21 5 19 4 
(n=515) 
FP 18 2 22 8 24 4 
(n=537) 
TQM 49 47 11 8 26 2 
(n=848) 
HRM 35 29 19 9 21 4 
(n=719) 
* The sum of row percentages is not 100% since some managers cited more than one 
source of knowledge. LP=Lean Production, FP=Flexible Production 
Table 3.9 Source of Knowledge about GMMTs for Those Turkish Managers 








Education Books Others 
Kaizen 38 26 2 6 21 7 
(n=133) 
LP 37 18 3 10 22 10 
(n=106) 
QCs 56 26 3 4 9 3 
(n=192) 
Team 56 22 4 7 10 11 
(n=212) 
JIT 44 23 4 10 15 0 
(n=154) 
BPR 24 12 11 14 32 6 
(n=90) 
FP 50 12 7 11 15 5 
(n=131) 
TQM 44 31 5 5 12 2 
(n=244) 
LP=Lean Production, FP=Flexible Production 
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My research appears to have similar results with the findings of earlier 
research which was conducted in the white-goods industry in Turkey (Nichols et al., 
2002: 71). Table 3.9 indicates that current company practice or company training 
constituted the main source of knowledge of methods TQM, QCs and Teams in 
seven or eight out of ten cases. By contrast, in the case of BPR, the mass media or 
books constituted the main source of knowledge in four out of ten cases. This 
suggests the less these management techniques are known, the greater the reliance 
on books and media as sources of knowledge. It is common in both China and 
Turkey that some managers knew about BPR mainly from books and the media. 
Most knew about TQM and Team work and these techniques were introduced in 
these countries in the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s. 
3.2.2 Further Analysis of Results 
Having given the sources of knowledge about modem management techniques for 
managers, I shall identify different features of these sources of knowledge and 
explain how economic and social factors affected managers learning about these 
techniques. 
3.2.2.1 Company Practice 
It is suggested that company practice is the most important source for managers to 
obtain management knowledge. The dynamics of the practice came from two 
different levels, namely, government strategy and the company strategy. 
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The government strategy of modernisation resulted in the rapid diffusion of 
Western management techniques. In February 1979, the People's Daily, the most 
reliable source of official views, called for urgent learning from the West: 
Japan realised industrial and agricultural modernisation in less than twenty 
years... They [Japanese] realised that technological modernisation went hand 
in hand with management modernisation. We must pay special attention to 
this experience. We must systematically study the advanced managerial style 
of capitalist countries and make it serve our purpose of realising the four 
modernisations (1979, cited in Lewis and Sun, 1994: 70). 
In 1982, the government (the State Economy Committee) campaigned 
nationally to popularise modem enterprise management technologies. In 1984, it 
put forward a proposal of applying 18 managerial techniques, such as TQM, total 
plan management, total cost accounting, total preventive maintenance, system 
engineering, value engineering, optimisation, activity based costing (ABC 
management) and statistical control techniques. Modem management techniques 
were firstly systematically introduced to Chinese SOEs at that time. The 
government arranged the schedule to push the learning movement forward and 
assessed the applications of these techniques every year. Learning foreign 
management knowledge became a widespread phenomenon in Chinese SOEs. For 
instance, top managers in Chem-1 implemented TQM company-wide. Managers 
worked out managerial plans after checking all production standards, targets, 
measures, inspection, records, accounts, regulation. They rebuilt 13 systems of 
quality guarantees and workers were encouraged to be involved in problem-solving 
innovation. In most Chinese firms, the main TQM activity was conformance to 
performance standards and to obtain ISO 9001 or ISO 9002 certification. This 
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shows that management tended to be oriented to the `hard" rather than `soft' form 
of TQM. 
My survey confirms the positive role of the government. For example, all 
companies in my sample applied TQM and 88% of managers knew about it. When I 
asked managers which modern management techniques had been applied, most of 
them mentioned TQM. Professor Rei, the director of the enterprises management 
department at a university in Shanghai, gave his comments: 
The government's advocacy was of significance. No matter how efficient it 
was, it did make managers in SOEs recognise that our country was far behind 
the world, and that global modem management techniques were important to 
the performance of our enterprises (Rei, 1999). 
In 1992, Deng Xiao Ping's southern tour invoked a new impetus to practice 
GMMTs in SOEs. The government introduced some management techniques but no 
longer forcefully propelled their application at the national level because previous 
activity of the government was criticised as a `precipitate action' and was not 
efficient. As a result, the government did not advocate lean production nation-wide. 
The viewpoints of managers about government advocacy are contradictory. 
Jiang, a female director of the general office in Chem-1, told me that the application 
of TQM was pressed by the government and the effects were less than good. 
According to Wilkinson (1997: 801), `hard' TQM concentrates on the tools and techniques and the 
systematic measurement and control of the work process. `Soß' TQM places more importance on 
areas such as increasing the customer orientation of the organisation, training, employee 
participation and cultural change. 
102 
However, a middle production manager in Auto-5 pointed out that an official call 
would be a good way to apply lean production: 
In my opinion, SOEs should adopt lean production because it has a special 
emphasis on flexibility, low inventories, and quick response to market 
demand. Lean production is useful to reduce waste, to lower costs and to 
make profits. If the government takes lean production as a way to reform 
SOEs and advocates adopting this technique nationwide, more and more 
companies will practice it. 
The management strategy in individual companies also affected the 
implementation of new management techniques. The different strategies of 
companies reflect different operational and organisational characteristics which 
include business ideas and goals, competitive priorities, and management 
mechanisms. In particular, company strategies are related to top management's 
cognition of market competition and the role of GMMTs. For example, 86% of 
managers in Elec-3 had heard about HRM from company practice. Similarly, 85% 
of managers in Elec-4 were familiar with team working because they had 
introduced it. 
My case studies, discussed in detail in later chapters, will indicate that the 
implementation of lean production in the auto industry is an example of strategic 
change in management practice and it was inspired by top management. The same 
thing happened in Chem-1. The survey shows that at least 71% of managers in this 
firm learnt about lean production due to their director's requirements. This 
proportion was the second highest overall and was over twice as high as that in 
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Chem-2 (33%). This resulted from the director's efforts to apply lean production in 
the firm, as director Fu elaborated: 
One day, by chance, I read The Machine that Change the World (1990). I 
found that this was the best book about management I had ever read. With 
many years of managerial research and practice, I completely accepted the 
idea of lean production. If I manage around the idea of lean production in a 
down-to-earth manner, I believe that a new managerial model, which suits the 
Chinese case, will be formed. You see, we have stopped the production line 
for one month to reduce the massive inventories. 
Jiang gave her comments on lean production practices: 
We have learnt and used several modem management techniques. Practices 
varied at the instigation of different directors of our firm in different periods. 
The new director Fu applied lean production and concentrated on quality 
management and cost management. He required every operative to follow 
standards. I think that it is more rational because it aims at resolving current 
problems and achieving management efficiency. 
It is shown clearly that company practice is the best way for managers to learn 
about modern management techniques. However, there was a lack of such practice 
of management techniques. These shortcomings might be explained by the fact that 
there would be lack of high quality top managers, and an inadequate level of the 
understanding of requirements in industrial competition. 
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3.2.2.2 Training 
From Table 3.8 (source of knowledge about GMMTs), we can see that company 
practice had a high relevance to training because a company had to train their 
managers to be familiar with the new rules of new management techniques. Few 
managers claimed that they studied these techniques from a training course if their 
company did not practice them. 
Managerial training in China became more responsive to the requirements of 
the economic reforms and the introduction of foreign advanced technology. As 
Warner observed, a major restraint on technology transfer from the West (and 
Japan! ) was the shortage of professional managers at all levels, especially in 
market-related disciplines (Warner, 1987). It is not surprising that the reformers 
have called for the training and building up of managerial and technical cadres to 
lead the modernisation process (Child, 1994: 172). In March 1979, the China 
Enterprise Management Association (CEMA) was set up by the State Economic 
Commission to co-ordinate management education in China. It established a 
network of training activities involving universities and institutes and SOEs. In 
1981, the government decided that middle and senior managers should be trained at 
least on one enterprise management course. A number of managerial training 
centres were created by authorities, companies and universities. Foreign experts 
were invited to give lectures. For example, the Commercial Cadre Institute of 
Beijing invited an expert from the UK to teach QCs in 1985 (Bank, 1987: 99). 
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Despite the above efforts, some researchers believe that the majority of 
Chinese managers lack marketing knowledge and experience of operating in a 
really competitive marketplace (Chen, 1993). Companies were in danger of losing 
out to foreign competitors in many markets because their managers were not 
adequately trained and developed in the appropriate skills and techniques necessary 
to meet the challenges posed by a rapidly changing organisational landscape. The 
situation became even worse because there was an acute shortage of qualified 
marketing educators and inadequate training programmes (Zhou, 1991; Siu, 1994). 
It will be an arduous task to re-educate and retrain Chinese managers as they have 
to learn basic skills. 
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All companies I investigated have carried out managerial training. Figure 3.2 
provides the time spent on training by managers in the three levels between August 
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1998 and July 1999. It is clear that the higher level the managers were, the longer 
they attended managerial training. When I looked at managers receiving training of 
at least 10 days per year, the proportion of senior managers (56%) was much higher 
than others. In contrast, the proportion of senior managers (5%) who had 
managerial training for less than 2 days was lower than others. One reason for this 
may be that the qualification certificate obtained from training was a prerequisite 
for obtaining directorial or general managerial positions. Moreover, senior 
managers were more likely to have opportunities to attend training which was 
organised by the holding companies. 
It was reported that amongst senior managers 18% had not received any 
training in the previous year, this compared to 22% of middle managers and 35% of 
junior managers. This was partly due to top managers taking a poor attitude to the 
development of human resources or that there was little expenditure on training. 
The situations of Shanghai managers were slightly better than Turkish managers in 
white-goods where only 4 out of 10 of all managers reported any training in the 
previous 12 months (Nichols et al., 2002: 77). 
Besides the nine listed modern management techniques, the most commonly 
attended courses were those in enterprise management, finance and accounting, 
organisational behaviour and quality management. The other courses were 
computer science, health and safety, trading, marketing and so forth. `Deng Xiao 
Ping on building socialism with Chinese characteristics' was conducted as a 
training course. 
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According to Table 3.10, the industrial sector was a major site for training 
because on average 53% of managers were trained there (66% top managers, 59% 
middle managers and 42% lower managers). The individual company was the next 
most important training site, with 40% of managers being trained within their 
companies. Each company had its own training features. As an example, Elec-2 had 
offered MBA courses for senior and middle managers since 1997. Managers were 
trained in accounting, enterprise strategy, HRM and marketing, and they could 
obtain certifications after they passed all of their examinations. 
Table 3.10 Training Places. 
Company Sector Abroad Other 
Percentage* 40 53 5 12 
* Row percentages need not total 100%, since there is more than one channel for training. 
It was of significance that some managers were trained abroad although it was 
a very small percentage (5%). When this did occur, managers could systematically 
acquire new knowledge and look at the operation of GMMTs in foreign companies. 
For example, director Fu in Chem-1 had been trained at the University of Warwick 
for three months in 1999. After returning, Fu introduced lean production into his 
firm. He firstly distributed copies of The Machine that Changed the World to senior 
and middle managers and asked them to take an examination two months later. Fu 
tried to build up a production flow, and to supply factory's customers on time. In 
another case, 18 middle managers in Auto-1 were trained in Germany for three 
weeks from where they imported equipment. The managers subsequently played an 
important role in implementing lean production. 
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My survey suggests that very few enterprises have drawn up systematic 
training programmes for managers. The head of the general office in Publ-1 Ye 
made the following comments: 
We lack an objective in, and systematisation of, training. Managerial training 
in Shanghai SOEs was insufficient to diffuse GMMTs techniques very 
widely. I am told that there is a definite objective of training in some joint 
ventures and foreign funded companies. 
3.2.2.3 Mass Media and Books 
There has been an enormous global growth of books on management. By 1989, the 
number of such books published each year was estimated to have increased by 50 
per cent since 1980 (Wood, 1989: 379). It peaked in the 1990s. For example, The 
Machine that Changed the World (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990) has achieved a 
singular prominence, selling more than 150,000 copies in the US in its first two 
years, and becoming a national bestseller. That same year, this book was a best 
selling business book in Germany (Babson, 1995: 1). The book was translated into 
11 languages and sold 400,000 copies globally. As another example, Reengineering 
the Corporation (Hammer and Champy, 1993) was on the best-seller list of New 
York Times for several months in 1993, and GMMTs evoked enormous interest 
from academics in various disciplines. The constellation of new management 
techniques have been widely publicised in the business press and journals. 
The mass media in China in the reform years became an important channel 
for spreading information on modem management techniques. Economic and 
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business coverage in the media attained great importance, and business publications 
were very popular. After the launching of the economic reforms in 1978, a new 
kind of journal, Management World, emerged to introduce new ideas promoting 
modernisation, which was run by the Economic, Technological, and Social 
Development Centre of the State Council (Lewis and Sun, 1994: 66). Some journals 
and magazines were published at provincial level but had a national circulation 
such as Shanghai Management Science. 
During my research, various articles were found in journals which introduced 
the concepts and theories of global management techniques, made comparisons and 
shared the experiences of implementation and practical application. For instance, 
there were articles entitled Just in Time--a New Innovation of Modern Enterprise 
Management (Qian), The Relationship between Business Process Re-engineering 
and TQM (Li, 1998), Lean Production and Quality of Employees (Luo), The 
Application of Lean Production in Small Enterprises (Le). However, the articles 
introducing GMMTs were too few to play an important role in diffusing these 
techniques. 
Figure 3.3 shows that the extent of managers obtaining knowledge from the 
mass media varied in the different age groups but the differences were small. For 
example, in the case of learning about flexible production from the mass media, 
there were a slightly higher proportion of managers in the middle aged group (24%) 
compared with the younger managers (21%) and the older managers (22%). Similar 
results were found in the other eight GMMTs. 
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Books have been an important means of transferring new idea from foreign 
countries to China. Some English books, which introduce modern management 
theories and techniques, have been imported and translated into Chinese. In the 
1980s, there was an emphasis on organisational behaviour and I IRM. One of the 
representative books, Drucker's The Practice of Management (1954), was 
published in China in 1989. In the 1990s, the emphasis shifted to lean production, 
JIT, team work, Kaizen and BPR. Various books were translated including The 
Machine that Changed the World (Womack et al., 1990; Chinese version, 1991), 
Just in Time the human Side (Adair and Heeley, 1991; Chinese version, 1995), The 
Lear Eiiteiprise (Dimancescu et a/., 1997; Chinese version, 1998), Lean Thinking 
(Womack and Dania, I996; Chinese version, 1999), The Essence of Business 
Process Re-Engineering (Peppard and Rowland, 1995; Chinese version, 1999) and 
Gemba Kaizen. - A Commonsense, Low-cost Approach to management (Imai, I997, 
Chinese version, 2000). Some books written by Chinese authors then appeared to 
help people to understand these new techniques, for example, Production that 
Changed the World (Shen et al., 1996), and Lean Production (Peng et al., 1995), 
Business Process Re-Engineering (Xu, 1997) and Team spirit (Jia et al., 1999). 
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Books are a good source by which managers can learn about new 
management techniques for themselves. Whether or not a book can be used in this 
way depends on two factors. One is managers' awareness which leads managers to 
find the solutions for their enterprises by looking through books. On the other hand, 
the educational level of managers has an impact on their understanding of 
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management books, as is clearly seen in Figure 3.4. This figure illustrates the 
relationship between the educational level of managers and the rate of their learning 
team working through reading books. Managers who graduated from postgraduate 
schools accounted for 33%, university graduates 29%, college graduates 25% and 
secondary school graduates for only 16%. Generally speaking, the higher the 
educational level managers had, the more likely they were to read books and to 
understand essential parts of the books. In terms of team working, managers who 
graduated from postgraduate schools (33%) and reported books as their main source 
of knowledge number twice as many as those who only graduated from secondary 
schools (16%). However, this trend did not apply to managers' job levels. Middle 
managers had the highest rate (25%) and senior manager the lowest rate (22%). In 
general, some managers complained that they were too busy to read books. 
3.2.2.4 University Education 
After 1978, China emphasised investment in human capital by developing the 
education system. Some top universities rebuilt departments of management and 
ran management courses. Then there was a boom in business schools and schools of 
economic management. By 1997,403 out of 1,056 universities in China taught 
economic management (Rei, 1997: 252) and Business Schools turned out about 
5,000 trained managers during 1980 to 1989. Management became the key to 
employment and professional careers. Several Western management schools 
(mainly from the US and the UK) have set up joint teaching arrangements with 
Chinese universities to introduce Western management disciplines since 1979. 
Some foreign pedagogical material was imported. Chinese students now receive 
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MBA education not only from Chinese institutions but also institutions abroad. In 
Shanghai, prestigious universities cooperate with their European and USA 
counterparts, the Europe International Business School being an example. 
In my survey sample, 71% of managers graduated from higher education 
institutes, with only 30% having studied a management-related discipline. Amongst 
these managers who studied a management-related discipline, the youngest group 
(44%) occupied the biggest proportion, compared with middle age group (40%) and 
the oldest group (16%). As shown in Table 3.8, the percentage of managers who 
learnt about GMMTs from universities was very low, varying from 9% (HRM) to 
2% (Kaizen). This might be that new techniques were introduced into China or 
appeared in university curricula after managers studied in the universities. In fact, 
Western management methods such as lean production, inventory management, 
supply chain and logistics management appeared on the curricula in 1999, whilst 
they were commonly seen in the courses of Western universities before this date. 
Management education still lacks a thematic unity and intensity, and cannot 
meet the needs of enterprise production and economic development. The head of 
the production department in Auto-5 said: 
I graduated from a university in Beijing in 1990. I did not learn about 
production control or flow of materials there. Working in Auto-5, I had not 
heard of materials flow. Now our company is applying lean production and 
JIT. The flow of materials as an important part needs to be studied and 
innovated. Now I am in change of the production flow. From planning, 
procurement, production, inventory to sells, I have to take pains to learn, 
understand and apply them by myself. I could freely use this technique now if 
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I had learnt it in university. I am pleased to know that some universities have 
courses about flow of materials and inventory management now. 
Figure 3.5 shows managers who learnt about automobile engineering or 
electrical engineering at university and worked in the related industries knew more 
about Kaizen than those managers who learnt about management at university. It 
seems likely that more managers learn about Kaizen directly through company 
practices than through university education. On the other hand, University 
education enhanced managers' abilities to learn and implement new management 
techniques. 
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3.3 Managers' Views on Global Modern Management Techniques 
3.3.1 Managers' Views on GM MTs in General 
Table 3.1 1 summarises the results of managers' perceptions of nine listed GMMTs. 
Although many managers did not provide a full response to the survey, 
nevertheless, some analysis is possible. Firstly, only about half the managers rated 
nine listed modern management techniques as useful. The average proportion was 
53%, with 83% (TQM) being the highest and 34% (Kaizen) the lowest one. The 
more managers were familiar with these techniques, the more managers thought 
them useful. For example, TQM was thought the most useful technique and 83% of 
managers claimed to know about it. 
Table 3.11 Managers' Views on GMMMITs. 
Techniques Very Useful A little Some Not really No answer 
(Row"/, ) useful (2) useful use useful 
_ 
(1) (3) (1+2+3) 
---- ---- Kairen 7 18 9 34 1 65 
LP l8 24 7 49 1 50 
QCs 16 27 7 50 U 50 
Team 22 33 8 63 O 37 
JIT 9 25 8 42 0 58 
BPR 11 20 9 40 1 59 
FP 5 24 13 44 1 55 
TQM 40 36 7 83 0 17 
HRM 34 30 6 70 0 30 
Total N=1,012 LP=Lcan Production. FP=Flexible Production 
Secondly, it is reconfirmed that many missing responses might be because 
managers had no knowledge of GMMTs. Compared Table 3.11 with Table 3.1 
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(Managers' familiarity with GMMTs), it is seen that these two missing rates are 
highly correlated. The missing rates in Table 3.11 are also higher than those in 
Table 3.1, which might mean that some managers knew about these techniques but 
had difficulty in giving their assessment because they did not use them extensively. 
Moreover, managers infrequently answered that these techniques were not really 
useful. 
Managers rating GMMTs as useful did so because they thought GMMTs gave 
them a competitive advantage inside their organisation, as a personnel manager in 
Elec-3 said: 
These management techniques--soft techniques are more important than hard 
versions because they easily form a continuous advantage for enterprise 
competition. The core ability of these soft techniques is difficult to copy by 
our opponents and has a long term influence on company performance. 
A middle manager in Auto-5 also pointed out: 
GMMTs are advanced techniques because people are regarded as the most 
important resource in these techniques. 
These two managers were aware of the soft form of modem management 
techniques, such as people management. Trevor (1983) divided management 
practices into a hard variant (technology, products) and a `soft' variant (social 
relations, education, conscience). However, most mangers recognised the 
advantages of hard variant of these techniques. An information manager in Elec-2 
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thought that lean production was scientific because it was a system pulled by the 
market. It was echoed by a production manager in Auto-5: 
Lean production has a special emphasis on flexibility, low inventories, and 
quick response to market demands. They are based on a wider product mix, 
multi-skilled operators and fewer organisational levels. BPR is also 
introduced because the ability to provide quicker responses to customers at 
lower costs than competitors, as a result of process redesign, can lead to 
advantages in the market. 
By contrast, there was a high proportion of managers who did not rate Kaizen, 
BPR and JIT. This appears to reflect the fact that managers had inadequate 
knowledge about these techniques or these techniques did not really work. 
3.3.2 Managers' Views on the Adoption of GMMTs 
Managers were asked `what is your view on the adoption of GMMTs'. The survey 
suggested a high level of support for adoption, with about 85% of managers saying 
they should be adopted. Managers stressed the importance of adopting GMMTs. 
This was borne out in their comments. In general, managers thought that modern 
management techniques were achievements of advanced management and it would 
be an inexorable trend for Chinese managers to utilise these techniques: 
We will be obsolete and separated from the outside world if we do not catch 
up with international management levels. Anything which can improve 
productivity we should learn and adopt (an administration manager in Elec-2). 
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In particular, modern management techniques were seen to meet the exigencies of 
the market economy: 
GMMTs are good because they suit a market economy. These techniques 
focus upon economic efficiency and maximal profit; they give people 
motivation and call for a high quality of employees; they make management 
follow strict rules (a middle manager of Auto-4). 
It is evident that most managers' attitude to GMMTs is positive and that there has 
been a change in managers' attitude to GMMTs, as a manager in Auto-1 described: 
During the Cultural Revolution, it was said that we would rather want 
socialist grass than capitalist seedlings. At the beginning of opening doors to 
the world and economic reforms, most managers took the attitude of `wait and 
see' and strongly opposed the danger of all-out Westernisation. Now we 
realise that it does not matter that these management techniques originated 
from capitalism or socialism. 
When I went further and looked at managers' views on the social significance 
of adopting GMMTs, 53% of managers answered `to accelerate economic 
development and to bridge the gap with Western countries'; and 29% of managers 
referred to `improved management in SOEs'. It is commonly believed that these 
techniques would be useful in widening their management ideas, changing their 
management system, strengthening responsibility, reducing waste and improving 
efficiency. Moreover, 17% in total said that GMMTs could be useful in increasing 
the capacity to compete in the global market, with 11% of managers citing `to 
propel the development of civilisation, increase wealth and to improve people's 
living standards'. As can be seen from Figure 3.6, there was only a slight difference 
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in managers' views on the introduction of GMMTs for development in relation to 
their seniority. 
Figure 3.6 Views on `Learning GM1N1Ts is Useful to Economic Development' 
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3.3.3 Managers' View on the Factors which Affect the Adoption of GM MTs 
A distinctive feature of China's politics and economy has been the dual power 
structure within every Chinese organisation consisting of executive management 
and the Party. Each has its own internal structure and has an independent reporting 
relationship to superior authorities outside the organisation. Moreover, in China, the 
weak link between ownership and property rights, in particular, the mediation of the 
link by government officials, set significant limits to managerial discretion (Child, 
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1994: 304). Previous research by Zhuang and Whitehill (1989: 64) concluded that 
China would not completely adopt Western management techniques and the 
solution to China's management problems would be uniquely Chinese in nature. 
This view is supported by my finding that 47% of managers in three age 
groups emphasised that the adoption of GMMTs should be in combination with 
Chinese practices (see Figure 3.7). Views like these were shared by managers, 
showing no clear age-related differences. 
Figure 3.7 Views on `Adoption of GMMTs in Combination with Chinese 
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This was not only a feature of the thinking of the new generation. A middle 
aged manager in Publ-l comments: 
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Most GMMTs developed in capitalist private ownership, history, culture and 
the situation of Western countries. They do not completely suit our situation. 
The Chinese economic reforms were designed to find a distinctive path of The 
Socialist Market Economy to modernisation rather than to adopt the whole 
Western model. What is the exact meaning of The Socialist Market Economy 
is, still not clear. What are the characteristics of the system? There is no ready 
model to copy in the world, so the Chinese government was left with one 
solution: feeling for stones to cross the river, as Deng Xiao Ping said. Having 
reformed for twenty years, we have adopted some GMMTs. We should create 
a new management technique suitable to our industrial situation. 
A manager in his 50s in Light-3 indicates: 
As far as I am concerned, GMMTs are rigid and relatively lacking in emotion. 
Although some Western countries make efforts to carry out the principle of 
picking people as the first, it is still far from the Chinese reality. In order to 
apply a management technique in a different environment, a variation of the 
technique in some aspects is needed. If a top manager ignores the social 
circumstances, enterprise ability and quality of employees, he cannot achieve 
high efficiency. 
This suggests that Chinese managers regarded GMMTs as hard forms of 
management practice. It is noticeable that managers were worried about the 
negative effects of the implementation of GMMTs including increases in 
unemployment and social instability. A director in Text-3 expressed his feelings: 
Applying Western management techniques which link cruel competition 
might produce some unanticipated outcomes, such as unequal job 
opportunities, and unfair income distribution and weak protection of 
employees' interests. The profit motivation may influence our value 
orientation. 
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Some researchers have noted the influence of cultural factors in the adoption 
of GMMTs in China. There is a stronger emphasis on relationships, group 
orientation, respect for age and hierarchy in China (Easterby-Smith et al., 1995: 33). 
Easterby-Smith et al. (1995: 55) described a comparative study that was carried out 
in matched Chinese and UK companies to investigate the sensitivity of HRM to 
culture. They found that in China relationships were important in the soft areas 
including appraisal, reward systems, the process of assessing potential and the basic 
stance of unions towards management. My research finding appears to support this 
view. As an example, `relationships' affected the implementation of JIT, as Chen 
said: 
China has a tradition of establishing an order based upon personal 
relationships (guan xi). As a result, the relatively low use of JIT in supply and 
delivery could be traced to the reason of an atypical purchasing behaviour (in 
charge of enterprise management in Elec-3). 
Being in the primary stage of a market economy is another factor that has 
affected China's ability to learn from GMMTs. The Western economy is in the 
post-industrial stage, with a well-developed infrastructure and market mechanism; 
whereas China is in the early stage of industrialisation, with an under-developed 
infrastructure and embryo market systems. It is obvious that post-industrial models 
are not suitable to the Chinese context (Fan, 1998: 211). Managers who have 
worked in planned economies are likely to have different ideas about managing a 
business to those of their Western counterparts (Child and Rodrigues, 1996: 52). 
The managers I interviewed have seen old ideas to be hurdles to the adoption of 
GMMTs: 
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The Chinese lived in a closed planned economy for several decades. Old ideas 
which were created in the traditional planned economy were obstacles to the 
utilisation of Western techniques. For example, the `iron rice bowl' has not 
been really broken, managers cannot dismiss workers who loaf on the job. 
This is far from ideal for a market economy (a top manager of Chem-2). 
Both managers' and employees' quality are a related issue: 
The improvement of managers' quality would be a prerequisite for adopting 
GMMTs. Poor quality of top managers will cause a short term strategy and 
the system will be inefficient. Both managers and workers lack knowledge of 
GMMTs so these techniques cannot be utilised very well (a manager in Text-3 
who was in charge of the production department). 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter has examined how GMMTs have spread and have been adopted to an 
extent that depends very much on economic and political triggering events and the 
actions of several social actors. It investigated managers' knowledge of GMMTs. It 
is found that the proportion of managers who were familiar with new management 
techniques was low. It reveals that managers in those companies which had 
introduced GMMTs were more likely to have related knowledge. Similarly, we 
found that individual educational backgrounds are a factor that caused differences 
between managers' knowledge but this kind of influence is not as direct and strong 
as the organisational factors. 
It is evident that the youngest managers are the most conversant with GMMTs 
in general. This can be explained by the fact that younger managers are relatively 
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well educated and they grew up at a time when China was being opened up to the 
world. There have thus been more conduits for them to access international 
developments in management theory and practices. 
This chapter also examined the sources of knowledge about GMMTs. It is 
evident that company practice and training are found to be most important sources. 
The government played a key role in the diffusion of new management techniques 
nation-wide. At company level, top managements' recognition of the market 
economy and new management techniques influenced their decision making 
regarding the implementation of new management techniques. Media and books are 
also important channels for managers to access GMMTs. University education has 
disseminated new knowledge and enhanced managers' abilities. 
It is worth noting that joint ventures are an important source of knowledge 
about GMMTs, as we will see in the follow chapters. Foreign partners impose 
highly standardised practices which support their product or corporate brands. 
Chinese partners and local supplier companies are required to learn about 
international management knowledge and to imitate foreign management practices. 
Two important implications can be drawn from this chapter. Firstly, Chinese 
managers generally--including younger ones--are apt to identify GMMTs with hard 
methods. Basically, they attempt to increase productivity through increased 
technological efficiency. They are aware of the importance of soft variants of 
GMMTs--mainly the nature of work organisation, for example, people 
management. But the socio-economic background and the negative aspect of 
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cultural traditions influenced managers to adopt the soft variants of the new 
techniques. 
Secondly, most managers including younger ones indicate a need to adopt 
GMMTs in combination with Chinese reality. When Chinese managers speak about 
GMMTs and Chinese characteristics, they are not thinking about what happens 
inside the factory but about, for example, unemployment. Most Chinese managers 
see Western management practices as being cruel because its objective is to pursue 
maximum profits. However, with further market competition, Chinese managers are 
unlikely to maintain excess labour and are likely to seek convergence with Western 
management. 
The following chapters will explore, in more retail, how lean production was 
implemented in the state components companies in Shanghai. 
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Part Two 
Case Studies of Lean Production Practice 
Chapter Four 
The Coming of Lean Production 
The auto industry has been a laboratory for innovation in production. Contemporary 
production arose in the Ford Motor Company, where scientific management and 
extreme mechanisation in the shape of the assembly line came together as Fordism. 
Recently, lean production emerged from the Toyota Motor Company. Beyond 
Japan, the process of convergence from mass production to lean production is now 
under way in both developed and developing countries. 
China is the largest developing country in the world. In what sort of situation 
has the Chinese auto industry been? Womack et al. (1990), in their book The 
Machine That Changed the World, indicated a situation of inefficiency with a 
massive labour force in the Chinese auto industry: 
The Chinese industry is still focused inward, pursuing a combination of 
extremely rigid mass production in its two volume-production complexes in 
Changchun (No. 1 Auto Works) and Hubai (No. 2 Auto Works) and 
inefficient low-quality craft production in about a hundred additional vehicle- 
manufacturing facilities spread throughout China. This disastrous 
combination gives China the distinction of having the world's largest motor- 
vehicle industry in terms of employment (more than 1.6 million workers) and 
one of the smallest in terms of output (a projected 600,000 units in 1990) 
(Womack et al., 1990: 268). 
But what changes have taken place in the Chinese auto industry since 1990? 
Facing global competition, have Chinese managers and workers learnt from their 
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Japanese counterparts? To answer these questions, my research focuses on several 
components companies in the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (Group) 
(SAIC) to investigate the application of lean production and related changes. This 
chapter briefly shows how these components companies were approaching and 
implementing lean production as a strategy when facing internal and external 
challenges. It also explores the processes and characteristics of lean production 
practices. This chapter starts with a general review of the implementation of lean 
production in the Chinese auto industry. 
4.1 Lean Production in the Chinese Auto Industry 
The Chinese national auto industry was born in 1953 when the No. 1 Auto Works 
was established in Changchun. In 1957, it manufactured the first Chinese-made 
vehicle called Jie Fang, a middle-sized truck, using techniques from the Soviet 
Union. In 1958, it produced the first Chinese-made car branded as Dong Feng, 
followed by the Feng Huang car which was produced in Shanghai in 1958. During 
the following 20 years (1959-1978), approximately 120 auto enterprises were set up 
nationwide under the planned economy. They gradually increased their production 
capacity, but were still at the stage of small batch production and low efficiency by 
1978. 
The rapid development of the Chinese auto industry took place after the 
economic reforms starting from the end of 1978. It was reflected by a sharp increase 
of annual output and fixed assets. Compared with 1979, the annual outputs of 
129 
automobiles and motorbikes in 1997 had increased by 8 and 50 times, and reached 
1.58 million and 10 million units, respectively. Fixed assets in 1997 increased by 26 
times and amounted to RMB 181 billion (China Automotive News: 17 `h December, 
1998). These developments mainly resulted from government policies, heavy 
government investment, foreign capital investment, the establishment of sanzi 
enterprises (sino-foreign joint ventures, co-operative ventures and wholly-foreign- 
funded enterprises), and the introduction of advanced foreign production and 
management techniques. Many government policies were formulated during this 
period of time, as partly indicated in the previous chapters. These policies 
empowered managers to run their enterprises independently and reduced 
interference from government in decision-making. The Chinese auto industry 
received US$ 18.5 billion of investment from the Chinese government and attracted 
US$ 3.2 billion of foreign capital (ibid.: 17`h December, 1998). It established 550 
sanzi enterprises with companies from more than twenty countries and districts. It 
selectively imported more than 580 advanced foreign techniques which involved 
the most important procedures of motor vehicle production, such as whole vehicle 
production, components production, assembly technology, production equipment, 
research and development (R&D) and management (ibid.: 17`h December, 1998). 
The introduction of the shareholding system, encouraged by the central government, 
enabled auto enterprises to increase their scale quickly through merging and share- 
control. Now 13 large Chinese auto companies account for more than 90% of the 
total output and dominate the domestic market. 
In spite of these remarkable achievements including the dramatic increase of 
production capacity and production technology levels, the optimisation of auto 
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product structures and the improvement of the auto industry structure, in recent 
years most Chinese auto companies have still faced the serious problem of low 
efficiency. This problem became much more acute with fierce competition in the 
buyer market, as can be seen from Table 4.1. Table 4.1 presents key data of the 
seven large Chinese automotive groups in 1998. Three out of seven groups were 
loss-makers and wanted to be revitalised. It is worth noting that SAIC did quite well 
even under poor market conditions. The experience of SAIC may throw light on the 
development of the Chinese auto industry. 
Table 4.1 Performance indicators for Seven Large Auto Groups in 1998. 
Group Sales Vehicle Profit Output- Profit- Productivity 
revenue output (million capital cost 
(billion (car) RMB) rate (°/a) rate (%) (RMB/year 
RMB) (10,000 person) 
units) 
SAIC 74.9 23.5 5500 20.9 17.8 174,069 
(23.5) 
Group-1 33.4 28.9(8.1) 570 4.47 1.95 54,738 
Group-2 15.0 19.1 (3.6) -94 1.75 -0.7 25,767 
Group-3 11.9 15.5 (10) 530 6.84 5.5 53.785 
Group-4 8.7 8.2 (0.8) -200 3.5 -0.7 31.785 
Group-5 5.0 8.9 (0) -91 0.73 -2.27 11,466 
Group-6 6.5 6.9 (0) 230 6.59 3.82 28,963 
Note: Productivity*=Net production value of labour productivity of total workers (RMB/year 
person). 
Source: statistics made by <China trade commence automotive association>, <SAIC Annual 
Report>, 1999: 4. Group 1-6 refers to six big auto groups. 
Management in the auto industry gradually realised that modern management 
ideas, strategies and techniques played important roles in the improvement of 
competitive capacity. Lean production is such a key management system which 
combines new management philosophy with distinctive practices. The history of 
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lean production in the Chinese auto industry can be traced back to the beginning of 
the economic reforms. Management learnt about lean production either by visiting 
foreign companies and receiving training abroad, or by inviting foreign experts to 
give lectures in China. 
The earliest report about the implementation of lean production came from 
Changchun No. 1 Auto Works. In 1978, a director-led delegation of this firm spent 
six months in five famous Japanese automotive companies to learn about the 
Toyota production system. After returning to their firms, the members of the 
delegation introduced the Toyota production system amongst middle managers and 
workers. They also tried to implement several techniques into their firms in line 
with their aspirations at that time. In 1981, the director of Changchun No. 1 Auto 
Works invited Taiichi Ohno, a pioneer of lean production, to visit his firm and to 
introduce the Kanban system (Feng, 1995: 179). As a result, Kanban management 
together with mixed-flow production and QCs were applied in a rudimentary way. 
However, these lean production practices were suppressed by the planned economy 
because there was no market mechanism in the early years of the economic reforms. 
With the development of the market economy, the Chinese auto companies were 
urged to systematically improve product quality and production efficiency through 
the implementation of lean production. In 1989 when No. 1 Auto Works imported 
gearbox production technology from Japan, it adopted several related management 
techniques such as cellular manufacturing, one-piece flow and JIT. 
In 1991, the publication of the Chinese version of the book The Machine That 
Changed the World (Womack et al., 1990) symbolised a new era of lean production 
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application in China. Thereafter, a large number of Chinese books about lean 
production appeared in the bookshops. These publications are significant sources 
for diffusing lean production in the context of the demands of the joint venture car 
assembly companies and intensive market competition outlined below. In addition, 
the Department of Mechanical Industry that, at that time, supervised the whole 
Chinese engineering industry called for the application of lean production within a 
competitive environment. The China Association of Enterprises also made efforts in 
the diffusion of lean production because lean production was rapidly diffusing 
throughout the world. The Chinese auto industry was facing rapidly growing 
competition in the domestic market and had to prepare for international competition 
because China would join the WTO and open the domestic market to global 
players. Without a doubt, lean production was considered as `the best practice' for 
companies to survive. 
Table 4.2 The Implementation of Lean Production by Company. 
Companies Implementation 
No. I Auto Group JIT, Kanban, Cellular manufacturing, 
Team working, TPM, Lean sale, Cost 
cutting. 
SAIC JIT, Kanban, Team working, Kaizen, 
AMRPII, Lean management, Cost 
cutting etc. 
Company-1 Quality control 
Company-2 Kanban management, Supply chain 
One piece flew. 
Company-3 Kaizan, JIT 
Company-4 MRPII (Manufacturing Resource 
Planning) 
Source: Feng, (ed. ), 1995: 3; Shen, et al., (ed. ), 1995: 384; Wang, 1999: 438; Qi, 1999; Du, 1999: 
24. 
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In 1995, lean production had been implemented in five Chinese automotive 
companies (Shen et al., 1996), one of them was Auto-1 in SAIC which started to 
apply lean production in 1993. During the research which was carried out in 1999,1 
found that several auto groups claimed that they had implemented lean production 
at a variety of levels (see Table 4.2). Amongst them, No. 1 Auto Group and SAIC 
made impressive achievements in the application of lean production, but it can 
hardly be said that lean production has been significantly diffused into the whole 
Chinese auto industry. In 1999, Du, an engineer at the Lean Enterprise Centre of 
Excellence, China Automotive Technology and Research Centre, published his 
paper Lean Production: the Best Choice for Chinese Enterprises (Du, 1999) and 
called for a popularisation of lean production. The Lean Enterprise Centre of 
Excellence has trained people to understand lean production techniques (one-piece 
flow, kanban etc. ) and lean thinking to cope with waste in the value stream. 
It has been hypothesised that manufacturing strategy should be linked to 
operational performances (Hanson and Voss, 1993). As shown in Table 4.1, the 
performance of seven large auto groups exhibited huge differences. SAIC had the 
best performance in profit, the output/capital rate, the profit/cost rate and 
productivity. For example, its productivity was three times as high as that in Group- 
1 and 15 times as that of Group-5, and its profit/cost rate was three times as high as 
that of Group-3 and four times as that of Group-6. Some important questions arise: 
how did SAIC achieve such an excellent performance and competitive position? 
Was this performance associated with specific modern management technique--lean 
production? The following section will address these issues by presenting the 
research results from the auto components companies in SAIC. 
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4.2 Description of SAIC and Its Auto Components Companies 
SAIC was established on the basis of the Shanghai Automotive Industrial General 
Corporation in September 1995. It has 60,000 employees and consists of over 50 
enterprises including whole-vehicle manufacturing companies and component 
supply enterprises. Now it is one of the largest auto manufacturing groups in China. 
SAIC has co-operated in its 40 firms with more than 20 world famous auto 
companies. In 1985, it established the first joint-venture company in China-- 
Shanghai Volkswagen (hereinafter referred to as SVW), with the German 
Volkswagen Corporation (hereinafter referred to as GVW). The initial investment 
in the joint-venture was RMB 350 million in total. With rapid development and 
further investment, the assets of this joint-venture reached RMB 4.6 billion by 
2000. In 1997, SAIC set up the joint-venture company Shanghai General Motor 
(hereinafter referred to as SGM) and Pan-Asia Automotive Technology Centre with 
the US General Motor Company and achieved a total investment of US$ 1.57 
billion. 
Table 4.3 The Alain Economic Performance Indicators for SAIC from 1994 to 
1999. 
Year Output of Gross output Sales value Total profit 
automotives value (billion (billion RMB) (billion RMB) 
(10,000 units) RMB) 
1994 11.35 19.55 36.26 4.01 
1995 16.00 29.12 53.36 5.47 
1996 20.00 39.13 65.45 6.61 
1997 23.04 43.76 73.35 7.00 
1998 23.50 45.08 74.94 5.52 
1999 25.40 53.65 88.30 6.24 
Sources: Shanghai Economy Year Book, 1995: 60; SAICAnnual Report, 1999: 4. 
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SAIC produces a wide range of motor vehicles and components. The main 
products are the Santana, Passat and Buick car; motorcycles; tractors; trucks and 
internal combustion engines. During a period of strong market competition, SAIC 
sold 231,000 units of the Santana series car and 20,000 units of the Buick car, 
occupying 45% of the domestic market in 1999. Comparing 1999 with 1994, its 
auto outputs increased 224%, the gross output value grew by 274%, the sales value 
rose by 244% and its total profits went up by 156%. SAIC also started to advance 
into the overseas automotive market and exported car products of US$ 87.19 
million in 1999. The main performance indicators of SAIC are summarised in Table 
4.3. My case study focuses on the eight state-owned components firms and one bus 
manufacturer (Auto-8) in SAIC. Table 4.4 lists their organisational forms, 
ownership and major products. 
Table 4.4 The Type, Ownership and Major Products of the Sample 
Enterprises. 
Enterprise Type Ownership Major products 
Auto-1 Works SOE 
Auto-2 Co. Ltd. SOE jointed by capital 
Auto-3 Works 3 SOE, 3 JVE firms 
Auto-4 Corporate 3 SOE, 1 JVE firms 
Auto-5 Corporate SOE 
Auto-6 Co. Ltd. SOE jointed by capital 
Auto-7 Corporate SOE 
Auto-8 Co. Ltd. SOE 
Transmission assembly 
Chassis system, Truck 
Spring 
Bearings, Bushings, 
Stamping, Truck, Bus 
Die casting, Oil pump 
Brake hoses, Flexible cables 
Bus, Coach 
Auto-9 Works 1 SOE, 2 JVE firms Clutch 
Source: Booklet in each enterprise; Lu, (ed. ), 1999. 
Note: SOE=state owned enterprise, JVE=joint-venture enterprise. 
136 
Table 4.5 gives their establishment date, employee numbers and major 
customers. Although I refer to them as state-owned enterprises, some are jointly 
funded by small amounts of foreign capital. Their management is totally staffed by 
Chinese managers and there are no foreign managers on site. Eight firms are car 
components manufacturers and their major customers are SVW and SGM. Auto-1, 
Auto-2 and Auto-3 are leading car components firms in China. Some enterprises 
such as Auto-7 and Auto-9 have annual production capacities of over 300,000 units. 







Auto-1 1997 (1925) 3,700 SVW, SGM, BrazilianVW 
Auto-2 1992 (1912) 8,560 SVW, SGM 
Auto-3 1998 (1937) 960 SVW, SGM, No.! Works 
Auto-4 1994 (1965) 2,500 SVW, SGM, WHCitroen 
Auto-5 1989 (*) 5,928 SVW, SGM 
Auto-6 1992 (*) 2,000 SGM 
Auto-7 1993 (*) 2,000 SVW, No.! Works, 
Auto-8 1994 (*) 3,000 Pu Jiang Bus 
Auto-9 1956 (1938) 2,153 SVW, No. 1 Works, German F&S 
Total 30,801 
Source: Booklet in each enterprise. * data is unavailable 
Beside car components, these enterprises also produced components for the 
other type of vehicles, for example, Auto-1 manufactured transmission assemblies 
for 15-ton heavy lorries and SH50 tractors and exported its products to USA and 
other Western countries. These firms had faced different market competition and 
had varying performances. For instance, Auto-1, Auto-2 and Auto-3 were profit 
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makers. By contrast, Auto-5 and Auto-6 were suffering from financial hardship. 
Their organisations and management strategies affected the extent to which lean 
production was implemented. 
4.3 Lean Production Practice in the Auto Components Companies 
Womack et al. (1990: 19) claim that `new ideas emerge from a set of conditions in 
which old ideas no longer seem to work. This was certainly true of lean production, 
which arose in one country at a specific time...... '. What specific reasons made 
managers in the auto components companies in SAIC apply lean production? 
Where did managers get their ideas? What were the processes and characteristics of 
its application? These questions have been pondered throughout my research. 
4.3.1 Context and Strategy 
4.3.1.1 The Challenge: Manufacturing Components Locally 
In 1985, as a milestone in the development of the Chinese auto industry, the first 
joint-venture company SVW was established. As a partner, German Volkswagen 
hoped to extend its overseas market and to use cheap labour whilst SAIC wanted to 
utilise foreign capital and technology in order to build up a modern auto 
manufacturing base. With the support of the government, SAIC made great efforts 
to establish SVW. During the first two years, all components of Santana cars made 
in SVW were imported from foreign companies because of the lower technical level 
of the components manufacturers in SAIC. Within this situation, on the one hand, 
SVW had to spend a lot of hard currency to import parts. On the other hand, 
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components firms in SAIC were struggling to survive. To change this situation, the 
metropolitan government set a limit on the extent to which SAIC could import 
components. SAIC could not easily obtain funds from banks. 
So, what happened at SAIC? Basically, SAIC decided to manufacture the 
components of Santana cars by itself which was a unique solution for the 
components enterprises' survival. The `Santana car components localisation' 
project was supported strongly by the state and local government because it was 
associated with the development of the Chinese auto industry. The project was set 
up in 1987 and was expected to produce 60% of total components locally within 
three years. However, all components made locally had to reach all quality 
standards set by the GVW. It meant that the level of production and technology in 
these enterprises would substantially increase from the 1950s level to international 
levels by the late 1980s. 
4.3.1.2 The Problem: the Situation of the Companies 
Every employee in SAIC recognised that they had to make enormous efforts to 
realise the Santana car components localisation because the company's production 
capacity and technology levels were well behind that of advanced countries. We are 
taking Auto-1 as an example but other enterprises had the same or even worse 
situations at that time. 
In 1987, Auto-1 had much less advanced technology and equipment than at 
present. The facilities could be described as less automatic and brought several 
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kinds of problems to production activities. Production was organised on the basis of 
separated shop floors with a closed single cycle and was pushed according to a plan. 
The utilisation rate of machinery was low (only 36%). The enterprise suffered from 
several different types of waste. It was common to have excess production and 
purchase of materials, with huge inventories being the most striking results. For 
example, in 1987, Auto-1 had a sales income of RMB 36 million but the inventory 
cost was RMB 13 million. The surplus people and excess departments in the 
enterprise had been a waste of human resources. 
Looking at the output of products, Auto-1 produced 7,000 transmission 
assemblies in 1987, but it was only 0.2% of the output of GVW. This transmission 
assembly copied the Bazy (the model of the 1950s) which was 30 years behind the 
modern Santana car. Furthermore, some employees had poor quality consciousness. 
The first passing rate of assembly quality was 39%. In general, there was an urgent 
need to fundamentally change the production and organisation system in order to 
catch up with the production levels of GVW. 
4.3.1.3 The Strategy: Adoption of Lean Production 
Lean production arose in SAIC at a specific time when the company had a joint 
venture with GVW. By interviewing managers and workers during my fieldwork, 
three main reasons to adopt lean production in SAIC are identified. Firstly, 
management realised that the introduction of production technologies needed to be 
associated with the introduction of advanced management techniques. In order to 
reach the quality standards set by GVW, management in the component supply 
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enterprises in SAIC were under pressure and tried to learn about lean production 
following SVW. In addition, management was inspired, to a great extent, by the 
book The Machine That Changed the World (Womack et al., 1990), from which 
SAIC managers gained information about the diffusion of lean production around 
the world. Finally, management in some Chinese-Japanese joint-venture 
components enterprises copied Japanese practices. Top managers visited these 
foreign enterprises and imported new management ideas. These will be discussed, 
in detail, below. 
Since 1987 when SAIC decided to produce the components of Santana cars 
locally, all enterprises in the sample have purchased a great deal of sophisticated 
equipment from foreign countries. Importing equipment provided opportunities for 
managers and engineers, as well as workers, to learn about advanced technology 
and management from abroad, as Wang recalled: 
With 42 engineers and workers, I disassembled a second hand assembly line 
from a German firm in 1988. I saw the equipment originally, observed how it 
worked and took notes. During three weeks, what impressed me were good 
organisation and rigorous management in the German firm. We would not be 
successful if we only imported equipment without adopting modem 
management techniques (a production manager in Auto-1). 
Xie, one of members in Auto-4 who transported an electroplate production line 
from England, spoke of the same feelings: 
In a British firm, I saw each worker had responsibility for product quality. I 
was ashamed because we lagged far behind them. When a modern production 
line is introduced, our workers should improve quality consciousness. 
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Having invested in new technology for four years, top managers in SAIC 
spotted the fact that although the company had improved automation levels it still 
lacked comprehensive product standardisation efforts, logistic systems, highly 
skilled workers, flexibility in production and so on. These disadvantages were 
barriers to technological development. Indeed, modernisation is a multi- 
dimensional and dynamic process. It implies an integral change in technological 
foundations as well as in operational systems, the managerial and production 
processes and labour organisation. However, they had no clear idea about what 
management techniques would be suitable. 
I visited SVW twice during the period of the research. The production 
manager Yao, who gained a Masters degree in a famous University in Shanghai, 
told me that SVW implemented lean production practices due to the requirements 
of management in GVW: 
Management in SVW was inspired by the lean production carried out in 
GVW which set up the Kanban management in 1992. Our company's German 
director visited Toyota in Japan as soon as he knew about this. He put forward 
a proposal to learn about lean production in SVW, designed initially to carry 
out Kanban, QQM (one kind of quality management), team and KVP2, (one 
kind of Kaizen activity). The engine plant was chosen for this trial. 
In September 1992, SVW invited a senior advisor J. Park of GVW to 
introduce lean production. He was an expert in studying lean production and a 
professor in the Department of Philosophy and Social Science at Berlin University. 
Later, the newsletter Shanghai Automotive in SAIC published the article Lean 
Production--That Changed Peoples' Way of Thinking. The word `lean production' 
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appeared in the enterprise's newsletter for the first time when most people had no 
knowledge about lean production. Yao believed that this was a sign that SAIC 
would implement lean production following SVW. A manager in Auto-1 said: 
We supply components for SVW which does not accept any defective 
products. SVW has adopted lean production so we have no choice but to 
adopt those principles of lean production to achieve quality assurance. 
By that time, the Chinese version of the book The Machine that Changed the 
World was published. The China Automotive Industry General Corporation 
received its English version from the organiser of the International Motor Vehicle 
Programme (IMVP). Director Lu, at SAIC headquarters, was spurred by the 
advocacy of the authors Womack et al. (1990: 225): 
Our conclusion is simple: Lean production is a superior way for humans to 
make things. It provides better products in wider variety at lower cost. 
Equally important, it provides more challenging and fulfilling work for 
employees at every level, from the factory to headquarters. It follows that the 
whole world should adopt lean production, and as quickly as possible. 
He firstly required top managers of enterprises to study this book. A top manager 
remembered what happened to him: 
At the beginning, I could not understand the book. Our production systems 
were totally different from that of the Japanese so I lacked relevant 
knowledge. When I read a page I had to go back to the previous pages. I 
mean, it was totally new to me. 
Hua insisted that director Lu played a key role in applying lean production: 
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Director Lu seized the opportunity of the Santana car components localisation 
to apply lean production. By visiting America and Japan, he saw the rapid 
diffusion of lean production and realised that the philosophy of lean 
production was what SAIC needed to learn. So director Lu made a good 
decision to build up the lean production system in SAIC (a vice-chairman at 
the SAIC trade union headquarters and a former enterprise director). 
In addition to top management's advocacy, the association with the foreign 
joint-venture enterprises provided an advantage in accelerating the process of 
implementing lean production because some joint-venture companies implemented 
lean production following their foreign partners. For example, Auto-10 joined by a 
Japanese company had carried out labour saving activities and the 6S. 6S originates 
from Japanese words: Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, Syukan and Shitsuke, meaning 
cleanout, organisation, clean and check, standardise, discipline and custom. 
In October 1992,16 top managers from auto components companies in SAIC 
went into training in the Japanese Company, where managers had an opportunity to 
observe facilities and operational practices. Their attention was particularly caught 
by the orderliness and cleanliness of the shop floor, as well as by the organisation in 
manufacturing cells and the co-operation amongst workers. They learnt that behind 
what they saw were the ideas of high quality, the elimination of waste and 
continuous improvement. As a result, management was convinced of the need to 
implement dramatic changes in their operations to achieve the desired levels of 
productivity. The training lasted one month and was reported in the newsletter 
Shanghai Automotive. One manager said this training made it easier to understand 
the book The Machine That Changed the World. He came to know the meanings of 
Kaizen, Kanban, 6S and so on. Hua continued to introduce: 
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The management's ideas and plans to adopt lean production were published in 
Shanghai Automotive during the first half of 1993. Each company had a 
different focus such as quality control, reduction of lead time, production 
management, training, 6S and so on. 
4.3.2 The Process of Applying Lean Production 
The introduction of lean production in auto components companies in SAIC was 
indeed a revolution in management because most of these old SOEs had old 
behaviour patterns formed under the planned economy. It took time practising lean 
production. In general, the implementation of lean production was done through 
three main phases. 
4.3.2.1 Experimental phase 
Having made the overarching framework, top managers in SAIC tried to 
structurally alter the manufacturing process from the old principles of batch 
production to the highly efficient JIT system in order to reduce waste. The media 
propaganda experiment took place from 1992 to the end of 1994. 
Auto-1 carried out the lean production experiment firstly amongst the SOEs 
in 1993. This was because that a fire broke out on a shop floor and equipment was 
damaged with substantial losses being suffered. The fire highlighted an urgent need 
to change old production methods and to strengthen management control, as well as 
quality control which was mentioned above. Lean production was introduced in 
order to achieve these goals. 
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On 6 `h August 1993, director Chen in Auto-1 put lean production on the 
agenda at a middle management meeting. He decided to establish a `lean production 
promotion leading team' and a `risk production office' to guide lean production 
practices. The head of the production department Wang, the former chief of the 
`risk production office', explained the connotations of risk production: 
We did take risks to apply lean production at the beginning. We tried to 
design one-piece flow of materials and to adopt the Kanban system. We called 
lean production `risk production' because working with the tighter time and 
the limited work-in-progress inventories would cause unpredicted risks. For 
example, the risk would happen when a machine broke down or a worker 
could not produce on time. 
The risk I am talking about is the possibility of harmful ramifications. I run a 
risk because lean production might create uncertainty and unpredictability. 
Then I tried to cope with this uncertainty, to bring it down to a minimum and 
to eliminate the risk. 
In Auto-1, workers were trained to operate more than one machine and 
participated in zero defects management. On the shop floor, a production spot was 
focused upon as a centre, an operator as a subject and a production manager as a 
leader. This formed an environment that all people serviced for the first line 
workers to create value and to reduce waste. Auto-1 was a pioneer in the 
application of lean production in SOEs. 
The Party committees and the trade unions supported the implementation of 
lean production and participated in its promotion. They also encouraged and 
organised party members and unions' members to implement management's 
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decisions. Being an excellent party member required not only team working and 
multi-tasking operation, but also making suggestions. The unions' role in lean 
production will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
4.3.2.2 Widespread Phase 
The management launched the lean production programme on a wide basis during 
the end of 1994 to 1997. At the end of 1994, a meeting was held in Auto-1 where 
director Lu asked all companies to learn lean production as in Auto-I. The SAIC 
headquarters also set up a `committee for guiding lean production'. Implementing 
lean production was the main economic project in 1995, as top management in 
SAIC headquarters announced: 
The central theme of the economic projects is to apply lean production 
company-wide in order to reduce production costs by 5% this year. The ways 
to achieve it will be: (1) to strengthen management at the point of production 
and to carry out team working; (2) to co-operate with suppliers and to adopt 
JIT production; (3) to carry out target cost management and economic audits; 
(4) to make a quality guarantee system, to practice zero defects activities and 
to increase products without quality checking (Shanghai Automotive, 1s`, 
January, 1995). 
Intensive training in the new programme took place firstly at different levels. 
Managers and workers were given lectures on the importance of adopting lean 
production and a knowledge of the basic concepts of lean production techniques. 
Several textbooks for training have been published since 1995, for example, The 
Concept and Method of Lean Production; Introduction to Toyota Production; 
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American Talk about Lean Production; Team Working; The 38 Examples of Lean 
Production. After 8`h, January 1995, all employees could gain knowledge of lean 
production from the newsletter Shanghai Automotive. The topics included `what is 
lean production', `what is waste' and so on. From the newsletters, workers also got 
information on the process of utilising lean production. For instance, they knew 
which workshop was chosen firstly by their directors to implement lean production 
and which technique would firstly be introduced in their enterprises. 
In 1994, Auto-3 redesigned the spring production line using suspension 
chains. By this time, the kanban system started to be used and team working was 
implemented to make progress in this firm. Auto-2 successfully implemented team 
working to improve product quality in1995. In this year, Auto-5 restructured 16 
production lines and learnt JIT for capital rationalisation by cutting down work-in- 
progress inventories and final product storage. It also applied team working in line 
with suggestions making. In 1996, Auto-1 put forward the `six no permission' 
working method, regarding service for first line production workers. The `six no 
permission' stipulates that: (1) workers must complete their daily production 
targets, no permission will be granted to delay to the next day; (2) once any 
malfunction of the machine is found, no permission to produce will be granted until 
the machine is fixed; (3) no permission to produce will be granted when a worker is 
using a broken tool; (4) when any defective part is found, no permission to produce 
will be granted until the problem is resolved; (5) when an operator is absent, no 
permission to produce will be granted until another worker can take this place; (6) 
no permission will be granted to ignore kanban. Moreover, the company applied 
`weekly planning' to reduce plan cycles and implemented Manufacturing Resource 
148 
Planning (MRPII). 
In the auto components companies in SAIC, quality management with its own 
unique style has been formed through years of trials and practice. Especially, 
managers have made tremendous efforts to pursue their goals such as zero defects 
production, zero work-in-progress inventories and zero malfunctions of equipment, 
and these will be analysed in Chapter 5. 
4.3.2.3 Improvement Phase 
The improvement phase started in 1998. Having made changes in the production 
techniques and organisation, the SAIC management paid attention to `continuous 
improvement' or Kaizen, applying the principles of lean production to reduce costs 
more broadly. 
SAIC put forward the suggestion of implementing lean management in 
October 1999. Management intended to popularise good experiences in lean sales 
practices, lean investment strategies, lean procurement policies and the exploration 
of new products, with an increasing priority in R&D. As an example, world-wide 
procurement was used in SGM, and new products were designed in SVW. The 
Shanghai Auto Marketing Corporation is a pioneer in applying lean sales practice. 
The key activity of the improvement phase was cost management concerning 
financial costs, sale costs and management costs. In particular, the YT model was 
advocated. It will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Whilst cost management was a key theme in the improvement phase, 
developing a `learning organisation' was another practice which was used to 
continuously improve the quality of employees. I will discuss this technique in 
Chapter 7. 
4.3.3 The Characteristics of Lean Production Practice 
Management in the auto components companies tried to adopt lean production in 
their own environment to reach the best results. The practices of lean production 
were characterised by: (1) being in harmony with the building up of the `sample 
production zone'; (2) being consistent with `crisis management'; (3) diffusion at 
various speeds amongst different enterprises. 
4.3.3.1 Building up a `Sample Production Zone' 
The original `sample production zone' was built up in 1988 when the project 
`Santana car components localisation' was set up. This was a strategy to form a 
modem production environment in order to improve the rate of the Santana car 
components localisation. All workshops or assembly lines which produced the 
Santana car components were asked to be a management model in enterprises. The 
`sample production zone' was introduced to rationally restructure people, machines, 
material resources and to carry out stricter management in order to achieve high 
quality. Every enterprise made efforts to build a `sample production zone'. The 
management in the SAIC headquarters assessed workshops and gave the title of 
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`sample production zone'. What is the relationship between the building of the 
`sample production zone' and the application of lean production? Hua indicated: 
The establishment of the `sample production zone' was a special way to 
realise components localisation. The `sample production zone' was also 
chosen as a pioneer of implementing lean production because the `sample 
production zone' had proved to be an effective way of improving on-the-spot 
quality control which laid a good foundation for adopting lean production. On 
the other hand, the `sample production zone' should be injected with new 
production techniques. Lean production was added into the assessment 
content of being a `sample production zone' in 1995. 
A report showed that 90% of the `sample production zone' had steadily 
improved quality management due to the application of lean production in 1996. 
4.3.3.2 `Crisis Management' 
In September 1993, director Lu in the SAIC headquarters put forward a suggestion 
for `crisis management'. He wanted all employees to know that their company was 
facing a life or death crisis and the key strategy to overcome this crisis would be the 
implementation of lean production. Chen explained the relationship between `crisis 
management' and the adoption of lean production: 
`Crisis management' is concerned about the future of our company. It was 
useful to understand the importance of learning lean production. It made 
people realise that we should adopt lean production if we wanted to survive 
(in Auto-4). 
Hua mentioned two special reasons for carrying out `crisis management'. One was 
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the lessons learnt from America. Another was the arrogance of some employees 
because the `Santana car components localisation' programme made progress: 
After visiting GM in America, director Lu found that GM saw the crisis 
behind its prosperity. However, SAIC was just at the beginning of 
development. At this time, some employees had the idea that if the Santana 
car faced difficulties in surviving then other auto enterprises could not live at 
all. It was a very dangerous idea. Indeed, SAIC was intimately involved in the 
Santana's development. In a very real sense, we shared our destinies with the 
Santana car. However, the Santana car faced two basic crises: (1) it was a 
single product. We needed to develop new and attractive products that were 
able to stay in the market longer; (2) the high costs of the product. Compared 
with national and international prices, the price of the Santana car and its 
components was high. It was weak in the cost-based competition because 
some other car companies in other cities have caught up with Shanghai and 
produced low priced cars. Moreover, when China joins the WTO, foreign car 
components enterprises with cheaper and higher quality can easily enter 
China. The competition will extend worldwide. When a crisis does occur we 
shall be too late to survive. 
SAIC management popularised lean production, as a strategy, to overcome 
the current crisis at that time. Management concentrated on fulfilling their goal with 
minimum inventories and defective products, and maximum quality and efficiency. 
They tried to reduce costs over a very wide range of areas including manufacturing 
costs, sales costs, administrative costs, and even capital costs. 
4.3.3.3 Diffusion at Various Speeds 
My investigation suggested that not all firms adopted lean production system 
equally. Lean production was implemented well in some enterprises whilst it was 
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only learnt by other enterprises to the first stage. Taking the Kanban system as an 
example, some enterprises built up the Kanban system in 1994, some had just 
started by 1999. Whilst one enterprise had practiced Kaizen for five years, some 
workers in other enterprise had not heard of it. Differences also existed on the 
different shop floors within one enterprise. Imbalances amongst enterprises and 
shop floors are reflected in my survey findings. I discovered that the workers 
surveyed had different experiences of management practices associated with lean 
production (Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6 Worker's Different Experiences of Management Practices 
Associated with Lean Production by Firm. 
Unit: % 
Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto A* 
--1 --2 --3 --4 --5 --6 --7 --8 --9 
1 89 78 89 84 77 80 100 68 74 83 
2 92 83 86 83 69 82 100 68 74 83 
3 94 84 88 91 74 82 100 76 91 87 
4 90 82 78 83 75 73 100 75 65 82 
5 95 94 88 92 75 81 84 75 69 85 
6 94 91 91 92 80 81 84 80 74 86 
7 93 91 88 87 80 83 98 89 82 88 
8 96 87 86 91 79 85 96 88 95 89 
9 87 79 88 74 75 72 96 77 70 81 
10 96 92 91 91 84 91 100 94 85 92 
Note: 1=one-piece flow, 2= Kanban, 3=multi-tasking operations, 4 =zero inventories, 
5=zero defects, 6= team worki ng, 7=Kaizen, 8 =TPM, 9=MRP, 10= cost cu tting 
A*=Average. The sum of row percentages is not 100% since there are more than one 
technique workers had experienced. 
Table 4.6 indicates that most workers had experienced cost cutting exercises, 
which reflects the smallest difference between firms (100% in Auto-7 and 84% in 
Auto-5, respectively). However, the biggest gap exists amongst enterprises in terms 
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of zero inventories, 100% in Auto-7 and 65% in Auto-9. It is no surprising that 
workers in Auto-7 who had experience of one-piece flow, Kanban, multi-tasking 
operation and zero inventories were more knowledgeable than those in other 
enterprise because these techniques related to JIT production. By contrast, the less 
that workers claimed that they had participated in lean production the less there was 
utilisation of lean production in these enterprises. It is confirmed that the percentage 
of workers in Auto-5 and Auto-8 who participated in these activities was less than 
those workers in other enterprises. This suggests that these two enterprises have not 
adopted JIT very widely. 
What accounts for these differences? During the research, most managers told 
me that the suppliers to SVW, a joint-venture company, had significantly better 
practices than other kind of companies because SVW had a quality standard which 
forced their suppliers to strengthen management. Auto-8 manufactured buses and 
Auto-5 mainly produced trucks, and this was part of the reason why they lagged 
behind other enterprises. Is there any other reason? Chen, a production manager in 
Auto-4 gave his opinion: 
Adopting new techniques was restricted by objective conditions. You see, the 
old shop floor's poor layout needed to be destroyed to realise one-piece flow. 
It was impossible to change all layouts at the same time. It would take time. 
However, in the state-owned companies, management was considered an important 
factor which affected the extent to which lean production was adopted. Hua insisted 
that the top manager in the enterprise played a dominant role in adopting lean 
production: 
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Indeed, the role of a top manager is especially important in the 
implementation of lean production. If a top manager intended to adopt lean 
production and did his best to implement the ideas of lean production, the 
enterprise would yield many fruits. However, if a top manager did not want to 
adopt lean production, even if other employees were enthusiastic about it, the 
progress would be slow. The positive effort of top managers is required to 
maintain the momentum of improvement. 
Gu, a director of the micro economy department in the Shanghai Academy of Social 
Science, believed that managers were very important figures in popularising lean 
production: 
The implementation of lean production should be through the company's own 
initiative. Although management were asked to adopt lean production by the 
SAIC headquarters, they had no confidence to carry on when they were 
worried about whether workers followed. If managers saw the application of 
lean production as surplus and excessive demands, they could not manage the 
enterprise well. Only if managers were aware of the importance of using lean 
production as a last resort could they adopt lean production without any 
distracting thoughts (Gu, 2000). 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has described the development and challenges of the Chinese auto 
industry during the age of economic reforms. The auto industry faced intensified 
competition from foreign companies which had adopted the new technique of lean 
production. There seems to be more or less recognition of lean production amongst 
the Chinese auto companies, reflecting a variety of degrees of application. As we 
have seen in this chapter, some state components companies in SAIC are in the 
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process of imitating the lean production model. 
It has been seen that one clear, and direct, mechanism for the introduction of 
lean production is the existence of joint venture companies, which can impose high 
standards based on their practice in other countries. For example, companies 
supplying components to SVW were under pressure to achieve quality standards, so 
these suppliers, to a joint-venture company, had significantly better practices than 
other kind of companies. Whilst the joint-venture companies accelerated the 
diffusion of lean production, the top management in SOEs played a dominant role 
in the utilisation of lean production. This was a reason why lean production was 
adopted to a different extent in different companies. This chapter gave the general 
characteristics of the application of lean production. However, it seems that auto 
components companies in SAIC overall are in the early stage of the adoption of 
lean production although a few companies are well underway. 
Having given a general introduction to components companies in SAIC and 
its application of lean production, the following chapters will, in turn, examine 
details of the application of the lean production system (Chapter 5); its impacts 
upon workers (Chapter 6); the changes in work organisation (Chapter 7); and the 
role of the trade unions in the new environment (Chapter 8). 
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Chapter Five 
Lean Production and Elimination of Waste 
Lean production is considered, by some sources, as a universal best management 
technique, which is distinguished by the elimination of waste (for example, 
Womack et al., 1990; Kenney and Florida, 1993). Management in the auto 
components companies of SAIC has implemented lean production, resulting in 
great changes in their production system and work organisation. This chapter 
focuses on the application of lean production in more detail. It explores how this 
new production system works by presenting its basic ideas and goals with the 
various techniques used for achieving them. Moreover, it describes how managers 
in the components enterprises built up their lean production systems; where 
manager's ideas came from; and exactly what they did. Furthermore, it also 
provides an initial account of how managers and workers viewed the resultant 
changes. 
5.1 The Understanding of Lean Production 
Womack and Jones advocated the thinking way of lean production, `lean thinking is 
lean because it provides a way to do more and more with less and less--less human 
effort, less equipment, less time, and less space--while coming closer and closer to 
providing customers with exactly what they want' (Womack and Jones, 1996: 15). 
During the research period, I found that the advantages of lean production had been 
recognised by management and workers I interviewed in the auto components 
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companies. For instance, `lean production aims at the maximum output with 
minimum input' (Wang and Zhong, both middle managers in Auto-1); `the goal of 
lean production is to eliminate waste, to cut costs and to improve productivity' 
(Zhu, a head of shop-floor in Auto-4); `lean production is used to improve product 
quality' (Yu, an operative in Auto-2). In addition, `lean production enhances 
workers' motivation' (Xie, a team leader in Auto-4); `lean production also 
promotes continuous improvement. It motivates workers to improve products and 
processes' (a production manager in Auto-3). In general, as Hua ( who is a former 
director of a firm and a union chairman in the headquarters of SAIC) said, `lean 
production is about leanness, with cutting costs being at its core'. 
The above understandings are fundamental to the effective implementation of 
lean production. The adaptation of lean production in SOEs is of significance 
because waste has been one of the most stubborn and fatal problems in SOEs. 
Employees in the auto components companies have been instilled with a cost-based 
thinking way instead of the traditional one. In the planned economy when 
enterprises were under the protection of the government, a profit was certain, and 
higher costs simply resulted in higher prices. Enterprises reported costs and prices 
to the government without caring about high costs. However, it led to massive 
waste and low efficiency. The price formula is: Cost + Profit = Price. By contrast, 
in the market economy, low cost and good quality is a prerequisite for 
competitiveness because the cost is uncertain and customers insist on a competitive 
low price. This means that profits can only be made by reducing costs. The price 
formula is: Price - Cost = Profit, as a head of the manufacturing department in 
Auto-3 suggested: 
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Looking at these two formulas, conversion is not a simple mathematics game. 
It needs a fundamental change, which affects the company's fate. My job has 
shifted to tap the potentialities of my company development. For example, it 
is to keep as little cash as possible tied up in inventories and to increase cash 
flow. 
Without a doubt, management's attempts to raise labour productivity and 
profitability constitute the dynamic behind the emulation of lean production. In 
SAIC, as will be discussed below, cutting costs runs through all the production 
process, with the reduction of work-in-progress inventories as the first step, the 
elimination of defective products as a focus and reducing the lead time as a driver. 
It seemed, on the face of it, that the primary goal of management was, as Kenney 
and Florida (1988: 136) claimed, `to increase productivity not through super- 
exploitation of labour but rather through increased technological efficiency, 
heightened utilisation of equipment, minimal scrappage or rework, decreased 
inventory, and higher quality. It thus increases the "value" extracted in production, 
decreases material consumed per unit output, and minimises circulation time, 
making the actual production process much more efficient'. However, my research 
reveals that the implementation of lean production was inevitably implicated in the 
intensification of labour, the increase of stress and more management control. 
5.2 Reduction of Work-in-Progress Inventories 
In the lean supply chain, JIT is a key technique to reduce costs. JIT seeks to exactly 
match production to both internal and external customer demands. The exact 
quantity of the necessary materials for the production line are intended to arrive at 
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the time needed to ensure that the exact quantity of finished parts are dispatched to 
the customer on time for further productive consumption. JIT's most visible aspect 
is its very low use of inventories which improves stock-turns and ultimately capital 
turnover (Delbridge and Oliver, 1991). It is also observed that JIT is often 
transferred from the core manufacturing company throughout the supply chain 
(Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Turnbull et al., 1992). 
In SAIC, SVW firstly announced it would apply JIT and demanded its 
component suppliers to deliver components on time. At the time the research was 
conducted, most local suppliers delivered every two days on average and did not 
approach the ideal of JIT production. SVW assembles a Santana car every two 
minutes on average, and a one hour delay in components delivery could, therefore, 
potentially affect the assembly of 30 cars. The component suppliers had 
responsibilities for delivery on time and paid for any costs due to delays. More 
exactly, SVW pushed the pressure down the supplier chain by shifting the burden of 
inventories onto them. 
Auto-1 firstly dabbled with JIT in 1993. As a supplier of SVW, Auto-1 
recognised JIT as not only providing customers with exactly what they want on 
time, but also ensuring that every production procedure was completed on time 
without unnecessary stoppage and work-in-progress inventories. In September 
1993, director Chen decided to build up the JIT system in two and half years with a 
reduction of work-in-progress inventories in the first half of year. 
In discussing JIT, reference has been made to a ship floating in deep water 
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(high inventories prior to JIT) that covers the rocks (waste and problems); then by 
gradually lowering work-in-progress (WIP) inventories, the rocks are exposed 
releasing improvement opportunities (through JIT). Auto-1 used craft production as 
a dominant mode of fabrication and assembly, and massive work-in-progress 
inventories hid problems by covering them up, as Wang described: 
There was a very small production line surrounded with a large amount of 
work-in-progress inventories. We also had materials inventories and finished 
goods inventories. Many problems were often hidden by these inventories, 
such as machine break-downs, worker absenteeism and poor quality of 
products. So maintenance, quality and management control were not 
considered important by managers and workers (a head of the production 
department in Auto-1). 
As a consequence, it was a formidable task for management to build up a JIT 
production system that required zero inventories and broke up old production 
methods. Each revolution has a hurdle at the beginning, as Yu recalled: 
When I was told firstly to cut work-in-progress inventories, it almost killed 
me. How big a risk I will take if an operation is unbalanced and a machine 
breaks down! `Headache' was a common feeling amongst middle managers 
like me. It would be unimaginable for me to manage without inventories (a 
production manager in the No. 1 Workshop of Auto-1). 
Pan believed that the reduction of work-in-progress inventories was also a 
challenge to workers because they would have to change their ways of doing things: 
For workers, it was convenient to pick up parts from boxes close to the 
machine. They used to fetch parts when they needed. Some workers who hid 
or threw defective products away could easily find parts to rework (the party 
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secretary in the No. 1 Workshop of Auto-1). 
When managers and workers were worried about the fluctuation of production, 
director Chen persisted in applying JIT production to reduce inventories and to find 
any problems hidden behind the inventory, as Wang recalled: 
To make middle managers understand, Chen led 28 middle managers to learn 
about lean production in ChangChun No. 1 Auto Works in September 1993. 
Later, he invited some experts to give lectures, and he introduced lean 
production in the training courses by himself. 
Figure 5.1 The Causes of Work-in-Progress Inventories. 
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old production system old idea no smooth operation 
According to director Chen's requirement, the No. 3 gear milling workshop 
with 105 people was chosen as an experimental site in which to reduce work-in- 
progress inventories. Workers were firstly asked to discover the reasons for massive 
work-in-progress inventories. By using the five `why' method of thinking to find 
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problems, they were able to produce some results, as shown in Figure 5.1. By 
spotting these problems, workers and management came to be aware of massive 
waste. 
It is clear that senior management forced workers to reduce work-in-progress 
inventories. The inventory control was implicated in the whole production process. 
In essence, without the existence of buffer stocks, management gained greater 
control over both production and the workers. In the following sections, it will be 
seen how one-piece flow and the kanban system were implemented to reduce waste 
caused by work-in-progress inventories in SAIC. Cellular manufacturing and 
standardised operation will be considered in Chapter 6. 
5.2.1 One-Piece Flow 
One-piece flow is a core of JIT, and initially involves implementation of kanban, 
group technology (cellular layout) and the quick change of dies. Williams et al. 
have indicated that: 
Low stocks are an important indicator of the physical integration of 
manufacturing operations and measure the manufacturer's ability to realise 
smooth continuous flow in multi-process manufacturing; flow is an important 
influence on productivity and costs because smooth flow takes out indirect 
handing labour and allows direct labour to work continuously and efficiently 
(Williams et al., 1992: 22; cited in Danford, 1996). 
During my research, several shop floors had developed new layouts in an 
attempt to group operations around the product and to improve material flows. The 
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No. 3 workshop in Auto-1 initially utilised one-piece flow. The engineers and 
production managers, as well as workers, designed a suspension conveyor belt of 
materials and work-in-progress goods. The automatic conveyor belts were used to 
reduce work-in-progress inventories. When I visited the shop floor, I wondered how 
the conveyor belt was designed because it was totally different from the old 
production line. Where did they get their ideas? Pan mentioned that learning and 
practice was the best way: 
We visited Changchun No. 1 Auto Works to learn how to design conveyor 
belts because they copied a firm in Japan. At the same time, we read some 
books about JIT. Engineers, management and workers worked together to 
design flow devices and tested them. Finally, a rough model of an idealised 
production flow was established. 
He continued to explain the features of one-piece flow: 
Firstly, one part (not a batch) is moved from one operation to the next as soon 
as it completes. Secondly, there is no place for extra work-in-progress 
inventories. The quantity of work-in-progress parts is not allowed to exceed 
the amount of loading in the previous working procedure. Finally, it is useful 
to improve product quality because only those goods that meet a certain 
standard can flow to the next procedure. 
From 1994, other enterprises applied one-piece flow one after another. The 
technique almost copied what Western companies did. In Auto-4, Xue told how an 
American expert was surprised by the one-piece flow there: 
One day, when an American expert was visiting my workshop, he asked me: 
`are you applying lean production? Has anybody been to an American firm? 
How did you know about setting up one-piece flow? ' I told him that the one- 
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piece flow device was designed by my co-workers and engineers who have 
not been to any American firm (in the No. I workshop of a firm). 
As another example, several professors from the university were invited by 
Auto-6 to rearrange the shop floor layout in order to form a flow. In 1995, one- 
piece flow was adopted in one workshop in Auto-7, Auto-8 and Auto-9. In Auto-3, 
three suspended cycle conveyor chains were set up. As a result, they moved 100 
toolboxes, saved labour and reduced work-in-progress inventories from 5,000 items 
to 2,000. In Auto-5, a production manager in the gear workshop firstly set up one- 
piece flow in February 1995. The experiment with one-piece flow was successful 
there. The work-in-progress inventories dropped two months later. They then built 
up 16 production lines in the whole workshop in May 1995. The results shown in 
Table 5.1 were also demonstrating to management and workers that waste was 
reducible and higher productivity levels were achievable. My survey shows that 
83% of workers had experienced one-piece flow. It demonstrated that a rudimentary 
frame of flow management has been formed in SAIC. 
Table 5.1 Changes after Adopting One-Piece Flow in Auto-5. 
Before adopting flow 
(1995 Jan) 
After adopting flow 
( 1995 Nov) 
Output monthly 2,840,000 3,460,000 
WIP parts 3,840,000 2,080,000 
Work rate 30% 50% 
Workers Reduced 4 people 
Lead time 45 days 20 days 
Spot and environment Disorderly and dirty Orderly and clean 
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Some enterprises successfully choose one-piece flow as a breakthrough point 
because it is a technique that is relative easily learned. The results in terms of 
reduced work-in-progress inventories and waste were directly perceived in a short 
time. When I asked managers about their interpretation of the success of one-piece 
flow, I found their reaction to be, in the main, highly positive. Managerial 
satisfaction was understandable because their underlying interpretation was that 
higher profits would not have been achieved if one-piece flow had not been 
introduced, as production manager Wang in Auto-1 put it: 
If I refer to a production line as a running river, then the parts flowing on the 
river neither dried up nor overflowed, this makes the operatives add value 
without stopping. All off-line people including maintenance workers and 
engineers have to serve the first line workers who create value directly by 
keeping every machine running smoothly. Operational efficiency has also 
improved since first line workers operated more than two machines instead of 
a single one, and standardised operations were applied. 
Another reason for management being increasingly keen to use one-piece flow was 
to exert tighter control over workers. Production manager Ru revealed his feelings: 
The production lines were stopped frequently because of incidents including 
machine break downs, shortages of material and tool breakages. Due to the 
existence of the safety inventory, workers were not motivated to discover 
problems. After applying one-piece flow, incidents dropped because 
operatives must follow the regulations strictly. There are rules involved in 
production, maintenance, material supply and so on. We just check to see if 
they obey the rules and no longer talk too much about them (Auto-3). 
A manager in Auto-2 had the same feelings: 
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In the earlier days, workers could choose their own break times. So there were 
always people walking around to take a cup of tea and chatting in the sitting 
room. Now, one-piece flow can readjust the continuity of production and 
balance outputs, operatives work on the production line with the same time to 
commence and stop to sit idle when the bell rings. This is a new kind of 
surveillance. 
On this point, Danford has observed during his research at Japanese 
transplants in Wales that, `the opening objective of the company's bell to bell 
system was to remove these longer discretionary breaks'; then `squeeze these little 
portions of time by forcing the operators into a state of ennui for which more 
production work was the only remedy' (Danford, 1999: 117). He went on to point 
out, `the reduction of "human waste" and "idle time" amounted to growing fatigue; 
working without breaks; working under constant surveillance...... '(Danford, 1999: 
120). 
At this stage, workers' attitudes to one-piece flow were mixed. On the one 
hand, workers realised that reduction of waste would improve productivity. Yu, a 
team leader in Auto-4 expressed his personal experiences: 
To be frank, I did not understand JIT the first time I heard of it. Usually, I 
produced extra components to be used the next month. Why should we apply 
JIT? I fulfilled the production targets, didn't I? Later, I came to understand 
what managers said. People were needed to transport and look after extra 
components. This is waste. In carrying out JIT, lots of money can be saved. 
On the other hand, workers complained that the production controls had obviously 
become tighter and they worked harder than ever before. Xue in Auto-4 gave his 
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opinion: 
One-piece flow looks like management control over parts or materials, it 
really is a control over people. You see, if an operative does not conform to 
discipline strictly, the flow will not be formed. 
A worker in Auto-3 spoke forthrightly: 
We have been tied directly to the production flow since flow-oriented 
production replaced the old production methods. You see, how difficult it was 
for me to handle several machines with their different processes and to keep 
production to run smoothly, how much pressure I suffered because I had to 
anticipate problems before they became serious enough to stop everything. 
The further speed-up of the assembly line made me exhausted. 
The management's efforts to maximise returns on investment collided with efforts 
to maximise workers' rights. The impact of JIT on workers will be discussed in the 
next chapter in some detail. 
5.2.2 Pull System and Kanban 
Schonberger (1982), Hall (1984), Sage (1984), and Heard (1986) all state that in a 
pull production system, the subsequent process draws the parts from the preceding 
process, it is also one of the requirements of JIT since only the final assembly line 
can accurately demand the necessary timing and quantity of parts required. Pull 
production is a consumer-initiated system rather than a forecast-initiated system. 
Management in the component supply companies tried to establish a pull 
production system. They made plans according to the requirements of the Santana 
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car and delivered components on time. Management in Auto-1 realised that the pull 
system would be useful to reduce work-in-progress inventories and improve 
managerial knowledge. During my research in Auto-1, a manager showed me a 
table, which was a comparison of a push system and a pull system (Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Pull System versus Push System. 
Terms Push system Pull system 
Responsibility 
Control of flow 
Dispatch 
Inventory 
Problem of production 
Communication 
Response time 
Visible sign of problems 
Material control 
Dispatchers 
To meet standards 




Changed by control system 
Inventory 
Record out and in material 
First line operatives 
Continuously 
Visible, follow customer 
Limit to minimum 





Kanban is at the heart of JIT or lean production because it is the chief 
mechanism for allowing the pull system as well as making schedules visible. 
Kanban is a card or other device that serves as a visual signal to control the flow 
and production of materials. It is also used for drawing materials or making a 
production order. The final process uses kanban to pull needed parts from the 
previous process, which pulls from the process before it, and so on. One-piece flow 
makes intensive use of kanban signals. The kanban system is useful to eliminate 
waste caused by excessive work-in-progress inventories. 
All sample enterprises in SAIC applied the kanban system including 
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production kanban and material kanban. The deepest impression of mine was an 
electronic kanban in Auto-2. A big screen--an electronic production kanban--was 
set up in a central position on the shop floor to show production information. A 
computer system was used to control the kanban system. 
Figure 5.2 One Kind of Production Kanban in Auto-2. 
The Santana Front Damper Structure Module 
Planned quantity: 5,400 units Date: 11 July 1999 
Completion quantity: 3,980 units Time: 12: 12pm 
Figure 5.2 shows one kind of production kanban, which presents completion 
against the target. A worker told me that according to the above kanban, this shop 
floor should produce 5,400 damper structure modules this day. By 12: 12pm, they 
had completed 3,980 units. Before the end of work time 3: 30pm, they needed to 
complete 1,420 units and would be not allowed to produce more than that. It 
seemed that workers had got to know about kanban. 
However, it was difficult for workers and managers to use kanban in the first 
stage of adopting lean production. Some workers disliked picking up material cards 
whilst some workers did not know what to do with the cards. The production 
manager Yu recalled: 
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Workers used to be given assignments by dispatchers. They doubted the 
necessity to use a kanban. One worker argued that he did not use kanban but 
the production line still kept running to fulfil monthly targets. I also believed 
it was unnecessary at the beginning. When a top manager asked to set up 
kanban, I did not take it seriously (Auto-1). 
It was certain that kanban did not work well at that time because a few 
workers did not comply with the rules and a few managers did not supervise them. 
However, things have changed since an incident happened in SVW. The head of a 
SVW firm Yu, whom I interviewed, told me about the incident: 
A worker who delivers materials should pick up a kanban card each time. 
However, he took ten kanban cards together after he delivered ten times. The 
reason was simple because he did not believe there was any difference. 
Unfortunately, this was discovered by a manager. The worker was punished 
and almost lost his job. All employees in SAIC were shocked by this incident. 
He continued to point out: 
Indeed, managers are key figures in the application of the kanban system. 
They should implement stringent criteria without any exceptions. Managers in 
our firm carried on strict management due to the pressures that came from our 
foreign partner. I believe managers in SOEs had the same pressures, but they 
came from the cruel market competition. 
Since then, senior management had tried to build a harsh disciplinary regime 
and asked management at all levels to repeatedly check the production process in 
order to change old operation habits. The process of implementing kanban was 
implicated with the assertion of management prerogative. Management had power 
to take disciplinary action against individuals who failed to conform to what 
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management said. So management enjoyed the benefit from using kanban, a manger 
in the production department of Auto-3 said: 
Waste caused big loss. You see, some workers drew double the amount of 
materials for producing 10,000 spring units. Later it was difficult to know 
where surplus materials had gone. 
By using kanban, workers drew materials in the exact amounts required. Of 
course, it was impossible to work well the first time. We gradually reduced 
material supplies. For example, if we produced 10,000 spring units in one 
month, we reduced materials supplies from the previous 20,000 units to 
15,000 units then finally 13,000 units. 
Similar results occurred in the other firms. By using kanban, for instance, the 
work-in-progress inventories of one production in Auto-2 had dropped from 18,000 
to 5,000 between 1994 and 1995. Auto-9 saved RMB 1 million on a shop floor in 
1996. Auto-1 saved interest on loans of RMB 5 million on average in 1996 and 
saved inventory capital RMB 5.4 million in 1997. Auto-5 reduced RMB 15 million 
the costs of work-in-progress and warehouses in 1999. At the time of the 
interviews, I inquired about the extent to which kanban had been adopted. A 
manager in the production department in Auto-2 commented: 
Having used kanban for five years, we made progress. But some workers 
occasionally do not follow the rules of kanban, and we need to check and to 
correct it. Of course, we need not to repeat what we did at the beginning. 
Kanban management is set up as an important assessment standard. Workers 
are used to it now although it takes time. 
On the other hand, a manager was candid in his statement that kanban was not 
feasible in some firms: 
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I believe kanban is at the highest level of lean production. It has three 
prerequisites including the smoothing of production, the layout of the process, 
and standardised jobs. But we have not ensured a smooth flow of materials 
and a balanced production process. In fact, pure kanban management is now a 
rarity in our firm. It is unworkable although it can eliminate waste. 
Similarly, zero inventories are a goal that can never be attained. In fact, every 
enterprise still keeps some inventories. A manager in Auto-3 said: 
It is impossible to eliminate work-in-progress inventories. I am worried about 
variability. I mean, machines may break down, some equipment takes about 
two days to set up and special raw materials or parts cannot be delivered on 
time. Only those enterprises in SAIC or in linked industries use JIT delivering 
raw materials or parts exactly at the time we need. Considering these factors, 
we have to keep some inventories in order to supply SVW on time. Some 
firms have temporary warehouses near SVW. 
The introduction of kanban has changed workers' behaviour. On the other 
hand, whilst the waste reduction was achieved by implementing kanban, a question 
arises: who were the prime beneficiaries? In fact, workers felt they had been treated 
unfairly. They did not get a fair reward either in respect to their hard work or with 
respect to the high profits the company had gained. The subject of worker's pay will 
be analysed in Chapter 8. 
5.3 Elimination of Defective Products 
5.3.1 New Emphasis on Quality Control 
Quality control has been a central theme in enterprise management in SOEs. 
Management in SOEs initially implemented TQM and QCs in the 80s, but they had 
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a long way to go. A top manager in SAIC indicated the importance of improving 
product quality: 
We have been focused on quality management for 12 years. In my opinion, 
everything will be fine if we improve quality. By contrast, if the product is of 
poor quality, the company can go out of business. The top priority of our 
company is quality. 
Quality control is a cornerstone of JIT since the continuous flow of 
production would be impossible without quality control. Whilst SVW implemented 
JIT, it pushed responsibility for quality control down the line to suppliers. Quality 
concerns were of increasing importance in determining the nature of buyer-supplier 
relationships. Any components which did not meet SVW standard would be 
rejected or, where they needed to be re-worked, this caused large amounts of waste. 
The firms I visited were building an environment of higher quality under the 
lean production system. When I entered the main entrance of Auto-I, I was 
attracted by a slogan `the principles of product quality'; `our image is quality, speed 
with quality; cornering the market with quality; making profit by quality'. In Auto- 
2, the eye-catching poster stated that: `Quality is the first target'. In SAIC, managers 
and workers came to realise that quality management under lean production was a 
totally new idea: 
In a planned economy, quality standards were set by the state rather than 
customers. Now, zero defects are a basic expectation of our customers. One 
defect may ruin a company's reputation and also causes waste (Shen, a 
supervisor in Auto-3). 
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Workers were satisfied with a 1% defect rate. Now, we are trying to limit the 
defect rate to 0.01% although it is difficult to have zero defects. We gave up 
the old audit unit and adopted a defect measuring unit of one million units, 
namely, PPM (Wang, a manager in Auto-1). 
In the past, there were always extra parts available if one made a defective 
product. Now, few work-in-progress inventories can be used to replace 
defects that are `inspected out'. The production line will stop when a 
defective part is found, which is known by everyone on the shop floor (Zhao, 
an operative in Auto-2). 
Before adopting lean production, quality control activities were largely a 
matter of rigorous inspection carried out by specialised inspectors in a 
specific area. Now, each operative is required to do it right the first time and 
to catch errors before they become defects on the production line. Each 
product is water tested for leaks (Qiu, a team leader in Auto-6). 
A number of quality management activities were carried out in SAIC, such as 
adopting international quality standard systems and zero defects systems. The zero 
defects system, a main activity of team working will be examined in Chapter 7. 
Under lean production, every operative has the responsibility for the quality of 
products that he or she is making, which increased workers' stress levels, and this 
will be analysed in Chapter 6. The adoption of international quality standards is 
discussed below. 
5.3.2 Quality Standards System 
Conforming to international quality standards is a key step to quality control 
because it ensures that a firm has an adequate process to protect it from poor quality 
and avoid producing defects by inadequate operations. 
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What were the imperatives to implement new quality standards? Before 1990, 
there was only a very simple quality standard that did not meet international quality 
standards. In order to produce the components of the Santana car, the components 
enterprises in SAIC had to achieve the quality standard set by GVW. At that time, 
several operating parameters were standardised across all Volkswagen groups 
world-wide. At first, SAIC faced a tough problem. A worker in Auto-2 told me his 
story: 
We tried to manufacture a suspension welding assembly, which was new to 
me and the engineers. After many trials, we failed to meet the quality 
requirements because the length of a welding point was too short. So our 
products were rejected. We expected the quality standard could be altered. 
But, the Germans insisted on the standard. 
The only thing we could do was to work up to this standard. It was a hard 
struggle. Top management invited specialists from GVW to give 
technological support in addition to importing some key equipment for 
welding. Engineers and workers made periodical visits to Germany for 
training in technology. Later, we were successful in matching the standards. 
You see, the customer's standard was a unique standard, it was rigid. 
Like Auto-2, all SVW suppliers had to meet quality standards set by GVW. 
Things were different from previous years, when almost anything could be passed 
as acceptable quality. It was impossible to negotiate with the Germans. Even if a 
few quality targets were harsh, suppliers had to obey the standards. Otherwise, they 
would lose the opportunity to supply SVW. Engineers worked hard to overcome the 
difficulties and to make progresses. 
After the implementation of lean production, top management in SAIC set a 
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goal to gain IS09002 qualification and evolved a supplier evaluation system which 
involved a much more detailed supplier audit. IS09002 is a quality standard for 
manufacturing processes being established by the International Standards 
Organisation. Quality is seen as being a result of all the operations of the enterprise 
and the certificate of IS09002 is a passport to international markets. 
The first leading group to monitor IS09002 adoption was set up in Auto-1 in 
January 1994, with director Chen being the group leader. The IS09002 quality 
standard started to be formulated in May 1994. A quality standard system was 
developed with 20 programme files and a quality guarantee manual after 
investigation, test and modification four months later. All operation processes were 
documented in much more detail. Furthermore, training was carried out as the 
driving force for stepwise achievement. 1,800 workers were trained. After strict 
assessments, Auto-1 got a GB/T19002-IS09002 system certification in December 
1994 and SB/T19001 and IS09001 one year later. All enterprises in SAIC were 
certified IS09000 series users by the end of 1998. 
The degree to which international quality standards are adopted is associated 
with continuous improvement. As a further development, Auto-1 and Auto-2 
aspired to the VDA awarded by the Germany Automobile Association and QS9000 
awarded by three American automobile companies. In 1996, Auto-1 was assessed 
as an `A' level component enterprise by GVW and passed the approval of VDA 6.1, 
with QS9000 being awarded in July 1999. It meant that their product gear assembly 
line could participate in international group supply without any limitation. 
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There is evidence that these improvements can be credited to the application 
of lean production. When I enquired about the biggest change in the enterprises 
since lean production was implemented, the answer was the improvement of 
product quality, as Xie put it: 
Lean production makes each individual responsible for what they produced. 
We do not have quality inspectors now. Every operative checks quality during 
the production process. The defective product rate has dropped dramatically. 
Otherwise, returned defective products will cause economic losses. We really 
benefit from lean production (a team leader in Auto-4). 
Chen emphasised the shift in workers' ideas: 
My job has been control of product quality. In the past, some workers ignored 
any quality inspections. Due to the pressure of competition, workers come to 
regain the initiative. They would like to ensure that all the jobs they did 
matched the quality standard. They enjoy being representatives of an 
enterprise committed to making products that satisfied customers' needs (a 
manager in the production department of Auto-4). 
Each department participated in quality control. Quality analysis at the 
product development and product design stages, for example, are essential to 
establishing overall product quality, since it is impossible to correct errors made at 
either stage once the product reaches manufacturing and inspection departments. 
The Santana cars were bought by 40% of SAIC employees by 2000. They had 
confidence in purchasing these cars because they trusted the cars' quality. However, 
there is an uneven and partial conformity to supplier quality evaluation systems 
amongst components enterprises, zero defects are still a utopian ideal despite 
considerable efforts in SAIC. Obviously, the management has passed the pressure 
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of quality control to workers. It becomes clear that the new relationships in fact bear 
distinct similarities to the management-by-stress inherent in JIT labour relations 
(Rainnie, 1991: 356; Parker and Slaughter, 1995). 
5.4 Shortening of Lead Time 
Lead time is the time interval from production dispatching to delivery of completed 
products. The JIT system aims at shortening lead time to reduce waste because it 
gives the enterprise an earlier return on its investment of resources in the product. It 
is evident from the company goals that the emphasis on lead time reduction is not 
just a function of improving capacities of delivery speed, but is also the general 
driving force for improving customer satisfaction (responsiveness), quality and 
delivery performance in general (Lindberg, 1998: 263). 
In SAIC, the most significant driving force has been the reduction of lead 
time. The reasons for selecting lead time as the driving force for change are several. 
First, time is easy to grasp, since it is a clearly defined concept known to everyone. 
Secondly, it is relatively easy to measure levels of performance. Thirdly, there is a 
clear inter-dependency between time factors and quality issues and/or cost issues. 
One pioneering enterprise in this respect is Auto-1 which initially used a 
sophisticated computerised technique--MRPII (manufacturing resource planning) to 
shorten lead time in 1995. MRPI1 offers information on how to monitor material 
flows and cash flows and makes it possible to put the required amount of products 
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in the required place at the required time. Auto-1 bought 16 modules from America. 
MRPII was intensively used in inventory management, production management 
and financial management. Auto-1 started to implement `weekly planning' in 1997. 
The `weekly planning' determined the planning period for a week instead of a 
month. When an unpredictable and varying schedule from customers was identified 
quickly, the previous planning of inventories could be quickly adjusted. The 
reduced plan period was consistent with the reduction of inventories. The 
production manager Wang introduced the implementation of `weekly planning': 
`Weekly planning' rotated planning on a weekly cycle instead of a monthly 
one. This made it possible to modify quickly to balance each process. Large 
waiting times were quite usual due to the shortages of materials and parts. 
Sometimes materials were lacking; at other times there was a surplus. After 
using `weekly planning', workers put data about the production process in to 
the computer at 9: 00am. An electronic kanban shows all material needs and 
processes of operations before 1: 00pm. 
Weekly planning also changed delivery times which were faster than before. 
According to the plan, raw materials were delivered directly to the shop-floor 
and finished components were sent directly to the assembly line. External 
component suppliers built warehouses near our enterprise and offered 
components to the assembly line on every shift. The cycle time for producing 
a Santana car decreased from 60 days in 1994 to 30 days in 1998. 
Auto-2 also claimed it had used MRPII. It should be noted that there are only 
a few enterprises that can afford a full-blown MRP and MRPII. The other firms in 
which I conducted research did not use MRPII. 
How had all of this impacted upon workers? With the effort of cutting down 
180 
lead time or inadequate customer orders, the unnecessary manufacturing days were 
reduced according to the plan. Workers were utilised so as to maintain equipment 
or to have days-off without pay to save costs for energy such as water, electronics 
and labour costs. Workers have to be amenable to this change. In Auto-2, a worker 
talked about his feelings: 
I used to work every working day. I did not believe that I must stay at home 
some days with reduced salary. Now I have changed my old ideas and adopt a 
new one that the first priority is for our enterprise to save costs. It is common 
sense to save costs by shutting down machines, switching off the lights and 
the like. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter began by presenting management and workers' views on the roles of 
lean production. It went on to explore the process of the implementation of lean 
production. It was seen that great attention has been paid to the elimination of waste 
by reducing work-in-progress inventories, dropping defective products and 
shortening lead time. 
My research suggests that component supplies in SAIC has been undergoing 
some radical changes in order to adopt lean production practices. Management, 
under the pressure from the customer SVW, has implemented lean production and 
just-in-time techniques, such as one-piece flow, kanban and quality control. 
However, the degree of application of the new techniques in different components 
enterprises varied greatly, and the process of implementation was slow and steady. 
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GVW, the German partner of SVW, plays an important role in imposing these 
changes. GVW adopts stringent quality management criteria, which often is 
associated with the presence of new management style, across all Volkswagen 
Groups world-wide and pushes responsibility for quality control down the line to 
suppliers. Any components which do not meet GVW standards will be rejected. For 
suppliers, the re-work will cause large amounts of waste and they will even be in 
danger of losing opportunities to supply SVW. GVW has provided training, advice 
and technology for local components companies to march the required standards 
and to improve levels of management competency. 
Sayer (1986), Turnbull (1988), and Tomany (1990) have argued that 
functional flexibility and the reduction of buffer stocks associated with the JIT 
regime is, in essence, the means for the intensification of work. Danford notes that 
`the process of stock and buffer reduction had clear implications for the 
intensification of labour, for the worker's capacity to take an unofficial breather' 
(Danford, 1996: 177). We have seen at the components companies in SAIC that the 
processes of implementation implied the exercise of management prerogative and 
the building of a harsh disciplinary regime. Management has increased control over 
the production process because their aims are not only to reduce inventories but 
also to eliminate labour by closing up the porosity of the working day. In this 
respect, this chapter therefore lays the foundations to further explore, in the 
following chapters, how lean production made workers work harder, how work 




Intensification of Labour under Lean Production Control 
The foregoing chapter has examined how management in the auto components 
companies of SAIC applied lean production control in the labour process, aimed at 
eliminating all human and material waste by slashing inventories, cutting down on 
the number of defective products and efficiently utilising labour. In this chapter, I 
explore the impact of lean production control on workers. 
The impact of lean production on workers in the West is a controversial issue. 
There are at least two divergent views on it so far. Womack and his fellow 
researchers (1990: 14) think that lean production can give workers the `freedom to 
control their work' which is in contrast to the `mind-numbing stress' of mass 
production. They claim that lean production uses `half the human effort in the 
factory' as compared with traditional mass production (Womack et al., 1990: 13). 
However, other researchers argue that lean production obligates workers to 
intensified labour through `management by stress' (Parker and Slaughter, 1995: 41). 
Babson (1995: 31) criticises that lean production cuts personnel to the minimum 
and forces the remaining workforce to do more work. Rinehart et al. (1997: 83) also 
charge that employees have too much work to do because of understaffing. 
Based on interviews and questionnaire-based survey data collected from the 
components companies in SAIC, this research illustrates that lean production 
heightens work intensity and stress in Chinese auto components manufacturing 
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firms, and it shows how management uses lean production techniques in labour 
utilisation to control the work pace. The analysis discloses the reasons why workers 
accept intensified work, and explores the impact of lean production control on 
workers' health and safety. 
6.1 Survey and Findings 
6.1.1 Perceptions of Work Intensity and Work-related Stress 
To measure employee perceptions of work intensity and work-related stress, they 
were asked to respond to three statements: (1) my job made me work very hard; (2) 
I never seem to have enough time to get my job done; (3) 1 worry a lot about my 
work outside working hours. The first two items are more to do with work intensity, 
the third is more to do with work-related stress. Tables 6.1a-c list the frequencies of 
workers' answers. 
It is a fact that more than two-thirds of workers reported that their jobs made 
them work very hard. Regarding job categories, 65% of direct production workers, 
76% of maintenance workers and 82% of group leaders agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement. Furthermore, about one quarter of workers thought they never 
seemed to have enough time to get their work done (27% of direct production 
workers, 20% of maintenance workers and 25% of group leaders). In addition, two- 
fifths of workers worried a lot about their work outside working hours (41% of 
direct production workers, 37% of maintenance workers and 46% group leaders). 
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Strongly agree 55 (13%) 6 (12%) 11 (27%) 72 (14%) 
Agree 216 (52%) 32 (64%) 22 (55%) 270 (54%) 
Neutral 105 (26%) 7 (14%) 6 (15%) 118 (23%) 
Disagree 33 (8%) 5 (10%) 1 (3%) 39 (8%) 
Strongly disagree 4 (1%) 0 0 4 (1%) 
Total N (%) 413 (100%) 50 (100%) 40 (100%) 503 (100%) 
Table 6.1b Responses to 'I Never Seem to Have Enough Time to Get My Job 













Strongly agree 19 (5%) 0 2 (6%) 21 (4%) 
Agree 88 (22%) 10 (20%) 7 (19%) 105 (22%) 
Neutral 116 (29%) 12 (25%) 8 (22%) 136 (28%) 
Disagree 149 (38%) 25 (51%) 15 (42%) 189 (40%) 
Strongly disagree 23 (6%) 2 (4%) 4 (11%) 29 (6%) 
Total N (%) 395 (100%) 49 (100%) 36 (100%) 480 (100%) 
Table 6.1c Responses to `I Worry a Lot about My Work outside Working 













Strongly agree 28 (7%) 1 (2%) 3 (9%) 32 (7%) 
Agree 134 (34%) 17 (35%) 13 (37%) 164 (34%) 
Neutral 120 (30%) 18 (38%) 7 (20%) 145 (30%) 
Disagree 105 (27%) 12 (25%) 11 (31%) 128 (27%) 
Strongly disagree 8 (2%) 0 1 (3%) 9 (2%) 
Total N (%) 395 (100%) 48 (100%) 35 (100%) 478 (100%) 
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From Table 6.2, it is can be seen that work intensity in SAIC may be slightly 
lower than that of manufacturing operatives in Britain and several firms in the white 
goods, car and textiles industries in Turkey. 72% of UK operative and 74% Turkish 
workers felt that their job required them to work very hard, compared to 68% of 
workers in China; 34% of UK workers and 41% Turkish workers thought that they 
never had enough time to get their job done (26% workers in China). However, 
workers in China were considerably more likely to be worried about their work 
outside working hours than UK operatives (41% against 20%), and slightly less 
likely to be experience work-related stress than Turkish workers (48%). 
Table 6.2 Comparison of Workers' Views on Work Intensity and Work 
Related Stress in China, Turkey and UK. 
Agree and strong agree China Turkey UK 
My job made me work very hard 281 256 4,230 
(68%) (74%) (72%) 
I never seem to have enough time to get my 103 142 2,156 
job done (26%) (41%) (34%) 
I worry a lot about my work outside working 162 166 1,271 
hours (41%) (48%) (20%) 
Source: WERS, 1998; Nichols et al., 2002, working paper. 
In SAIC, as shown in Tables 6.1a-c, the perceptions on work intensity and 
stress levels vary according to job category, ranging from 65% to 82%. Does this 
mean that the real workload of direct production workers is lower than that of 
maintenance workers or group leaders? The answer is not very straightforward. Age 
patterns are different in the three job categories of the surveyed workers. Besides 
the most important factor of workload, age also has a significant influence over 
workers' perceptions of work intensity and stress. Looking at production workers, 
186 
their statement of `my job made me work hard' has clear age-related differences 
(see Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3 Production Workers' Views on `My Job Made Me Work Very Hard' 
by Age Group. 
<31 31--40 >40 
N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Agree 86 (51%) 68 (74%) 108 (78%) 
Neutral 59 (35%) 20 (22%) 21 (15%) 
Disagree 23 (14%) 4 (4%) 9 (7%) 
Total 168 (100%) 92 (100%) 138 (100%) 
Table 6.3 shows that only 51% of production workers aged under 31 agreed 
with the first statement. This may be the reason why the percentage of production 
workers reporting their job made them work hard is lower than maintenance 
workers and group leaders. The figures may not reflect the real workload, but the 
perception. That is, young production workers may bear a workload as heavy as or 
even heavier than elder workers, but good health and the strong capacity in body 
recovery of younger workers enable them to feel better than the old workers. So the 
statistical results listed in Table 6.1a, hardly lead to the conclusion that the 
production workers bear less heavy workload than the maintenance workers and 
group leaders. 
Taking jobs as a whole, Tables 6.4a-c display the responses of workers in 
different age groups in SAIC to the three statements, respectively, which are heavily 
weighted by the production workers accounting for 82% of the total surveyed 
workforce. The proportion of workers who agreed or strongly agreed with the 
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statements increases significantly with age. Looking firstly at answers to the first 
statement, the workers who felt that their job made them work very hard amount to 
55% for those aged under 31,69% for those between 31 and 40, and 79% for those 
over 40. Similarly for the second statement, those who thought they never seemed 
to have enough time to get their work done account for 16% (under 31), 26% (31-- 
40) and 37% (over 40), respectively. As for those who worried a lot about their 
work outside working hours, 33% of the youngest group indicated this, as did 41% 
of the middle age group and 49% of the oldest age group. Therefore, it is very clear 
that, besides the workload itself, the age factor should be taken into account. 
Table 6.4a Responses to 'My Job Made Me Work Very Hard' by Age Group. 





N (%) N 
Total 
(%) 
Strongly agree 18 (9%) 20 (16%) 34 (17%) 72 (14%) 
Agree 90 (46%) 67 (53%) 124 (62%) 281 (54%) 
Neutral 66 (33%) 31 (25%) 30 (15%) 127 (24%) 
Disagree 20 (10%) 7 (6%) 11 (5%) 38 (7%) 
Strongly disagree 4 (2%) 0 1 (1%) 5 (1%) 
Total N (%) 198 (100) 125 (100%) 200 (100%) 523 (100%) 
Table 6.4b Responses to `I Never Seem to Have Enough Time to Get My Job 
Done' by Age Group. 
Age (years) <31 31--40 >40 Total 
N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strongly agree 6 (3%) 7 (6%) 7 (4%) 20 (4%) 
Agree 25 (13%) 24 (20%) 61 (33%) 110 (22%) 
Neutral 63 (32%) 31 (27%) 48 (26%) 142 (28%) 
Disagree 89 (45%) 51 (43%) 58 (32%) 198 (40%) 
Strongly disagree 14 (7%) 5 (4%) 10 (5%) 29 (6%) 
Total N (%) 197 (100%) 118 (100%) 184 (100%) 499 (100%) 
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Table 6.4c Responses to `I Worry a Lot about My Work outside Working 
Hours' by Age Group. 
Age (years) <31 31--40 >40 Total 
N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strongly agree 10 (5%) 8 (7%) 10 (5%) 28 (6%) 
Agree 54 (28%) 39 (34%) 80 (44%) 173 (35%) 
Neutral 64 (33%) 39 (34%) 49 (27%) 152 (31%) 
Disagree 64 (33%) 28 (24%) 39 (21%) 131 (26%) 
Strongly disagree 4 (2%) 1 (1%) 5 (3%) 10 (2%) 
Total N (%) 196 (100%) 115 (100%) 183 (100%) 494 (100%) 









Strongly agree 47 (13%) 26 (15%) 73 (14%) 
Agree 192 (55%) 91 (50%) 283 (53%) 
Neutral 86 (24%) 47 (26%) 133 (25%) 
Disagree 24 (7%) 15 (8%) 39 (7%) 
Strongly disagree 4 (1%) 2 (1%) 6 (1%) 
Total N (%) 353 (100%) 181 (100%) 534 (100%) 
Table 6.5b Responses to `I Never Seem to Have Enough Time to Get My Job 
Done' by Gender. 
Gender Male Female Total 
N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strongly agree 15 (4%) 6 (4%) 21 (4%) 
Agree 78 (23%) 33 (19%) 111 (22%) 
Neutral 107 (32%) 40 (23%) 147 (29%) 
Disagree 118 (35%) 82 (48%) 200 (39%) 
Strongly disagree 20 (6%) 10 (6%) 30 (6%) 
Total N (%) 338 (100%) 171 (100%) 509 (100%) 
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Table 6.5c Responses to 'I Worry a Lot about My Work outside Working 









Strongly agree 22 (7%) 10 (6%) 32 (6%) 
Agree 128 (38%) 47 (28%) 175 (35%) 
Neutral 99 (29%) 56 (33%) 155 (31%) 
Disagree 81 (24%) 52 (31%) 133 (26%) 
Strongly disagree 7 (2%) 3 (2%) 10 (2%) 
Total N (%) 337 (100%) 168 (100%) 505 (100%) 
The proportions of men who agreed with the statements about work intensity 
were slightly higher than that of corresponding women (Tables 6.5a and b), whilst 
the proportions of men who agreed with the statements about work-related stress 
were overtly higher than that of corresponding women (Table 6.5c). This is 
different from the survey results obtained in UK, where women (in all industries) 
were more likely than men doing similar hours to agree that their jobs were intense 
and stressful (Cully et al., 1999: 172). In SAIC, both men and women were full 
time employees and their age patterns were almost the same. The lower perceived 
stress and job intensity of the Chinese females might be speculated to be the result 
of greater care given to them by management in Chinese companies by arranging 
for them to do easier work, changing their jobs to light ones when they get older 
and pressuring them less hard. In contrast to Western families, Chinese couples 
normally share the burden of housework and look after their children together. 
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6.1.2 Changes of Workload and Work-Related Stress 
In order to measure the changes in work intensity and work-related stress due to the 
introduction of lean production control, workers were asked two questions: 'I las 
lean production increased your workload'?; `Does lean production control increase 
your work-related stress'? Figures 6. l a-b show workers' responses, which clearly 
indicate the intensification of workload and stress because of the introduction of 
lean production control. Seven out of ten direct production workers (71 % and 73'%x) 
gave positive responses to the two questions. The proportions of maintenance 
workers giving positive answers were 72% and 66 %, and those of corresponding 
group leaders 58% and 76%, respectively. 
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Figure 6.1b Workers' Perceptions of the Changes in Work-Related Stress 
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From Figures 6.1 a, it is can be seen that, on average, 70% of workers claimed 
that the workloads had increased, this is in accordance with the previous result that 
two-thirds of worker felt their jobs made them work very hard (see Table 6.1). 
Regarding job categories, production workers (7l%) were more likely than group 
leaders (58%) to agree that their workload had increased, this has supported my 
previous speculation that the workload of production workers might not be lower 
than that of group leaders because half the young production workers (under 31) did 
not perceive they worked hard (Table 6.2). Comparing Figure 6.1 b with Table 6.1 c, 
workers in the three categories had similar feelings about the increased work-related 
stress. However, workers (72%, on average) were more likely to report increased 
stress than to claim that they worried a lot about their work outside working hours 
(43%). This may reflect the fact that there were multiple reasons for worker stress 
such as increased responsibility for product quality and machine maintenance. 
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Figures 6.2a and 6.2b show that young workers (under age of 31) were more 
likely than the others to report increased workload and stress whilst they were less 
likely than others to claim they had to work very hard and worried a lot about work 
outside of working hour (see Table 6.3a and 6.3c). The underlying fact was revealed 
by workers interviewed. Workers indicated that young workers in SAIC occupied 
heavy and intense work posts with increased responsibility under management 
control. This may be further evidence that analysis of workers' perceptions of work 
intensity and stress needs to take age into account. The relatively good physical and 
health condition of young workers affected how they judged things. 
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Figure 6.2b Workers' Perceptions of the Changes in Work-Related Stress 
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Figure 6.3b Workers' Perceptions of the Changes in Work-Related Stress 
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Gender was not a factor in the responses, as seen in Figures 6.3a-b. The 
proportions of men and women who agreed that their workload and stress were 
increased by lean production control are quite similar, 68% and 70% agreed there 
had been changes to workloads, 71% and 72% agreed there had been changes in 
work-related stress levels. 
6.1.3 Job Intensity, Work-Related Stress and Job Security 
Many Western commentators have claimed that `heightened job insecurity will lead 
to greater levels of job intensity and stress, as workers work harder to stave off the 
prospect of job loss or, more directly, worry about the consequences of job loss' 
(cited in Cully er al., 1999: 173). The survey results in the UK showed that `there 
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was no clear link between perceived job security and how hard employees reported 
that they had to work'. `However, on the other two measures, there were negative 
associations with perceived job security, the most substantial to do with the stress- 
related item: worrying about work outside working hours. The proportion of 
workers feeling insecure who worried about their work (34%) was almost double 
that of workers who felt secure in their jobs (19%)' (Cully et al., 1999: 173) (see 
Table 6.6a). The survey in SAIC depicts a totally different picture. 
Table 6.6a Indicators of Work Intensity and Stress by Perceived Job Security, 
Surveyed in UK. 
My job requires me Never have enough Worry about work 
to work hard time to get work outside working 
(n=24,072) done hours 
(n=24,072) (n=24,072) 
Employees feel their % of workers who % of workers who % of workers who 
job is secure agree agree agree 
Secure 77 37 19 
Neutral 77 44 25 
Insecure 73 47 34 
All employees 76 41 23 
Source: Cully et al., 1999: 173. 
Table 6.6b Indicators of Work Intensity and Stress by Perceived Job Security, 
Surveyed in SAIC. 
My job requires me Never have enough Worry about work 
to work hard time to get work outside working 
(n=531) done hours 
(n=522) (n=517) 
Workers Feel their % of workers who % of workers who % of workers who 
Job is secure agree agree agree 
Secure 91 45 58 
Neutral 40 4 22 
Insecure 41 9 21 
All employees 66 26 40 
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Amongst the surveyed workers, 51% agreed that their jobs were secure, 18% 
disagreed, and 32% chose neither of these two options. The proportion of workers 
giving positive responses to the three statements is listed in Table 6.6b. The 
proportion of the workers feeling insecure who were required to work hard (41%) is 
less than a half of that of workers who felt secure in their jobs (9 1%). As for the 
workers who thought they never had enough time to get their work done, the ratio 
of the proportions drops to less than 1: 5 (9% against 45%), and for the workers who 
worried about their work outside of working hours, the ratio is less than 1: 2 (21% 
against 58%). These positive associations reflect the fact that job insecurity does 
not serve as an important mediating factor. This result might be explained in this 
way. Firstly, job security was not a major concern for most workers in SAIC at the 
survey time because the Chinese auto industry was still in a period of rapid 
development. Secondly, 63% of workers had served their firms for more than 10 
years. They had rich experience in components-manufacturing processes in the 
firms. This not only made them feel secure in their jobs, but also meant they had to 
work hard when their firms faced strong competition. Thirdly, because workers 
perceived their jobs were secure so they accepted the new management system-- 
lean production. It is the lean production system that puts huge pressure on workers; 
it makes workers work hard and causes them to worry about their job outside of 
working hours, as is described and further explained in the next section. 
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6.2 Modern Management Techniques and Labour Intensification 
According to Karl Marx, surplus value may be produced either by lengthening work 
hours or by increasing labour intensity, thus revolutionising the means of 
production by applying new techniques. The former increases absolute surplus 
value and the latter relative surplus value. Lean production is regarded as an 
effective production system to produce high relative surplus value. To achieve high 
outputs with low inputs, management in the auto components companies of SAIC 
have utilised several lean production techniques in order to enhance control over the 
labour process. Here we examine how these managerial controls result in the 
intensification of labour. 
6.2.1 Multi-tasking Operation 
As discussed in Chapter 5, in order to eliminate work-in-progress inventories, the 
management in SAIC introduced new production techniques such as one-piece flow 
and cellular manufacturing. In 1994, Auto-1 was the first to adopt cellular 
manufacturing amongst the sample firms. From 1995 onwards, other firms 
gradually designed their cell layout and rearranged work assignments. The 
equipment layout in cellular manufacturing differs from that of previous production 
systems. A manager described how work was done prior to cellular manufacturing: 
Before 1995, the machines in my workshop were grouped according to their 
functions. Accordingly, workers formed several groups, with each worker 
operating one machine. For example, mill operators who merely did milling 
formed a milling group and drill operators who only did drilling formed a 
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drilling group. After processing by one machine, components needed to be 
stored and moved to the next processing area by conveyors. This caused 
excessive work-in-progress inventories and unnecessary movement (in Auto- 
5). 
A cell consists of a set of machines with different functions. These machines were 
arranged according to the processing sequence so that only a few processes can be 
done within one cell. Cellular manufacturing reduces components movements. The 
manager continued to explain how a U-shaped cell worked: 
We established our U-shaped cells in 1995. Different machines and tasks 
were grouped together according to product family rather than machine 
function. The U-shaped cell was designed to minimise workers' walking time 
and handling of materials. Workers' jobs were reassigned. I mean, a multi- 
skilled worker should be able to operate at least three machines with different 
functions and do, for example, planing, milling and drilling skilfully. Finished 
components were transferred on a transferring chain to the next cell (Auto-5). 
The effect of cellular manufacturing was obvious. After two months of 
cellular manufacturing, the work-in-progress inventories of four components on this 
shop floor dropped by 11 %, the cycle time from semi-finished products to heat 
treatment was reduced from 20-25 days to 8-10 days, and two workers were made 
redundant. This manager admitted that he did not like the U-shaped layout at the 
beginning but changed his mind later when he saw the benefits. So far, 87% of 
workers in my sample have been involved in multi-tasking operations. 
Whilst this firm was benefiting from the changes from single-machine 
specialisation to multi-tasking operations, workers suffered from the ramp-up of 
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workloads. With the introduction of cellular manufacturing, the productive time 
increased from 31% to 53% in this workshop because one worker operated many 
machines at the same time or in sequence. A majority of operators interviewed 
believed that managerial control was the main reason that workloads were heavier. 
Shen in Auto-3 made a comparison: 
Several years ago, I could pace myself and create a break. At least I could sit 
down for a while when I was really tired. But now I have to cope with two or 
three running machines. I cannot choose when I take a break. I am always on 
my feet from one bell ring to another (a group leader in the Hot Roll Shop 
Floor). 
When asked about the multi-tasking operation, Qian complained: 
I mean, it is hard to look after two machines. I have no spare time between 
completing one job and starting the next one. Is this an excessive 
requirement? Yes. I do need to get a minute's breather. I can hardly bear this 
workload in regard to my physical capacity (an operator in the automotive 
chassis plant of Auto-2). 
Wang showed her sympathy to the operatives: 
To run several machines in sequence, operators on the assembly line have to 
keep walking instead of sitting down as they used to do. Furthermore, they 
need to walk quickly to keep up the flow, to detect defective products and to 
respond to machine problems. They are dead tired. I am very sympathetic to 
them (a female union official in Auto-10). 
The implementation of multi-tasking operation was a difficult and traumatic 
process. Wang stated: 
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At the outset of applying the multi-tasking operation in my firm, workers 
complained a lot about the intensification of labour and a lack of safety 
protection. When a pregnant woman lost her embryo during her work hours, 
this invoked strong criticism. Workers related this incident to their heavy 
workload. As a director of the manufacturing department, I was at the centre 
of this criticism and under great pressure as to whether I should keep this 
production practice. Later, we carried on the practice, but shifted female 
operators to lighter production duties (a director of the manufacturing 
department in Auto-1). 
After learning the lessons from Auto-l, management in other firms merely chose 
young men to carry out experiments on the shop floor. They also adopted other 
methods, such as education and incentives, to ease the criticism and the strong 
resentment of workers. A worker gave an example of how management persuaded 
workers to accept the new system: 
You know, I could not believe that I had to handle two machines instead of 
one. I thought, this would be twice as hard as I used to work. I attended a lot 
of meetings in the early days. The management told us that our company 
faced two choices: using the new production system or being defeated in 
market competition. In order to produce components for the Santana car 
efficiently, we had to give up old ideas with the old production system and 
work hard in the new system. No matter whether or not I understood what 
management said, I had to do what I was told, otherwise I had to leave. You 
know, it is impossible to get an easy job nowadays. It took me several months 
to learn about managing two machines (in Auto-3). 
Wang in Auto-1 told me very frankly how he used material incentives in the first 
stage when workers shifted from single task to multi-tasking and then abolished it 
later: 
201 
At the beginning of operating two machines, a worker could get a bonus for 
eight extra hours each day. Later when workers got used to operating two 
machines, I told them that the bonus was unreasonable because the labour 
intensity was reduced through the increasing level of automation and 
investment in equipment. I persisted that a worker operating two machines 
was fair and the company had to make profits from its investment. So the 
bonus was gradually dismantled. Workers were angered by this decision. But 
they had to accept it because they knew this decision was made by top 
managers. Workers could not change it (a director of the manufacturing 
department in Auto-1). 
Now workers are getting used to multi-tasking operations. The headquarters 
of SAIC issued a circular to all workers and asked them to carry out two `1x3' 
projects, that is, each worker should be able to operate at least three machines and 
each machine should have at least three capable operators to use it. As for capable 
workers, the management encouraged them to be familiar with all the skills of the 
production process. These workers are called `Yi Xian Tong' in Chinese. Now a 
worker operates 2.6 machines on average. The most capable operative can use six 
machines in Auto-l. The multi-tasking operations greatly reduce labour costs, but it 
is achieved only through the intensification of labour. 
6.2.2 Work Pace Speed-up 
In 1999, the output of the Santana car in SVW reached 245,000 units, which is 53% 
higher than the 1995 production (160,000 units). During the same period, car 
components manufacturers in SAIC met the demands from SVW without recruiting 
new workers. This was mainly achieved with the help of lean production 
techniques. Although some new production lines were set up from 1995 to 1999, 
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the workers on these lines came from existing production groups. This resulted in a 
significant decrease of workers numbers in these production groups. Quantitatively, 
the number in a group in Auto-1 decreased from 26 to 19. A group in Auto-5 lost 
14 operators out of 30. Does this mean that the production quota is reduced 
accordingly? The answer is `no'. For example, in a team of the cool roll workshop 
in Auto-3, the number of workers dropped from 12 to 7, but the output per worker 
increased six times (from 20,000 units to 120,000 units). This greatly increased 
output by the same number of workers (zhen chang bu zhen ren) was felt to be an 
onerous workload by workers; workers often use the term `overburdened' to 
describe their situation. 
How did management achieve their targets? Normally workers worked eight 
hours a day, although shifts and timetables in the sample enterprises were diverse. 
For example, workers in Auto-1 did one shift from 7: 00am to 3: 30pm with a half- 
hour lunch break and two ten-minute tea breaks. In Auto-3, two shifts were 
operated, one from 6: 30am to 3: 00pm and the other from 2: 30pm to 11: 00pm. Forty 
four per cent of surveyed workers did shifts. Facing huge output demands and fixed 
work hours, the management in SAIC focused on increasing efficiency by 
minimising idle time (i. e. by closing up the porosity of the working day) and 
eliminating all unnecessary motions of workers. They issued the `full-load work 
method (manfuhe gongzuofa)' and tried to squeeze 60 seconds work out of each 
minute and 60 minutes work out of each hour from every worker. The 
standardisation of operations was a key step in eliminating unnecessary motions of 
workers and minimising idle time of both workers and equipment. For the head of 
department of manufacturing, the low utilisation rates meant a waste of resources: 
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You know, a worker should be able to produce 8 springs a day, but he just did 
4 at that time. The work pace was too slow. It resulted in huge waste not only 
in human resources and equipment, but also in electricity energy, which cost 
RMB 40,000 a day. I was in charge of the study of standardised operation in 
my firm. After applying the standardised operation approach, the work pace 
was significantly improved, we not only increased the group output, but also 
transferred two workers to other groups. We saved a lot (in Auto-3). 
In auto-l, Wang indicated how he introduced the first practical scheme of 
standardised operations: 
I took part in the introduction of standardised operations in my firm. I 
watched all motions an operative made, measured the time of each motion and 
the time between the motions, and listed the motions and the time in a table. I 
discussed the table with my engineers and determined which motions were 
necessary and which were not. I tried to eliminate unnecessary motions and 
shorten the idle time. Then the first practical scheme of standardised 
operations came out. I explained my scheme to the operatives and asked them 
to follow it. 
In the majority of sample enterprises, video recorders and computers were used in 
assessing standardised operations. An engineer explained to me: 
I found that video recorders and computers were very useful in popularising 
standardised operations. I used a video recorder to record live operations of 
some workers and analysed their operations. During group meetings, I showed 
workers the records, pointed out unnecessary motions and persuaded them to 
give up their own methods. I used a computer to demonstrate to them the 
proposed standard operations and left a copy with them so that they could 
compare their process with the standard ones from time to time. 
Did workers co-operate with the engineers and managers on `time and motion 
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studies'? The head of the department of manufacturing in Auto-3 told me a story: 
One day, I was watching the operation of a worker and preparing to record his 
operation. `Pa', I heard a sound and found that the worker switched off his 
machine. He told me that he was leaving for lunch, but I knew he was 
reluctant to be recorded. I had to continue my work after the lunch break. 
The `standardised operation' procedure is designed not only to speed up the pace of 
workers, but also enables the whole production process to run smoothly. This 
requires every worker to use the `standardised operation' procedure, as Ru 
explained: 
The standardisation of operations is required for smooth production which is 
the cornerstone of the JIT production. In a multi-process production line, 
every worker, who may handle several machines with their different 
processes, needs to follow the standard work pace and complete their work 
within a specified cycle time, that is, all workers work in phase to allow 
production to run smoothly. Any worker who does not follow `standardised 
operation' will cause the worker next to him/her to wait and increase group 
idle time (one production manager in Auto-1). 
Did workers follow standardised operations laid down by engineers and managers? 
Ru continued: 
To be honest, I found from workers' facial expressions they were resentful 
when I asked them to use the `standardised operations' procedure, I mean, 
they did not like to follow the scheme and timetable. It took time to change 
their habits. 
A production manager in Auto-5 told a similar story: 
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Since carrying out one-piece flow, I asked all workers to use the `standardised 
operations' process. However, a few workers stuck with their old behaviour. 
This disturbed the whole flow on our production line. It was difficult to 
monitor because some workers did not fill in the form on the notice-board. 
They saw filling in papers as a useless task. 
How did workers react to the standardised operations? Fan in Auto-5 said: 
I agree that my previous productivity was indeed too low, which was not good 
for the future of my factory. The `standardised operations' does improve our 
work efficiency. However, I hate someone watching me when I am working. 
At the time `standardised operations' were introduced, the work pace was 
reasonable. Later it became faster and faster. I am really exhausted now. The 
managers always think about how to increase my production quota. I hope 
they will consider my capability when constantly changing the so-called 
standardised operation procedure and making us work harder and harder. 
Through the standardisation of operations, an invisible peer pressure from co- 
workers also forced operators to speed up their work pace. Moreover, management 
used notice boards to display and monitor workers performance every hour. It was a 
common result that work time had increased and free time on the job was strictly 
limited. When absences occurred, the remaining workers had to do extra work 
because there were not enough workers available for a full complement. 
It is found that the workload of workers was significantly increased, which 
could be seen from operation rate data, as one engineer put it: 
The operation rate is an index to measure the workload of workers. It is 
defined by the ratio of the total operation time of a worker and the allowed 
maximum time for a component to stay at its position. The former includes all 
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time spent on switching on his/her machines, loading components, switching 
off the machines, unloading the components, checking the machines and 
components, changing tools, cleaning, walking and so on. It decreases with 
the automation level of the machines. The latter depends on the production 
quota: the higher the quota, the smaller the cycle time. Eliminating 
unnecessary motions and improving poor motion can decrease the rate, whilst 
increasing the quota increases the rate. Before applying lean production, the 
operation rate was about 40%. This was too low. Now we have decided that 
the operation rate for first-line workers should be in a range between 60% and 
65% and the rate for off line workers in a range between 50% and 60% (Auto- 
1). 
When I visited some firms in SAIC, I found that the operation rate had actually 
reached 75%. However, a worker complained: 
I was told that eliminating all unnecessary motions could make us work 
smarter rather than harder. However, any idle time created has been filled up 
with another task. The workload and pressure became much higher than 
before (in Auto-2). 
No doubt, as the porosity of the working day was reduced, some misunderstanding 
and conflicts started to occur. A worker in Auto-5 complained: 
They (engineers or managers) sit in their offices comfortably and run the 
production procedure with a computer. How can they understand how hard I 
am working when I am asked to complete an action every 20 seconds or 
assemble one part in 36 seconds and to keep repeating this process from 
7: 00am to 3: 30pm? 
A manager experienced such conflict personally, he reported: 
One day, when I asked a worker to use the `standardised operation', he 
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shouted at me, `look at those (maintenance workers) and those (managerial 
staff), why should I do my work so quickly? Am I at the bottom of society? ' 
Production managers and group leaders had to spend a lot of time to persuade 
workers. It seemed that it became more and more difficult to achieve their goals 
after the speeding up of the work pace. A worker in Auto-2 told me: 
I expect them (engineers) to come up with some ideas for eliminating non- 
value-added labour through the kaizen process. But I do not want to be forced 
to accelerate work pace endlessly. You see, there are only two ten minute 
breaks each shift and a lunch break. I hardly have a few minutes free to go to 
the toilet except by calling the group leader for help in extreme emergency 
conditions. 
The demand for car components declined slightly in 2000, but could workers 
slow down their work pace? The answer was in the negative. Workers were still 
asked to do their work according to the standardised operation and achieve 60 
seconds working time for every minute. When the production quota was fulfilled, 
workers were asked to shut down their machines and to stay at home. On the days 
when demand was intermittent, workers received no pay of about RMB 30 per day 
when they stayed at home (see Chapter 8). This suggested that production flexibility 
did not unwind workers workloads. 
6.2.3 Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) 
Zero malfunction of equipment is one of the goals of lean production. Zero 
malfunction enables management to squeeze out sixty minutes of useful work from 
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every worker in every hour. If the management puts large investments into 
modernising the firm's equipment, the zero malfunction of equipment should be 
easier to reach. However, the management imported key equipment which was 
second hand and regularly broke down, although the equipment was better than 
what had previously been used. In order to reduce the number of indirect workers, 
the management added pressure to both the remaining maintenance workers and 
their production colleagues. 
TPM was then introduced into SAIC. The goal of TPM is to gain 
productivity, not merely to maintain machines. TPM aims at preventing problems 
instead of merely reacting to them. According to the training booklet used in SAIC, 
TPM means that all departments associated with production have a maintenance 
function, and management and product development requires the participation of all 
employees, in order to prolong the life time of equipment and to pursue to the limits 
of their efficiency. TPM aims at improving the quality of outputs both through 
improving the quality of employees, and the quality of equipment. Here improving 
the quality of employees includes giving responsibility to all employees, increasing 
the self-maintenance capacity of operatives, and broadening the capability of 
maintenance workers from their own speciality into other skills. Engineers are 
expected to design equipment with no or lower maintenance needs. The practice of 
TPM was introduced in 1993 and changed the whole equipment management 
system in SAIC. As a result, both maintenance workers and operators were given 
additional tasks. Wang compared the situation prior to and after the application of 
TPM: 
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Before the application of lean production, the maintenance of equipment was 
centrally organised at workshop level and only involved maintenance 
workers. Operatives paid little attention to maintenance. When a machine 
broke down, maintenance workers rushed to repair it like fire fighters. If they 
were not called, maintenance workers enjoyed sitting in their room and 
chatting with each other. They did not worry about the interruption to 
production because of the massive work-in-progress inventories. 
Now, we have a very limited work-in-progress inventory. Therefore, it is 
essential to keep every machine running smoothly, otherwise the production 
line has to stop. To achieve zero malfunctions of machines, everyone has got 
his/her responsibilities from the maintenance workers, through direct 
production workers to managers. Equipment management is weighted heavily 
in our assessment (second only to quality control). The score against this 
assessment is closely associated with our pay. I always worry about our 
machines because they are more than ten years old (a manager in Auto-1). 
Since the introduction of TPM, the maintenance workers had suffered more stress 
because stoppage of the production line drew the attention of upper management. 
This in turn created added pressure from above for rapid correction. A maintenance 
worker indicated how the slack previously in the line had gone and he was now 
working stressfully: 
The old times have gone. Now I cannot just sit in my room and wait for 
reports from operatives. I am asked to check machines at least three times per 
shift. I have to keep walking around the machines and try to sense any minor 
changes in smell, noise, vibration and so on. I am always worrying about 
breakdowns during my shift because it means a cut in my bonus and the 
interruption of the whole production line. In case a piece of equipment 
breaks down, I should arrive at the point of production within 20 
minutes and fix it within a limited time. In the most serious scenario, I 
am only given two days to complete my work (in Auto-1). 
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The maintenance workers had extra workloads, as one put it: 
Now I have to spend a lot of my time on regular checks and maintenance to 
prevent any malfunction of the machines. As for major equipment, we have 
got a special maintenance plan that includes condition monitoring, preventive 
repair and maintenance, first grade maintenance (every 500 hours), second 
grade maintenance (every 2,500 hours), fine adjustment and checks (every 
year). I must fill in forms and keep all maintenance records for further 
inspection (in Auto-3). 
Most maintenance workers had to work at weekends or during holidays because the 
machines were fully occupied during workdays, a worker complained: 
You know, these key imported facilities are second-hand and have run for 
about ten years. They regularly break down. I often have to carry on my work 
after the bell and cannot go home on time. I also spend a lot of weekends and 
public holidays doing regular maintenance in order to avoid interrupting the 
normal production. This makes me very tired. I hate working in this way, but I 
have no choice. One day when I objected to working at the weekend, my 
manager said to me: `this is your work, isn't it? If you do not want to work at 
weekends, would you like to be an operator? ' I was an operator and did the 
hardest work in the firm (in Auto-2). 
One of the most striking features of TPM is that operatives maintain their own 
machines. Yu told me that: 
Now I not only operate the machine, but also do some maintenance that was 
normally done by maintenance workers. At the start of each shift I need to 
carry out an `aircraft style' check on my machines according to a list. This is 
called `self-check'. Then, a maintenance worker checks them again and signs 
a form. Our group leader may check machines randomly. I was trained and 
expected to have `four abilities', that is, the ability to find any abnormal 
phenomena; the ability to deal with the abnormality correctly and quickly; the 
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ability to set up the check criteria by myself and the ability to operate 
machines according to standard procedure. Before I go home, I need to check 
out the machine again and sign the production point card. This is overtime 
work without any extra pay (an operator in Auto-2). 
A worker in Auto-1 pointed out the same experience: 
It is not easy to be an operative. When I find a problem on my machine now, 
my first reaction is not to find a maintenance worker, but to diagnose the 
problem and try to fix it by myself. This is called self-maintenance. 
Sometimes, the problem is simple, I can solve it by replacing the damaged 
part with a new plug-in one. Sometimes, I have to dismantle and repair the 
machine, a task previously undertaken by skilled fitters and electricians. 
Another worker indicated he had to do cleaning work to maintain equipment: 
In my workshop, 6S has been implemented. The important point of 6S is that 
the workplace should be tidy, clean and in order and every operative should 
have such kind of good habits. I have to spend lots of my time to clean and 
lubricate machines and try to avoid damage by dirt, dust and grit. The 
management told us to shift traditional thinking away from `maintenance is 
someone else responsibility' to `it's everyone's business, every day'. 
The comments of the direct production workers above indicate that the self- 
maintenance programme under TPM obviously intensified their workloads. The 
climate of strain on the shop floor makes the workers an adjunct to the machine 
rather than the other way around. It is evident that lean production in SAIC is 
somewhat similar to the Fordist management method that treated workers as merely 
an appendage of the production apparatus (Dohse, 1985: 124). 
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6.2.4 Quality Control 
For production workers, the greatest pressure comes from the daily quality control. 
They have been given additional tasks and responsibilities for quality control since 
the application of lean production. When a defective product occurs, there are few 
spares in stock to replace it and the problem is immediately exposed so that 
employees will then be more alert to avoiding even minor problems. Zero defects 
remains the top priority of management in SAIC. To achieve this goal, management 
changed their quality control philosophy and set up a new quality control system. 
The head of the production department outlined quality control: 
Quality control now places great emphasis on making products right the first 
time. Our previous focus of `not delivering substandard products' are replaced 
with `not producing substandard products', that is, a quality of product does 
not rely on inspection at the end of a shift but on the whole production 
process. We firstly ask production workers to undertake self-inspection. Every 
worker must follow the guidelines of `not producing, not passing and not 
using substandard products (bu Shen than, bu chuan di and bu shi yong bu he 
ge than pin)'. Group leaders and production managers also have their 
commitment to quality control. Specific checkpoints have been set up in order 
to minimise any potential quality problems. Effective reward and punishment 
regulations are used. Now everyone in SAIC treats quality control very 
seriously (in Auto-I). 
Obviously, management passed the pressure of quality control to workers. Tang 
explained how product quality was related to pay: 
According to the rules, if worker A made a defective part that was found by 
worker B next to worker A, then worker A would lose two grades in bonus of 
one month. If worker B did not find the defect and passed the defective part to 
213 
worker C who then found the problem, both worker A and worker B would 
receive a reduced salary in that month. Worker B would be further punished 
due to passing that defective part. Therefore worker C would be awarded one 
grade in output salary (a group leader in the welding workshop in Auto-2). 
The quality control system also resulted in tremendous psychological pressure on 
workers because all products were marked by individual producer. A worker in 
Auto-6 told me: 
You know, my colleagues check my products, my group leader and even 
managers also check my products. I was asked to mark every product I made. 
This means any quality problem associated with my products can be easily 
traced back to me. Every morning, my group leader holds a short meeting and 
informs us about quality problems that have been found. I always worry about 
my name being mentioned. 
A push-button was another way to show the quality problems, as another worker 
said: 
In my workshop, every worker has a push-button at his/her workstation. As a 
serious quality problem is found, the worker can push this button and switch 
on the red light in a prominent position in the workshop. Everyone will know 
what is happening. Some workers will gossip, `he/she is a skilled worker, how 
could he/she do things like that'. Because every quality problem is recorded, 
group leaders and the production manager will be informed. Sometimes, a 
director is informed as well. Management is asked to punish the worker in 
order to prevent a recurrence of such defects. The pressure is unbearable 
(Auto-5). 
When production group management is assessed, `quality control' ranks at the top 
of the list. Group leaders and line supervisors also felt huge pressures. Qiu told me 
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how she was scared of quality incidents: 
Quality control certainly is a tight system. Every one understands that. As an 
assembly group leader, I am always nervous. Last year, SGM rejected all our 
products. The incident was broadcast to all employees. I was asked to find the 
reason and warned to avoid this happening again. My bonus was cut for three 
months (a female group leader in Auto-6). 
Ru told me about his experiences: 
Checking products is one of my tasks now. I always worry about the 
occurrence of a quality problem. When the telephone rings I am nervous even 
at home. I do not receive phone calls unless I have to. I do not want nasty 
things to happen, but sometimes they do happen. Last week, I was sick and 
stayed at home. I was told that 2,000 springs were returned by my customer. 
Although the products were free from any technical faults, their appearance 
did not meet the requirement of the customer. I was fined RMB 1,000 and I 
was removed from the supervisor position (a supervisor in Auto-3). 
Some workers complained that speeding up the production pace made it difficult to 
check their products carefully. A worker expressed his feelings: 
Now one-piece flow cuts costs and increases productivity, however, in order 
to achieve the targets I have to speed up my work pace. This brings new 
problems. I no longer have enough time to check my products carefully. 
6.3 Did Workers Accept the Intensified Labour? 
As discussed above, the new management technique of lean production made 
workers work much harder and more stressed. Did workers accept the intensified 
labour? A majority of respondents gave an affirmative answer. As shown in Figure 
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6.4,57% of workers thought they could work at the pace of their current job until 
they are the age of 55 or reach retirement. The official retirement age is 55 for male 
worker and 50 for female workers in China. This proportion is much higher than 
those car workers in some other countries. 78 per cent of Canadian vehicle 
assembly workers thought it unlikely they could sustain the pace until age 60,68 
percent in UK (Lewchuk, Stewart and Yates, 2001: 76) and 94 percent in Turkey 
(Nichols et al., working paper). 
Figure 6.4 Responses to `Could You Work at the Pace of Your Current Job 




This does not mean that the intensity was still bearable for more than half the 
car workers in China. Several reasons can be explained by the workers who were 
interviewed. Firstly, the updating of machines and some Kaizen activities partially 
reduced work intensity. Me reported his perceptions on the advanced equipment: 
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Human potential is limited. Only advanced machines can make our life easier 
and improve productivity dramatically. My group imported a world-class 
connecting-rod bearing automated line from Great Britain. It was difficult to 
cope with the line at the beginning. However, after I got used to operating the 
line, I felt so wonderful. I don't feel any physical fatigue because the machine 
is of a high level of automation (a group leader in Auto-4). 
Secondly, better pay made workers accept harder work. The intensified labour 
is strongly linked to labour saving which produces profits, it will be discussed in 
Chapter 7. In recent years, SAIC achieved better economic efficiency than other 
automotive companies in China. This was reflected in workers' pay. The average 
wage of employees in state-owned firms in SAIC is about double the average wage 
of employees in other Shanghai SOEs. Both managers and workers indicated that 
they saw the changes due to the application of lean production and gradually 
accepted them. As Chen, head of the department in quality control in Auto-4, 
testified: 
When workers complained about the heavy workloads during the training 
course, I asked workers to endure these and told them that they would benefit 
in the near future. You know, the group that saved 3 workers almost saved 
RMB 60,000 a year; workers bonuses were increased significantly. Workers 
now understand what I said before. 
Shen in Auto-3 stated the change of workers' attitudes to multi-tasking operation: 
At the beginning, workers were passive to do what managers asked, for 
example, multi-tasking operations. Now they do it on their own initiative 
because they see higher efficiency and get higher incomes. Workers have 
realised that today's changes must be credited to the application of modem 
management techniques. 
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By contrast, workers in low profit firms have different feelings, as a worker in 
Auto-5 put it: 
My job has a full workload and quick work pace. I have no choice. Look at 
my friends and relatives who lost their jobs recently, I feel a little lucky. I 
need a job. I would feel it fair if I could get a salary that matches my labour. 
But I cannot. 
Finally, the most important, and real reason was that psychological pressure 
from the rising unemployment rate in China made workers tolerate heavy 
workloads. In their words, `if I do not work hard today then I will have to make an 
effort to find a job tomorrow'. In fact, layoffs and declines in income will directly 
affect workers' lives because they have to pay mortgages for their apartment and 
loan on their cars. In Auto-3, Ru indicated: 
You see, a larger number of workers have been laid off nation-wide and 
locally. I feel content because I have a job. Workers like me have got used to 
multi-tasking operations now. I do not mind whether the workload is heavy or 
not. 
Yu, a group leader in Auto-2, expressed similar feelings: 
I am worrying about no work to do rather than more work to do. Comparing 
myself with those people who were laid off, I cannot complain. I have still got 
a job although it is a hard one. 
When Dohse looked at why Japanese workers accept management systems 
which increased work and physical stress, he found out one of reason was that 
workers strongly depend on management. `At Toyota, management alone decides 
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on promotions...... This dependence on management for career advancement is 
reinforced at Toyota by an extremely individualised wage system...... The lack of 
solidarity among Japanese workers as a result of their being so strongly dependent 
on management personnel decisions is additionally links to the lack of union 
regulation of shop-level labour deployment and work norms' (Dohse, 1985: 136- 
139). This point of views was confirmed by the research conducted in China. 
Workers in the components companies showed a similar dependency on 
management which had great power over individual's pay and employment. This 
might be because there was a close parallel between Chinese culture and Japanese 
culture including hierarchy. 
6.4 Health and Safety 
A recent Health and Safety Executive survey of self-reported work-related illness in 
Great Britain found stress, depression and anxiety to be the second most prevalent 
condition claimed to be caused or made worse by work. New management 
techniques--quality circles, team working, total quality management and 
performance related pay schemes--topped the list of reported stressors (cited in 
Nichols, 1998: 370). As explained in the above sections, the workload and work 
related stress of workers in SAIC increased significantly due to the introduction of 
lean production. This trend is expected to continue for a long period of time. 
Although workers accepted intensified labour, the effect of lean production on 
health can not be ignored. 
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Comparison of the health and safety condition is made amongst four countries 
(see Table 6.7). It is found that workers at four Canadian vehicle assembly plants 
were most likely to report that they worked in pain half the days in the previous 
month, and workers in a GM plant in the UK stand second (Lewchuk, Stewart and 
Yates, 2001). However, Chinese car workers were more likely than Turkish ones to 
complain about physical pain for more than half the time in the last month (18% 
compared to 8%); more about dust (32% compared to 5%); about the same amount 
about temperature (32% compared to 31%); and more about noise (38% compared 
to 21%). It seems that the physical working conditions in Chinese car factories 
might be worse than those in Turkey. This might be caused by a fact that most 
components companies were established on the basis of their original factories 
which were built 40 to 70 years ago, and some equipment was old whilst some 
machinery was imported from developed countries. 
Table 6.7 Indicators of Physical Discomfort at Work: Reporting Physical 
Discomfort for Half the Time or More in the Last Month. 
Per cent Canada UK Turkey China 
N=100 N=550 
Physical pain or discomfort 42-67 39.3 8 18 
Dust related **5 32 
Air temperature related ** 31 32 
Noise ** 21 38 
* The data is unavailable. Source: Lewchuk, Stewart and Yates, 2001: 78; Nichols et al., 
working paper. 
After taking account of exposure time, it is found that the most intensive 
physical discomfort was caused by noise because 27% of workers complained of 
that problem every day. The second was due to dust in the air. The long term effect 
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of lean production on health is presently unknown, but may be a real future 
problem, although more than half the workers thought they could continue their 
present working practices until their retirement. 
There are also positive effects of lean production on health and improvement 
of physical working conditions. The physical working conditions in these factories 
are generally good, compared to the standards that prevail in the local informal 
economy and in medium and small firms in the local formal economy. 65% of 
respondents thought that their work environment had improved because the 
environment was generally tidier and clearer. Most workers and union officials 
mentioned that the work environment was much better than before, as Zou put it: 
It was unimaginable. Before our new production line was introduced, machine 
oil leaking from old machines lay on the floor. My shoes were soon damaged 
by it. The jumbled work-in-progress inventories pilled up everywhere. Under 
lean production, management invested lots of money in new machines and 
asked us to carry out 6S activities. The work environment has been improved 
greatly. As you see, the shop floor is tidy and in order. Industrial rubbish is 
hardly seen. This is beneficial to our health (a union official in Auto-1). 
Xie, a group leader in Auto-4, also had the same feelings: 
The management in my firm takes health problems seriously. They try to 
improve working conditions. For example, summer in Shanghai is very hot 
and wet, the outdoor temperature can easily reach 38°C. Now 90% of 
workshops have air-conditions. There are also rules and regulations to reduce 
health risks. If workers in noisy workshops forget to put their earplugs in, they 
will be fined. They are also asked to make their workstations clean and tidy. 
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As for safety, the top manager regarded it as the most important thing in 
SAIC and it is one of the major items in production group management 
assessments. 41% of respondents noted that their safety at work has improved, 
compared with 23% of respondents who claimed a decline of safety. Management 
claimed that accidents occur much less frequently. Because `accident rate' is a 
sensitive topic, it is impossible to get data on this. Management further gave some 
reasons which helped to drop the accident rate. Workers were trained to enhance 
safety consciousness and practise self-protection measures. They were asked to 
monitor each other on safety issues. Group leaders had responsibility for the safety 
of all group members. Group leaders advised workers to put their safety before 
production. They walked around and checked safety risks frequently. They had 
authority to stop a worker operating if they felt it was not safe. I asked workers if 
the increased work pace had caused a growth in the accident rate. Many workers 
gave a negative answer. They said that the stringent safety rules prevented accidents 
from happening. Any behaviour against rules would be punished. For example, 
regular maintenance should be done on all machines and a worker must wear 
glasses to protect his eyes from damage from metal splinters and welding flash. 
Kaizen activities also made workers' operations safer. Yu in Auto-1 said: 
Kaizen has made work much safer. You know, when a worker is running 
several machines and tired, he may be in danger because he is not able to 
concentrate. A worker noticed this and made suggestion to install a protective 
grid on the machine. After their Kaizen activity, workers feel much better and 
safer (a production manager in No.! workshop). 
It is evident that if things have improved, this may be because they were so 
bad before. For example, there was previously no guard on a machine. If the 
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working conditions did not change, workers might be in much worse situation. This 
is because if workers are working harder than ever before, and under constant stress 
and surveillance, they will have more accidents, as considerable casework tells us 
(Berggren, 1993; Babson, 1996; Rinehart, 1996). 
6.5 Summary 
Qualitative and quantitative data obtained from components companies in SAIC 
have been presented in this chapter. These data show that lean production control 
has resulted in significant increases in work intensity and work-related stress in 
Chinese auto components firms. This chapter has also analysed how these increases 
are related to some specific management techniques in labour utilisation and work 
pace control, such as multi-tasking operations, full load work method, total 
productive maintenance and quality control. It can been seen clearly that the essence 
of the system is not to turn over control to workers, but to increase management 
power by using a different form of workforce control (Parker and Slaughter, 1995: 
44). 
Whilst it is certainly true that labour has been intensified, it is also the case 
that labour time has been extended--wages not being paid for operatives checking 
the status of their machines and for performing extra maintenance work used to be 
done by maintenance workers. Survey evidence indicates that workers gradually 
accepted the new management techniques under the influence of the severe 
employment environment in the other industrial sectors in China. 
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In addition, it is perfectly evident that lean production has not achieved 
efficiency--if by this is meant full utilisation of resources. Workers are made to 
work very hard when at work--but, for the sake of profit, they are also sent home to 
leave resources unused. 
The impact of lean production on health and safety is briefly discussed. It is 
evident that lean production shows both negative and positive influence on health 
and safety. Because the intensification of labour is on going, the long-term effect of 
lean production on health and safety should be a major concern. 
After an analysis of lean production impacts on workers, in the next chapter, 
consideration will be given to the changes of work organisation resulting from team 
working, Kaizen and intensive training. 
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Chapter Seven 
Work Organisation in Transition 
A number of influential pieces of research on lean production have endorsed the 
distinctive Japanese work organisational paradigm as a putative alternative to 
Fordist mass production. According to Womack and his fellow researchers, 
Japanese organisational practices constitute a new form of lean production and 
herald the appearance of a `Post-Fordist' regime. In their words, lean production 
places the dynamic work team at the heart of the lean factory. It provides workers 
with the skills they need to control their work environment and the continuous 
challenge to make work go more smoothly (Womack et al., 1990: 99-101). Kenney 
and Florida describe the new organisational form as consisting of overlapping work 
roles, job rotation, team-based work units and relatively flexible production lines 
(Kenney and Florida, 1988: 131). 
In contrast, Dohse and his colleagues argue that the Japanese management 
system is simply the practice of the organisational principles of Fordism under 
conditions in which management prerogatives are largely unlimited (Dohse et al., 
1985: 141). Many researchers in the West cite evidence of attempts at strong 
management control existing in Japanese transplants (Garrahan and Stewart, 1992; 
Danford, 1999). 
Whilst researchers are arguing whether lean production represents an 
alternative organisational paradigm to Fordism, they sometimes share a common 
assumption in their implicit acceptance of the existence of a distinctive Japanese 
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work organisation. Is it possible to transfer the Japanese work organisation 
paradigm from its original environment to new ones? Empirical research has 
suggested that team-based work organisation can be effectively transferred to 
Japanese automotive transplants in the United States (Florida and Kenny, 1991: 
381). Another piece of research conducted by Elger and Smith (1994: 38) in the UK 
indicated that in Japanese transplants, factory regimes were selectively adjusted to 
fit into local market requirements; particular industrial sector logics and particular 
labour relations conditions. 
To date, there has been no discussion of the issue of transferability of 
Japanese organisational forms into Chinese firms. China has experienced a 
transition from a planned economy to a market economy in recent years. By 
looking at the cases in the auto components companies, I examine the transfer of 
Japanese work practices to China in respect of two related research questions: To 
what extent have these auto components companies emulated the new work 
organisation? Does the transferred organisation take on Chinese characteristics? 
This chapter focuses on lean production related organisational changes such 
as team working, Kaizen and multi-skill training. Based on quantitative and 
qualitative survey data analysis on the work organisation in the auto components 
companies, it answers the following questions. What are the characteristics of team 
working? How were Kaizen activities carried out? Does the training programme 
make workers multi-skilled? 
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7.1 Team Working at Auto Components Companies 
Team working is a key organisational feature of lean production. The co-operation 
and involvement of workers in the work environment are seen to be too important 
to be ignored. In the auto components companies, the management-initiated 
transformations in work organisation began with the introduction of team working. 
7.1.1 The Team Concept 
It is difficult to define the term `team' precisely in a lean production plant because a 
team may refer either to a work team, the formal structural unit, or to a co-operative 
group whose members come from different organisational levels. Regarding team 
functions, Womack et al. assert that cross-training, multi-skilling and job rotation 
take place through the medium of teams. Kenney and Floride (1988: 132) suggest 
that work organisation is based on `self-managing' teams. However, critics such as 
Parker and Slaughter (1995: 48-49) argue that team working leaves workers with 
less authority and more accountability, and workers are pressured to transfer 
continually their knowledge to management. Graham (1995: 205) indicates that the 
team serves as a mechanism of management control. Stewart and Garrahan (1997: 
231) point out there is rarely an admission regarding the role of team working in 
securing surplus value from labour. This implies that workers become agents of 
their own exploitation. 
There are two kinds of teams (tuan dui) in the auto components companies. 
One refers to the production groups which are the basic units, running day-to-day 
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operations in accordance with the nature of a new production line on the shop floor. 
The production groups originate from the former work groups called `ban zhu'. 
Each group now has its clearly defined responsibilities, production and quality 
targets. Every worker is organised into one of the production groups. For example, 
in the Auto-3,140 workers and seven managerial officials in the cold roll workshop 
are divided into seven production groups. 
Another form of team is the project team consisting of a small number of 
industrial engineers, production managers and workers who may come from 
different production groups. The project team is a temporary organisational unit 
which is formed to deal with some specific production problems. It engages in 
improvement activities, operating as QCs. Its aim is not only quality control but 
also the reduction of costs and non-value added activity. According to my survey, 
62% of respondents had been project team members. At the time when I was 
conducting the survey, 38% of respondents were still project team members. In the 
mind of most workers the team concept is strongly related to the project team. This 
can be confirmed by my interviews for, as Tang said: 
On our shop floor, several teams are organised which provide us with 
opportunities to participate in innovation. These teams are not standing 
organisations. They will be dismissed as their projects are completed (a 
worker in Auto-4). 
Zhuo said frankly: 
Workers in the (project) teams made many suggestions over the past several 
years, but there is not any (project) team on my assembly line at the moment 
because the line is running smoothly and no problems need resolving (a group 
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leader in the assembly line of Auto-5). 
Whatever the understanding of the team concept, it is a fact that workers in 
the auto components companies have some knowledge of teams. As discussed later, 
the traditional organisation in SAIC is being transferred and team working reflects 
a change of work organisation on the shop floor. 
7.1.2 Team Working 
In China, worker involvement in industrial management and technical innovation 
has a long history stretching back to 1958 when Chairman Mao promoted the 
management principle of `participation, reform and integration' (Liangcan yigai 
shanjiehe). It means that officials should participate in production activities and 
workers participate in industrial management to reform all unreasonable regulations 
and rules; engineers and managers should integrate themselves with workers in 
production practices and technical innovations. It is evident that this principle 
contains some ideas of Western team working. This principle is no longer 
mentioned nowadays because the nature of the principle was considered to have 
been distorted during the so-called `big leap' and the Cultural Revolution. 
After the economic reforms, team working based on work groups was 
encouraged with the issue of `regulations for group work'. Awards were given to 
the groups having done well according to the standards set by the regulations. In 
1987, team working was enhanced with the requirement for quality control. Work 
groups with excellent performance might be named as a self-governing group or a 
trustworthy group, with the latter at the top level of awards. 
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A new team working campaign was initiated in 1994 when lean production 
was first introduced in the components companies in SAIC. The management 
called for discretion, decentralisation of responsibility and full realisation of 
workers' potential and inculcated in workers the idea that team working was a 
`human-centred', self-managing work practice. This was because they were aware 
that lean production techniques counted for nothing without the participation and 
responsibility of employees. 
7.1.2.1 Team Working -QCs Activity 
At the early stage of applying lean production, managers confronted many 
challenges in the production process. Team working was first carried out in some 
experimental firms, and aimed at improving resolving production problems, for 
example, bottlenecks. From 1995, it spread into every subsidiary of SAIC. 
Production managers and work groups (ban zhu) leaders organised team working at 
different levels from project teams to work groups. 
QCs activities were dedicated to detecting problems, finding the reasons 
behind them, making formal suggestions and implementing team decisions. Ru in 
Auto-1 gave an example: 
Firstly, one member described a problem and all members would try to find 
the cause of the problem and the best method to resolve the problem. Finally, 
the team leader would assign tasks to members. The implementation results 
might be checked in later team meetings. Those who had their proposals 
accepted by the team and those who successfully implemented the proposal 
would be awarded bonuses. Their photos and achievements might also be 
publicly displayed on notice boards at prominent positions around the firm (a 
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production manager in the No. I workshop). 
QCs meetings were always recorded. Figure 7.1 is an example of a QCs 
meeting note. This report was kept on file and was often used in regular progress 
evaluations. The achievements of QCs activities play an important role in the 
assessment of individuals, work groups (ban zhu) and workshops. 
Figure 7.1 A QCs Meeting Note. 
A QCs meeting note in Auto-3 
Date: 14`h Nov. 1998 
Place: Main meeting room 
Participant: Zhu (QC leader, work group leader), Wu (deputy director of quality control 
department), Wang (head of technology department), Zhuo (technology engineer), Li 
(member of quality control department, ) Chao (dispatcher of manufacturing department), 
Zhao (work point engineer) and Gu (work group leader). 
Agenda: 1. Li reported the result of a quality examination of randomly selected products. 
The pass rate was 100%. 
2. Discussion of spring quality problem. 
Problem A: load instability 
Solution: changing load tolerance, improving winding procedure. 
Problem B: spring surface problem--burr 
Solution: 
Reason solution person in charge complete date 
Machine wear out increasing wear-resistance Zhou end of Nov. 
Crackle on tool changing tool Gu, Zhu end of Nov. 
Poor operation training Zhu, Gu end of Dec. 
`Zero Defects' was a major subject of QCs activities and commenced in 
1995. It uses a device that can be a detecting instrument, a restricting tool or a 
signal device to eliminate defects that may occur due to the oversight of workers or 
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more likely the incompetence of engineers. Normally, team members design the 
device that can be used to inspect products automatically and to prevent human 
error related defects. The first example of a zero defect project occurred in Auto-2 
in 1995 when bearings kept dropping off bases. The QC team solved the problem 
by adding a pressure sensor to the assembly machine. When the bearing was 
parallel to the bearing base and was fitted well, the pressure sensor sent a signal to a 
green light showing the machine worked well. Otherwise, the sensor sent a signal to 
a red light and stopped the machine. During the zero defect campaign, workers 
were encouraged greatly to think about production management and product 
quality. 267 zero defect projects have been completed and RMB 8.8 million have 
been saved in Auto-2 since 1995. 
7.1.2.2 Team Working-Production Group Management 
Production group management is the other form of team working in the auto 
components companies. With the introduction of lean production (1993), the work 
group (ban zhu), a Chinese traditional production unit based on the production 
function, started to be transformed into the production group that was regarded as 
the basic organisational unit. The practices are closely related to original work 
groups, that is, different work groups may be transformed following different 
routes. A production group may be formed with the same work group members (for 
example, on assembly lines), or it may be formed with members coming from 
different work groups following the restructuring of the layout of workshops into 
cellular manufacturing. As for production lines born after the introduction of lean 
production, the related production groups have been set up according to the 
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requirements of team working. The production group has comprehensive functions 
and carries out natural group tasks to produce one product or a set of products. 
Each production group is now responsible for output, quality, material handling and 
meeting the demands of its downstream `customers'. 
Continuous changes to the production groups and related management were 
still going on when I was visiting SAIC. The top management of SAIC set a goal to 
completely transfer the production group to a real lean production team within 
several years. They have made great efforts to promote production group 
management. In 1998, a `circular concerning the further strengthening of 
production group management' was issued in SAIC, which determined the new 
meaning and functions of the production groups. This circular advocated team spirit 
and required group members to participate in quality and productivity improvement 
programs and to share responsibility for group performance. 
Table 7.1 Assessment of Production Group Management. 
Dimensions Percentage Content 
Production 10% Production targets, work-in-progress inventories. 
Flow 12% Visible, pull, one-piece flow and U-shape cells. 
management 
Human resource 12% Deployment, operation rating, absenteeism, training. 
Safety 12% Rules, safety education, prevention of accidents. 
Cost 16% Cost reductions, break-down of process to achieve 
targets. 
Equipment 18% Preventive maintenance, resolution of small problems. 
Quality 20% Checking, analysis of quality targets, control and 
feedback checking. 
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Production group management was periodically examined in SAIC. Table 7.1 
shows an example of the examination, in which the items listed are weighted 
differently. The most important items are associated with cost, equipment and 
quality control. The results of the examination are used in determining performance 
pay and other awards for the whole production group. 
In 1999, `organisational learning' and `system thinking' were called for in 
production group management in SAIC. In a training outline, management believed 
that organisational learning could constantly bring forth new ideas and could make 
for a successful enterprise. Management asked workers to treat learning and study 
as part of their daily job, and to form a good environment of systematic learning. 
Eventually `organisational learning' aimed at setting up higher-performance 
production groups, that was, the learning production group which focuses on 
members learning from each other, efficiently finding problems and resolving 
problems with collective wisdom. Management also recommended workers to learn 
from the book `Fifth Discipline' (Senge: 1990) about system thinking and asked 
them to apply the ideas of system thinking in their group management. 
7.1.3 Workers' Views about Team Working 
As described above, team working is a central element of the new form of work 
organisation in SAIC. It did significantly improve group performance and make 
contributions to the increasing productivity of the company. Here I would like to 
discuss how workers viewed team working. My survey data indicate that workers 
had mixed feelings toward team working. 
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Facing a buyers' market, workers did feel that team spirit pulled them 
together to attain company goals and to beat the competition. As Ru put it: 
In the past, when a worker stopped working because of a machine problem, 
his colleagues might seize the chance to have a break. But now, if the same 
thing happens, other group members will help him out. Every group member 
has commitment to make production go smoothly (a supervisor in Auto-3). 
According to the survey result, 85% of respondents agreed that working in 
teams helped them feel like part of SAIC. 79% of respondents believed that all 
managers and employees should be members of the same `company team' (see 
Table 7.3a). This is also reflected in the interviews, from which I learnt that most 
workers felt a shared destiny with their company. For example, Qiu in Auto-6 
described the company situation at that time as workers and managers being in `the 
same boat'. A worker in Auto-1 believed that team working enabled workers and 
managers to `stick together'. Chen, a union official in Auto-2, did a survey about 
what concerned workers most a few days before my survey. He explained as below: 
Although workers were concerned to keep their jobs, most of them thought 
about company things such as product life cycle, the quality and market of 
new products. They understood that it would be meaningless to talk about 
their future if the company could not survive. Most of workers believed that 
our company would not ignore workers' interests (a union official in Auto-2). 
However, managers may perceive workers' team spirit differently, as one manager 
put it: 
I feel that for most workers, the team means their own shop-floor production 
groups. The demarcation lines between management and workers are clear. I 
do not believe that workers think their general manager is working in the 
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6 same team' with them. 
When asked who benefited from team working, about two-fifth (39%) of 
workers thought they benefited, 34% of respondents pointed to the whole enterprise 
including workers and management, 10% mentioned management, 7% referred to 
team leaders and 10% answered `not sure', as is shown in Table 7.2. This 
demonstrated that team working was a win-win strategy, at least at the time when I 
visited the company. 
Table 7.2 Who Benefits from Team Working? 
Workers Whole Management Team leaders Not sure 
enterprise 
39% 34% 10% 7% 10% 
Total N= 326 
A majority (81%) of respondents said that team working gave them chances 
to talk about their jobs and make suggestions. A high proportion (79%) indicated 
that team working brought them new skills (see Table 7.3a). 
Table 7.3a Views on Team Working Positive. 
I believe that all managers and employees should be members 79% 
of the same `company team' n=273 
Working in a team helps me feel like I am part of the company n=271 85% 
Working in a team gives me a say over how my job is done n=272 81% 
Team working has given me new job skill n=280 79% 
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Table 7.3b View on Team Working Negative. 
Working in a team is a way to get us to work hard n=272 82% 
Working in a team gets us all pressuring one another n=271 76% 
Besides their likes, workers also clearly indicated something they disliked 
about team working. As shown in Table 7.3b, eighty two per cent of respondents 
felt that team working was a means of making them work hard. One worker on a 
production line explained: 
It is a big challenge for the whole group to achieve 100 percent quality control 
and efficiency. We have to work much harder so that our group can meet the 
quality commitment of not producing, not passing and not using substandard 
products. We also have to work much harder so that our production quota can 
be achieved when a group member is ill or injured. 
Seventy six percent of respondents complained they felt considerable pressure from 
other group members (Table 7.3b). A group leader told me: 
The `production group management system' assesses a group as a whole 
according to the performance of the whole group. The incentive component of 
wages is directly associated with group performance. Sometimes, some 
members doing well show up or blame others. Those falling behind are often 
under tremendous pressure from their colleagues and have to speed up their 
work pace. 
A worker in Auto-6 confirmed what the team leader said: 
You know, we have the promise of product quality. Any mistake not only 
affects the reputation of our group, but also the pay of our group. I really felt 
guilty when I once did something wrong. 
237 
The bottom-up control of team working such as peer pressure supplemented 
normal management control. Some workers regarded this practice as a new form of 
surveillance and control which combined peer pressure with traditional supervision. 
Ru gave his feelings about this side of traditional supervision: 
It is not easy being a production worker. The production manager applies 
disciplines to you and the work group leader looks at your work all the time. 
In addition, the managers who pass the production line frequently check the 
quality of your products and your equipment. I always worry what I may do 
wrong. I think that traditional surveillance is still working (in Auto-1). 
How did workers view the change in the decision making process? Relevant 
statistical data are presented in Figure 7.2. In general, 62% of direct production 
workers and 57% of maintenance workers thought their influence in decision 
making had stayed the same or decreased, whilst half the group leaders had the 
same idea. It should be noted that as for workers who agreed that team working 
increased their influence in decision making, the real meaning about increases in 
decision making is that they get involved in finding problems, making suggestions 
and solving problems with supervision of their group leaders or production 
managers. This does not mean that workers were empowered to have a final say or 
they achieved self-management. A worker expressed this very clearly: 
Yes, I often express my ideas about problems occurring in production during 
group meetings and solve small problems by myself with the approval of my 
group leader. This does not mean I can do what I want. For example, I am told 
that I have the right to stop a production line if I find defects. In fact, I need to 
report the defects to a group leader first. If he or she cannot sort the problem 
out, he or she must report it to a production manager who can finally decide if 
the production line should be stopped. Now you understand how I am 
empowered. 
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A worker in Auto-I told nie about his experiences in QCs activities: 
Empowerment? It is out of the question. Engineers play a key role in team 
working. They do ask workers whether there is anything that needs improving. 
Workers get clues from the engineer and make some suggestions. 
Nevertheless, engineers and project managers always have a final say. 
A union chairman frankly told nie: 
It seems that workers have been empowered in the firms with regular team 
working activities. In fact, workers have no right to make final decisions. 
There is a tendency now that in some firms team meetings are becoming 
formalistic and the team working is faltering. In some firms, QCs terms have 
not been set up so far. It will be great to achieve real self-management. 






















=stayed the same 
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Figure 7.2 shows that 47% of group leaders felt an increase in their decision 
making process. This proportion is higher than that (38%) of corresponding direct 
production workers. This fact indicates that group leaders were key figures in team 
working. Group leaders were members of shop floor production groups and had 
managerial responsibility for immediate production activities. A group leader told 
me: 
I have been a group leader for more than 10 years. Before the application of 
lean production, I worked as a normal worker and occasionally attended some 
meetings held by managers. But now I have a lot of duties that were normally 
carried out by managers or other staff. I spend only half my time working as 
an operator on the production line. I have to spend the rest of my working time 
training new workers, filling in for absentees and doing paper work, such as 
filling out quality check sheets and making daily productivity reports. 
Sometimes, I have to assign tasks to production workers, take responsibility 
for quality control of my group and make suggestions about the performance 
pay of group members. This is not an easy job. 
Almost all group leaders were appointed by production managers. In addition 
to their position and length of service, their salaries were closely related to the 
performance of their group, which were about 20% higher than that of normal 
workers. Suggestions from their production managers might play an important role 
in the scale of their salaries. Therefore, group leaders strongly implemented the 
intentions of management in organising team working. Workers were not happy 
about that, as a worker stated: 
Our group leader was appointed by management. He may change our work on 
a daily basis. We have to work harder and harder to achieve newer and newer 
goals. I do not like him. He is an agent of the management. 
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Most respondents (76%) thought that group leaders should be elected by their 
members and should represent their interests. In SAIC, the union is quite weak. It 
may take a long time for group leaders to represent their members' interests. 
In summary, managers in the auto components companies have utilised team 
working to achieve the company's goals and to beat the competition. Team working 
did promote team spirit and enable workers to make their suggestions although 
workers are far from empowerment and self-management. In the next section, I will 
analyse how managers utilised Kaizen to cut costs and continuously harness 
workers knowledge for further development. 
7.2 Kaizen 
7.2.1 What is Kaizen? 
Kaizen, the Japanese name for continuous improvement, is a philosophy that seeks 
unceasing improvement at all levels. It is not only a technique supporting TQM or 
JIT, where work-in-progress inventories, defects and non-value added operations 
are identified as targets for improvement; it is also a strategy dealing with cost 
reduction and productivity improvement. The Kaizen process can draw on any 
management tool including suggestion schemes, small group problem-solving, 
brainstorming or work study (Malloch, 1997: 107). 
Sengenberger and Campbell (1993) view Kaizen as one of the principal 
features of lean production. Indeed, for them the objectives of lean production and 
many Kaizen programmes are identical: the avoidance of waste (cited in Malloch, 
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1997: 109). At the same time, continuous improvement is required because lean 
production has a customer orientation. Continuously changing customer needs and 
generally rising standards make Kaizen necessary. 
According to the advocates of lean production, Kaizen harnesses workers' 
know-how, democratises Taylorism, synthesises manual and intellectual labour, 
induces an empowered workforce to participate voluntarily in the continuous 
improvement of operations, and generates job satisfaction and commitment (cited 
in Rinehart et al., 1997: 153). However, Rinehart et al. contradict this view and 
argue that the process of Kaizen does constitute a departure from Taylorism, but the 
outcomes of the process generally conform to Taylorist dictates (Rinehart et al., 
1997: 155). Furthermore, Kaizen is held as central to both physical and intellectual 
exploitation, Kaizen is merely a means for constantly increasing the pace and 
intensity of work (Dassbach, 1996: 29). 
In the following section, I will analyse how management in the auto 
components companies in SAIC promotes Kaizen and how Kaizen is organised to 
utilise workers' knowledge. Furthermore, I try to answer two questions. Does 
Kaizen give workers more power? Does Kaizen increase the workloads and 
pressure on workers? 
7.2.2 The Origins of Kaizen in SAIC 
The idea of continuous improvement was firstly launched in SAIC in 1995 with the 
absence of any mention of Kaizen. SVW practised KVP2, which had been 
242 
advocated in Volkswagen Germany. KVP2 means rapidly continuous improvement 
to compare with the system of Japanese Kaizen. KVP2 emphasises improvements in 
flow, quality, service and price. In 1995, SVW organised 40 groups and 
successfully improved 146 items. It saved RMB 1.744 million. Despite its success, 
the experience of SVW had attracted relatively little attention in SAIC. This was 
because managers in other firms were eager to learn new lean production systems 
and it was too early to talk about continuous improvement. 
Kaizen as a systematised approach did not appear until 1996 when a Japan 
company offered its joint-venture company (Auto-10) in Shanghai consultation on 
production management by adopting Kaizen within a three year period. Managers 
and workers were instructed in the philosophy of Kaizen by Japanese experts. The 
method involves seeking gradual improvement forever and to develop a consistent 
process--oriented way of thinking. Kaizen contributes to the full utilisation of 
labour. Kaizen was organised on some shop floors where the production layout was 
rearranged up to five times. A standard work-study was carried out several times. In 
combination with suggestion making, Kaizen won the workers involvement. At the 
end of 1998, the labour force of Auto-10 decreased from 333 direct production 
workers to 213. The company avoided adding an additional 83 workers to the 
labour force and saved RMB14.56 million. 
Kaizen in Auto-10 attracted great attention amongst the top management of 
SAIC, who attributed its implementation to environmental pressures. In 1998, more 
and more acute competition occurred in the whole car and components market. The 
competition came from a few large automotive enterprises which manufactured 
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high quality products through setting up joint-ventures with foreign companies and 
some small enterprises which produced low price components. In 1998, SAIC 
suffered a decline in prices and a reduction in profit (from RMB 7 to 5.5 million). 
The only way to secure profits was to cut costs because customers demanded 
products with high quality and low price. Top management in the SAIC 
headquarters learnt lessons from joint-venture enterprises--SVW and Auto-10, and 
decided to diffuse Kaizen amongst the whole group. 
7.2.3 Kaizen Practices 
Kaizen in SAIC has three main practices: firstly, to instil into workers the idea of 
constant improvement and draw suggestions which focus on cost reductions; 
secondly, to adopt or renew standard operations which provides the basis for cost 
cutting by saving labour; finally, to break down the savings targets for workers. 
7.2.3.1 Suggestion Making 
The suggestion making of Kaizen has two features. First, Kaizen is always tied to 
concrete cost reductions. Second, the suggestion makers are expected to have the 
ideology of continuous improvement. The management in the auto components 
companies tried to make all employees exhibit the Kaizen ideology-- there was not 
an end and everything could be done better--to gain momentum in the development 
of the enterprise. Every individual was spurred to find better ways of doing his or 
her job to improve company operations. During my fieldwork, workers told me 
what they thought about Kaizen: 
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`Kaizen is to seek for a new starting line every day and to do everything better 
than what has been stipulated' (Zhong in Auto-1). 
`Kaizen is to consistently add pressure to myself', `Kaizen starts from my job' 
(Tang in Auto-2). 
`Kaizen does not let me ignore small improvements' (Ru in Auto-3). 
`We use brainstorming in the meetings to encourage people to come up with 
ideas in the Kaizen groups' (Qiu in Auto-6). 
Kaizen was used by management to further extract workers' intelligence and 
knowledge because operators were familiar with the functions of machine and 
operation processes. The suggestions that came from workers were seen as 
evidence of workers participating in a further level of capital and labour utilisation. 
Most proposals were concerned about savings in materials and supplies or 
improving the efficiency of machines and tools. In the period 1998 to 1999, SVW 
adopted 644 suggestions and implemented 518 so as to save RMB 8.8 million. 
During the same period, Auto-5 had drawn 575 suggestions from employees and 
adopted 240 items resulting in savings of RMB 3.2 million. During the first two 
months of 1999, a workshop in Auto-3 yielded 31 suggestions. 
The workers of Auto-1 can make suggestions once they find a way towards 
improvement. Each production group is also expected to submit at least two 
suggestions with high quality twice a year. As an example, 31 members who 
produce covers for gears in this firm have submitted 75 proposals and the adoption 
rate has been 100% since Kaizen has been implemented. The main innovation was 
to re-assemble an imported second hand machine and make parts instead of 
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importing parts. This saved $15,000 alone. An assembler in Auto-3 suggested 
buying grinding / milling cutters rather than buying single-function cutters for a 
saving of RMB 100,000 a year. Workers on one shop floor of Auto-4 submitted at 
least one suggestion every month. For example, a worker designed a device which 
showed great technical sophistication and made for greater efficiency. The most 
recent Kaizen project in Auto-2 was carried out to manufacture components for 
SGM and new products for the B5 car, SVW, which led to savings of DK 9 million. 
Compared with early suggestion programmes within team working, the 
emphasis of Kaizen is on the quality of proposals instead of the number of 
proposals. The reason is simple. Previous efforts at team working have made 
progresses for several years but increased the difficulties of continuous innovation. 
A manager explained: 
In the early team working, workers searched for other people's visible 
weaknesses. Now we are requiring workers to find the problems in their own 
jobs. For example, a worker normally operates his machine according to a 
computer programme without a doubt. Now, he has to think how to improve 
his job and even to change the programme. 
A worker indicated a little difference between Kaizen and team working: 
Each individual from the top manager to worker on the production line 
participates in Kaizen in various ways. Suggestions are submitted not only 
from project team members, but also from non-team members. The principle 
of Kaizen places an emphasis on incremental improvements and team working 
focuses on a collective co-operative spirit. 
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There are material and non-material incentives towards workers' suggestions 
although they are less than the value of the workers' efforts. When a suggestion is 
adopted in Auto-1, the production group receives a RMB 500 bonus and the 
individual worker who made suggestion gets RMB 500. Every participant receives 
a small gift like a hand towel. RMB 100 is awarded to a successful proposal maker 
in the Auto-4. Over several years, Auto-5 gave RMB 100,000 to the most 
outstanding suggestion submitters. In addition, workers were rewarded by non- 
material incentives. Miao stated: 
The taking of rewards and the presentation ceremony itself were valued highly 
by workers. An official announcement of the results of the suggestion scheme 
is published in the evaluation results table and in the enterprise newspaper. 
When our top manager phoned workers to congratulate them on the 
implementation of their good suggestions, workers were happy with this (a 
party secretary of workshop in Auto-4). 
7.2.3.2 Labour Saving 
Labour saving activity is invoked by a top management policy `to cut 5% of the 
expenditure on three items (financial, management and sales costs)'. Middle 
managers monitor labour saving performances. The central concern of management 
is to eliminate slack in the system. The management in Auto-1 has tried to remove 
wasted human effort through systematic work analysis. Wang told how Kaizen was 
running: 
The moment we applied one-piece flow, the production system was in- 
balance. However, when we ran Kaizen, we tried to break this balance. You 
know, some workers do not like to do more work. I have to seek out a possible 
route to further increase their work pace. Every time, an adoption of a new 
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design means an increase in the workload of workers, this will go on and on. 
You know, we can cut labour costs for about RMB 50,000 a year if we just 
save one person (the head of the manufacturing department in Auto-1). 
This was not an isolated case. To utilise machines and workers to the 
maximum, some firms continuously improved the standardised method of working 
by restructuring the layout of machines and by recalculating the work pace again. 
This was imposed with little or no consultation, particularly in respect of the 
frequent adjustments in line balancing. I observed a shop floor in a firm in order to 
see what Kaizen was really about. A work group leader told me that the process of 
Kaizen was described on the notice board. Figure 7.3 shows the Kaizen results. 
Figure 7.3 clearly shows that Kaizen led to an intensification of the labour process, 
because works were added every time when the line was re-balanced. This did not 
permit workers `the freedom to control one's work' (Womack et al., 1990: 14). As 
an operator said: 
I feel exhausted when I go home every day. How hard must I work? Did 
management claim that Kaizen would be concerned about the human side? 
Without a doubt, management in most of the firms in which I conducted 
interviews claimed that workers were scared of this kind of Kaizen and showed 
their reluctance to follow the managements' intentions. The labour saved was used 
to create new production lines for the Buick car in SGM. During the period 1993 to 
2000, the members of a work group in Auto-1 were cut from 26 to 19. Three people 
on an assembly line of Auto-4 were transferred to a new team. 14 operators out of 
30 in a production group of Auto-5 were cut. The inevitability of these labour 
savings ensured a greater and greater intensity of work. 
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0.4% 88% decrease 
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7.2.3.3 A Break-down of Savings Targets 
Beside the increase in workloads, all employees experienced tension when they 
were assigned savings targets. The external cost-driven pressure is shifted to 
internal employees and is magnified through the use of a special measurement 
device. YT, a component company was injected with foreign capital from Thailand 
and carried out a management strategy `to make every employee be a manager'. 
This means that each employee would operate as if he/she was a member of 
management. Its aim was to continually cut costs. Chen explained to me how the 
project should be run: 
First, all resources in the form of money are measured by a computer system. 
Secondly, the firm is treated as an internal market. All relationships amongst 
departments are relationships of business, service and contract. Thirdly, an IC 
card (intelligent card, an electronic credit card) for recording the usage of 
resources of the firm, is used by everyone to deal with production, turnover, 
distribution and consumption. All manufacturing costs on the shop floor 
(wages, depreciation equipment, water and electricity bills, consumption of 
material, low consumption goods and repair cost) are measured by individuals. 
The operators can easily know their balance from a computer (a head of 
department of information in YT). 
This seems to heighten employees' responsibilities and accountabilities. 
However, the IC card added extreme pressure to employees. Individual 
performance is much strongly linked to his or her profit and balance sheet. 
Although some workers possibly get paid more when the more cost they saved, 
most workers were in danger to get less pay because it is not easy to save enough 
money. A worker said this system forced him to calculate costs very carefully and 
struggle to spend money to a minimum. Top management in SAIC called for all 
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employees to learn from the YT experience. Although a few firms I investigated 
did not use IC cards, the target of cost reduction was devolved down to the 
production group or individual. A worker complained that the pressure came down 
the line and it was at the bottom that the pressure was greatest. Beyond the shop 
floor, all other employees were under pressure. For example, in Auto-3, the staff in 
the market department intended to extend their market share because the cost might 
be decreased by 7% if the firm produced 2 million more suspension springs. The 
engineers tried to reduce the material in the spring factory. Dropping each spring 
weight about 0.02--0.24 kg means that RMB 400,000 might be saved. As the head 
of the planning department at this firm put it: 
The pressure of saving cost is associated with the pressure caused by the fear 
of job loss. Workers and staff understand more and more our decision. If our 
firm closes down, all employees will lose their jobs and then they will blame 
us for lacking responsibility. 
As a union chairman Hua commented: 
You see, cutting cost is like twisting out water from a dry cloth--it was 
impossible, the worker's pressure is unimaginable. 
7.2.4 Survey Results 
My survey investigated the extent to which the workers had experienced Kaizen in 
different firms. Broadly, Kaizen involves employees in participation and suggestion 
making. In general, one out of every five respondents claimed that they experienced 
a lot of Kaizen activity, 63% some experience, 25% few and no experience. Table 
7.4 lists the data obtained from nine components firms and indicates that workers 
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participation in Kaizen varies from one firm to another. Auto-1 tops the list with the 
highest rate (79%) of worker involvement, which is followed by Auto-4 (70%) and 
Auto-2 (69%). In contrast, workers in Auto-8 were the least likely to be involved in 
Kaizen. Although there may be many reasons for this, it is certain that in my survey 
sample Auto-8 was the only firm that manufactured buses and did not supply 
components for SVW and SGM. The quality and price of products did not get any 
feedback from the two joint-venture companies, so workers in Auto-8 had less 
pressure to conform to a continuous improvement programme. 
Table 7.4 Extent of Workers' Experience of Kaizen by Firm. 
A lot (%) Some (%) Little (%) None (%) Any (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)+(2) 
Auto-1 47 32 14 7 79 
Auto-2 14 55 22 9 69 
Auto-3 22 43 23 12 65 
Auto-4 22 48 17 13 70 
Auto-5 13 39 29 19 52 
Auto-6 9 51 23 17 60 
Auto-7 28 34 36 2 62 
Auto-8 7 30 52 11 37 
Auto-9 15 36 31 18 51 
Total N=523 
When asked the question `how do you view the changes since your firm 
started to practise Kaizen', 79% said `better', 17% said `the same' and 4% said 
`worse'. Figure 7.4 shows the views of production workers, maintenance workers 
and group leaders on Kaizen. The group views are broadly similar to each other. 
The views from different age groups reveal a similarity between them as well. 
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There are several ways to explain why workers felt better because of' using 
Kaizen. Firstly, workers saw that Kaizen brought reductions in waste and savings in 
costs to improve the efficiency of the company and its competitive capacity. 
Secondly, Kaizen would be good for both companies and workers. Kaizen did bring 
workers economic benefits. The management adopted the policy of `reducing 
labour without reducing bonuses in a production line or work group'. When labour 
was saved, the workers who remained shared the bonuses of the worker who had 
left. Thirdly, Kaizen provided chances for workers to think about production and 
development in the companies. The management thought it made sense to get 
workers involved. Finally, Kaizen might facilitate working smarter by means of 
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time and motion studies. The results of my interviews are consistent with the above 
analysis. Production manager Wu in Auto-10 said: 
In 1996, we started to apply Kaizen. On a shop floor, the team members had 
dropped from 13 to 9 and the output per member had increased from 800 units 
to more than 900 units. When we began to cut labour, the workers who 
remained complained about the increased workloads and resisted our 
decisions. In order to give workers incentive, my company launched a new 
policy, namely, the workers who remained shared the bonuses of the worker 
who had left. There were 13 members and each got bonuses of RMB 170. The 
sum amount of bonuses, RMB 2,210, then was shared by nine workers and 
each had bonuses RMB 250. Every worker had increased their bonuses by 
48%. 
In another shop floor, there were five people in a group. After Kaizen, a 
person left the group and the other four people shared the bonus of five. A 
worker in a group that had not applied Kaizen asked me when his group would 
introduce Kaizen. 
Workers started to realise that they benefited economically from the labour 
saving programme. It is worth noting that the workers' pay has increased since 
1996 in general. The percentage of the wage accounted for by bonus and the 
amount of wage varied according to the economic performance of the individual 
company. For example, the average annual level of production workers wages in 
Auto-1 in 2000 was RMB 20,000, amongst them RMB 5,000 to RMB 10,000 were 
bonuses. It is clear that bonus is a means of giving workers incentive. 
The workers' wages and living standards are higher than those of most people 
in Shanghai. The average wage of employees in state-owned firms in SAIC is about 
double the average wage of employees in other Shanghai SOEs. Workers in SAIC 
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also receive company welfare benefits which include old-age pension insurance and 
housing accumulation. Workers, however, were only partly reimbursed for their 
hard work. One assembly workshop in Auto-10 had saved labour costs RMB 6 
million in 1997 and RMB 8 million in 1998. Workers' hard work contributed to the 
profit making of the company. 
Workers were asked question `if you find a way to do your job that is easier 
or faster than the standard one, what do you do'? ' A majority of' respondents (70(, `0) 
said that they would submit suggestions (see Figure 7.5). This was in line with 
management expectations. The respondents who wanted to tell co-workers ( 16%) 
were more than those who would share their ideas with group leaders (I I `%, ). The 
possible explanation is that some respondents disliked group leaders because group 
leaders helped management to intensify workload and enhance labour control. 
Figure 7.5 What Workers Would Do if They Find a Solution to a Problem? 




Although workers would contribute ideas to their company, this did not mean 
that they were willing to sacrifice their own time for the company. When 
respondents were asked if they regarded their lunch breaks as their personal time or 
as a good time to discuss company's issues, approximate hall the workers defined 
their lunch break as personal time and only one third of' them regarded it as 
'discussion time'. In fact, workers had to contribute their own time to their 
company. For example, production group meetings lasted one hour, half in the 
company time and half in workers' time. As I 'Or data collection and analysis in 
Kaizen, workers had to do them completely in their own time. 
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The outcomes of Kaizen show that there was little evidence of worker 
empowerment and enrichment of the labour process. Firstly, production and 
engineering management took more extensive management prerogatives to gain full 
control of the Kaizen process. They not only managed re-organisation and job 
assignments, but also approved suggestions submitted from workers. This fits with 
the idea of `Kaizen from above' (Helper, 1995: 271). Secondly, workers had no 
means of being involved in business decision-making. Workers did not play a 
central or independent role. Furthermore, workers made improvement partly 
because they concerned the future of their company and partly because they got 
bonus. Finally, the fact remains that not all workers were motivated. These workers 
initially endorsed Kaizen. They had an interest in cutting costs and making 
operations more efficient, but they were disappointed when their suggestions were 
not implemented or they were forced to participate in continuous improvement. A 
few workers and union leaders I talked with complained that workers' suggestions 
were aborted. A female worker in Auto-6 told me that workers were disappointed 
since the problem they found could not be resolved for a long time and their 
suggestions were ignored by managers. The chairman of the trade union Zhang in 
Auto-5 critically indicated: 
Kaizen failed because the management controlled everything here. The 
original idea of Kaizen was to encourage workers to improve on their own and 
develop a harmonious relationship with management. Workers were 
disappointed because there was a lack of funds to support innovations they 
suggested or management was not interested in listening to workers opinions 
and paid little attention to the problem on a timely basis. 
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From the managements' point of view, Kaizen practices are still far from 
perfect even in Auto-1 where workers experience in Kaizen tops the list of the 
firms I surveyed. One manager recalled: 
We failed to get a VD6.3 certificate (International Quality Standard, assessed 
by German experts) recently. One of the reasons was that the willingness of 
workers to implement continuous improvement was not high enough 
according to the inspectors' report (in No. 1 workshop in Auto-1). 
In the other firm, a union official pointed out: 
To be honest, it was a very hard process to learn and apply Kaizen because we 
needed to change old practices formed in the planned economy. We made 
progress after several years' practice. However, it is hard to say that we did an 
excellent job on Kaizen. Kaizen is endless. We only achieved part of our 
goals. Long term improvement occurs in spirals. 
Overall, Kaizen helped firms to cut costs, make greater efficiency and 
workers' fates were linked to this. Kaizen also encourage workers to make 
suggestions and enables worker to benefit them. These are the main reasons why 
Kaizen is still being carried out in the firms and why most workers felt Kaizen 
made things better. However, it should be noted that Kaizen inevitably intensifies 
the labour process. Kaizen was a method of work measurement. Like the traditional 
method, Kaizen tried to squeeze more and more work out of workers and save 
labour costs. Workers became more and more stressed as Kaizen targets became 
higher and higher. For the future, workers will have no easy way to make 
reductions in costs and will have to spend a lot of their own time to learn new 
knowledge and to contribute their know-how to management. 
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7.3 Training and Skill 
Work organisational paradigms have a significant influence on training systems and 
skill structures. Debates about skills can be traced back to Braverman's Labour and 
Monopoly Capital (1974), which argues that deskilling and Taylorism is an 
inevitable feature of capitalist management. The new management paradigms have 
invoked an argument centred on the idea of a re-skilling process since the 1980s. 
Piore and Sabel (1984) indicate that the new technological market conditions 
require intellectual participation from workers with upgraded skills and greater 
autonomy. More recently, the arguments are about whether the lean production 
system creates a more skilled workforce. Womack et al. (1990: 101) suggest that 
the increased training prescribed in lean production provide workers with the skills 
they need to control their work environment. It is one of the supposed features of 
the break from Taylorism. However, there is also the argument that whilst multi- 
skilling is necessary to exploit arrangements such as JIT, variations or new 
responsibilities such as self-maintenance may be small and it is more accurate to 
speak of multi-tasking (cited in Thompson et al., 1995: 721). Jacobs provides the 
evidence that the nature of training in the MACI (Michigan Automotive 
Compressor, Inc. ) differs in significant ways from the promised scenario of 
empowerment and multi-skilling. The training for production workers is limited to 
memorisation of standardised, company-specific procedures for problem-solving 
(Jacobs, 1995: 322). 
This section will provide a picture of actual training practices in SAIC in 
order to examine the congruence between lean production and the skill of workers, 
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to evaluate what real changes took place in the utilisation of skills. It will also 
explore the role of training in the process of adopting lean production. Such a study 
is based on analysing survey data and listening to workers' voices. 
7.3.1 Training Agenda 
Training was placed at the top of the management agenda in auto components 
companies at the initial stages of the introduction of lean production. Management 
was confronted with the fact that the quality of workers was not in accordance with 
the imported advanced techniques and management. Lean production was a totally 
new production form. Its application urgently required a well-educated and skilled 
workforce. Additionally, as a long-term strategy, an educated workforce would 
ultimately enhance productivity and competitiveness. 
At the time I conducted fieldwork (1999-2000), the auto components 
companies were state-owned enterprises with a long history. These firms recruited 
workforces directly from high schools. This combined with the low levels of 
training due to a lack of dynamic and appropriate investment funds for training. As 
a result, an inadequate level of skill resources became a main barrier to the 
development of these companies. 
Management was responsible for the training of employees whilst trade 
unions only participated in organising training. Managers paid attention to the 
training budget, experienced trainees and equipment. According to the `SAIC 
Employees Training Registration Rule', the training target is for `at least 40 hours 
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(about five days) of training per worker annually, 60 hours per middle manager and 
80 hours per top manager annually'. Some companies advocated `40+4' training 
system (working for 40 hours and training for 4 hours every week). Many training 
facilities provided individual training as part of the overall training programme. 
7.3.2 Training Programme 
7.3.2.1 Training for Lean Production Control 
The emphasis in training shifted from the traditional apprenticeship system to meet 
the exigencies of the application of lean production. Concretely, what the training 
programmes covered was the spread of new knowledge and new technical learning 
to cope with the new production process, an understanding of the organisational 
changes and the revised management strategy. Without a doubt, training was the 
means to realise management control. 
The spread of lean production knowledge was a necessity. Lean production 
consists of a full range of techniques of advanced manufacturing: one-piece flow, 
Kanban, cellular manufacturing, JIT and quality control systems. These new 
techniques were implicated in new forms of work organisation, such as team 
working and a continuous improvement environment. Each firm arranged for 
workers and engineers to be trained abroad. After planning, regimenting and 
implementing step by step, employees rapidly transferred knowledge learned from 
the classroom to real practices on the shop floor. Pan, the party secretary of No. 3 
workshop in Auto-1 believed that good management techniques could not be 
implemented without the training of workers. Workers needed more training before 
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they could do what they expected to do. Tang, a work group leader in Auto-4 
recalled: 
Lots of training was necessary for lean production. The training was carried 
out twice per week. Each training session lasted for one hour. I was filled up 
with too many new things, and my brain was getting to its limits. I was 
nervous. I had to know and refresh these things. 
In the newly constructed assembly workshop, only one flow line was 
installed. The changes had resulted in a high number of variants on one assembly 
line with which workers had to cope. Workers were trained to perform a wide 
variety of tasks, including simple machine repair, quality control, material ordering, 
and problem-solving. Each firm had its own training tasks. For example, Auto-1 
trained every employee to have knowledge of quality standard QS-9000, VDA6.1 
and VDA6.3. Auto-2 concentrated upon a system of quality assurance. The training 
results were visible, as Ru in Auto-3 put it: 
Trained workers are more likely to see defects at an early stage and to be 
capable of competent manual corrections. 
Regarding the team working training, workers were trained to understand the 
following questions: what is team working? Why does the enterprise carry out team 
working? Why do workers benefit from team working? As production manager 
Chen in Auto-4 recalled: 
On the training course, I said team working was that every individual 
contributes his or her intelligence to attain company goals whilst considering 
other members new ideas and suggestions. When workers knew the other 
firms had team working, they asked me when they would start to do it. They 
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would not like to lag behind. You see, workers took the initiative on issues 
pertaining to the innovation. The shop floor created an environment for team 
working. Information was displayed on a board to show team members, 
projects and results. 
Table 7.5 Production Group Leader Training Arrangement. 
Content Hour Lecturer sources Resources of textbook 
1 Enterprise management 144 University <Management> 
2 Production management 24 Planning dept. SAIC <Lean production> 
3 Team working 12 Planning dept. SAIC <Lean production> 
4 Special production zero 8 Quality dept. Self-edition 
5 Quality standards 40 Education dept. Self-edition 
6 Quality cycles 4 Quality dept. Self-edition 
7 Zero-defects activity 4 Quality dept. Self-edition 
8 6S 4 Planning dept. Self-edition 
9 Equipment management 12 Facility dept. Self edition 
10 Cost management 24 Education dept. <Cost management> 
11 Car structure 32 Education dept. <Car structure> 
12 Writing 20 Education dept. <Chinese> 
13 Computer literature 120 Education dept. <Computer application> 
14 Visiting 40 Education dept. Self-edition 
Where training had taken place, team leaders or group leaders were more 
likely to be intensively trained and they were expected to train team members. They 
were first trained to understand the goal of application of lean production and the 
links to the individual and the contribution value to the companies' goals. The full- 
time training arrangement (which lasted three months) for production group leaders 
in Auto-2 in 1999, is shown in Table 7.5. It can be seen that team working 
constitutes a small proportion of this training--which is largely `hard'. 
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The quality of workers, including group leader, influenced the extent on 
which they obtained the new management knowledge and techniques, as Wu, a 
production manager, indicated: 
The lower education levels of worker are impediments to the introduction of 
lean production. Our firm is not like a Japanese firm where most workers 
graduated from universities. Japanese workers were easily understood and 
implemented managers' demands. You know, I could not simply give an 
instruction. I needed to spend a lot of time explaining in detail to workers 
about how to do it. This is the difference. 
7.3.2.2 Training for Flexibility 
Functional flexibility refers to the ability to move workers from one task to another. 
Most employees at the workplace were formally trained to be able to do other jobs 
except their own. As discussed in Chapter 6, workers were trained to operate multi- 
tasking. According to the companies' requirements, all workers should be able to 
operate at least three machines. The operation of each machine should be learnt by 
at least three workers. This is called the two 'lx3' projects. From 2000 onwards, 
SAIC began to implement the `315' training plan, which meant that 40% of 
workers should be competent in 3 technical skills, 20% in 5 technical skills and 
10% for whole production line operation. Workers were trained to be adaptable. 
Each sample firm had a `315' training plan. In the assembly line in Auto-6, 
60% of operatives could operate three jobs, 20% knew five jobs and 10% were 
capable of operating on the whole line. In one group of Auto-4,32% of group 
members knew three jobs and 5% knew 5 jobs. The flexibility showed that workers 
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were able to cover for absenteeism. The training methods were also flexible. 
Beyond any formal classroom training and special imported technology training, 
there was informal training by which workers learnt from each other. 
Special flexible training was available for those workers who were asked to 
move to a new job since some companies sought to save labour. Workers preferred 
to be versatile rather than staying on one job. Common sense dictates that the more 
skills workers master then the more opportunities they have to keep their jobs. Shen 
in Auto-3 introduced: 
Due to labour saving, 200 to 300 workers and staff left their positions and are 
trained for new positions. They will be assigned new jobs after three months 
training. 
The strategy of functional flexibility not only requires different skills from 
individual worker, it also impacts on the composition of the workforce. The higher 
the qualifications workers obtain the more easily workers keep their job. More and 
more workers studied at night school and then took external degrees through the 
local technical college on their own initiative and paid tuition fees by themselves. A 
worker in Auto-2 paid RMB 1,100 to be trained for a middle level technical 
certificate. Production group leader Xie of Auto-4 took pride in his team members, 
five youths out of 16 got polytechnic college certificates. Ru in Auto-3 gave 
another example: 
On our shop floor, 30% of workers graduated from middle technical schools 
after 1995 (12 persons) are receiving on-the-job training. They put in so much 
effort to gain a certificate from the polytechnic college. You know, they are 
almost exhausted on the job and they also had to work hard to pass 
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examinations. Workers' tuition fees can be paid by their company if they get 
the certificates. Otherwise, they will pay the fees by themselves. 
7.3.3 Evaluation 
My survey looked at what the training covered, the education level of workers, how 
training was related to the workers and workplace characteristics, and how workers 
viewed their skills. The data show that 20% of workers (non-managerial staff) 
graduated from colleges or universities and a majority received their education 
from high schools or middle-level polytechnic schools. The education level of 
workers is not high, although a few workers received certificates for on-the-job 
training. Even inside SAIC, workers in the state-owned firms had lower education 
levels than those in the joint-venture firms. For example, in Shanghai GM, 49% of 
employees (including workers) have certificates from colleges and universities. 
The technical grades of workers in SAIC were slightly improved. From 1996 
to 2000, the proportion of those at middle levels increased from 20% to 39%, the 
proportion of those at high levels grew from 2% to 6%, technicians from 1% to 
1.5% and senior technicians from 0.03 to 0.14%. 
I asked whether the workforce needed training to meet the technical 
requirements of their jobs. I asked `how long does it normally take before new 
workers are able to do the job as well as more experienced workers already 
working here? ' Most respondents (80%) answered `more than one month', 8% 
were familiar with their jobs in a month and 12% would reach the required standard 
in two weeks. 
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Table 7.6 Duration of Job Training in SAIC. 
More than 31-40 days 21-30 days 11-20 days 1-10 days None 
40 days (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
11 38 17 50 11 
Total N=558 
Table 7.7 Duration of Job Training in Britain and Turkey. 
Percentages 10 days 5--<10 2--<5 1--<2 days < one None 
and more days days day 
Workers in 39 16 22 43 6 
Turkey white- 
goods 
WERS 98 87 15 97 53 
employees in all 
manufacturing 
Source: Nichols et al., 2002: 77. 
In general, workers were asked how many days formal training they had 
attended in the preceding twelve months (October 1999 to September 2000 in the 
case of SAIC). Table 7.6 shows the duration of job training in SAIC and Table 7.7 
shows those experiences in Britain and Turkey. Within British WERS 98 
(Workplace Employee Relations Survey) data, employees in British manufacturing 
sample are considered as a whole. Comparing the two tables, it is found that 94% of 
employees in Turkey white-goods had received some training. The proportion is 
only a little higher than workers in SAIC (89%) but more than for British 
manufacturing employees (47%). Workers in SAIC (39%) were more likely to 
receive intensive training (more than ten days) than those of Turkish (3%) and 
British (8%). 
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This proportion varied considerably across the surveyed firms. It was found 
that intensive training took place in Auto-1.27% of respondents in Auto-1 attended 
more than 40 days training whilst the average percentage was 11% and only 3% of 
respondents had not received training compared with 11% on average. In contrast, 
56% of respondents in the non-component firms were never trained in the period of 
one year. 
Table 7.8 Training as a Source of Management Knowledge. 
Kaizen LP* QCs Team JIT BPR FP* TQM HRM 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
43 53 42 40 32 34 34 100 38 
Note: LP*=lean production, FP*=flexible production Total N=582 
The systematic training of workers prepared them for lean production by 
introducing both soft skills and hard skills. A number of workers learnt about new 
management practices by training. When I asked `how do you know about the nine 
listed management techniques', on average, 46% of respondents referred to 
training. The details are shown in Table 7.8. For example, training was the best 
resource for workers to learn about team working. My survey shows that 40% of 
respondents knew team working from training, compared to 37% from practice and 
6% from the mass media. The survey results also reflected the company's practices. 
Quality management was the most important skill in daily work, 100% of 
respondents had received TQM training. Many workers mentioned that training was 
also provided in the following areas: health and safety, group leadership, computer 
skills and law. 
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Table 7.9 shows the link between training and increases in skills by three job 
categories. There were no obvious differences amongst them. Only 3% of 
production workers were more likely to be trained than group leaders over ten days. 
Similarly, just 8% of group leaders claimed their skills had increased more than 
maintenance workers. Maintenance workers were more satisfied with skill 
improvement than others. 












More than 10 days 40 34 37 514 
training (39%) 
Skills increased 63 68 76 489 (64%) 
Satisfied with skill 68 77 73 510 
improvement (69%) 









More than 10 days 37 39 40 528 
training (39%) 
Skill increased 64 63 64 502 (64%) 
Satisfied with skill 58 73 77 530 
improvement (69%) 
Taking age into account, I found that workers in different age groups had 
almost the same likelihood of receiving more than ten days training and reporting 
increases in skill levels. But, the older the workers the more they were satisfied 
with training, as Table 7.10 represents. It is perhaps understandable that older 
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workers might make a comparison with the past when their skills were at a lower 
level. Younger workers might have more expectation to improve skills. 
SAIC has incorporated a concern for training within the overall production 
process. According to the chairman of the trade union in SAIC, SAIC had provided 
11,053 training places for workers for five years. Most employees knew about lean 
production whilst few managers had heard about it in the other industries. Recently, 
top management in SAIC put forward a proposal to be carried out called a `learning 
organisation' activity. Its underlying principle is team learning and life-time 
learning to affect the transition from firms based learning to organisational based 
learning. Employees are required to improve their abilities to learn and to 
experience continuous learning. Firms are expected to be a knowledge-intensive 
environment. It is, however, a long way from achieving its goal. 
7.4 Summary 
My research finding indicates that the auto components companies in SAIC have 
adopted a lean production related work organisation. All organisations are at 
different stages in this process of change. Most workers had experience of team 
working. Team working like QCs provided an opportunity for workers to 
participate in improvements of product quality and innovation. It is, however, far 
from the ideal that workers in self-managing team design their own jobs. The 
production group management is a kind of form of team working. Essentially, team 
working in SAIC invoked some cohesion with the Japanese approach to labour 
regulation and control. 
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Management in the auto components companies has applied Kaizen to utilise 
workers intelligence and to eliminate waste. Workers were encouraged to 
contribute their ideas about improving their work. Kaizen helped firms to cut costs 
and to increase competitive capacities. These were viewed favourably--not least 
because of the economic benefits from the workers who left their jobs. On the other 
hand, workers' ideas were not the dominant influence on the organisation of work, 
their Kaizen suggestions must be approved by engineers or managers. In addition, 
Kaizen was also a means for constantly increasing the intensity of work and made 
workers very stressed. This was viewed unfavourably by the workforce. 
Management had carried out training to assist lean production controls. 
Special flexible training was available for those workers who were asked to move 
to a new job following labour saving. Although workers reported that the training 
had increased their skill level and made them feel better, this does not mean lean 
production leads to multi-skilling because the workforce is still largely semi- 
skilled now. 
It is clear that work organisation in SAIC is in transition. Market pressures 
have galvanised the company into introducing team working, Kaizen and intensive 
training. However, global competitive pressures still challenge management to 
introduce further modern management techniques. 
In the next chapter, I shall analyse the role of the trade unions in the process 
of applying lean production. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Role of the Trade Unions 
The role and significance of trade unions under lean production environments have 
been widely debated. Critics argue that, because of the `fragile' nature of the lean 
production system, trade unions should forge an identity independent of the 
company and to address problems of labour control within the labour process by 
strategically challenging the outcomes of lean production (Rinehart et al., 1996; 
Stewart and Martinez Lucio, 1998; Upchurch and Danford, 2001). Unions are 
relegated to a minor role in involvement with management and are seen as being 
weak in protecting workers' interests. Views about the union helplessness come 
from both sides of the debate. Womack et al. disregard unions because they claim 
there is no need for them. By contrast, critics point out that enterprise unionism 
leaves workers without an effective collective force to challenge management 
prerogatives and demands (Clarke, 1990; Dohse, 1985). 
There is a lack of research on the trade unions' roles under lean production in 
China. This chapter, therefore, has three objectives. The first objective is to 
examine the changing unions' roles at national level and unions' involvement in 
lean production at the workplace level. The second objective is to scrutinise if 
unions can maintain fair pay and secure jobs for workers. The third objective is to 
examine workers' views on the role of the trade unions by looking at the possibility 
of building strong independent unions to represent the interests of workers in 
enterprises that have adopted lean production. 
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8.1 Trade Unions at the National and Enterprise Level 
8.1.1 The Changing Trade Unions at the National Level 
The traditional role of the Chinese trade unions has been as `transmission-belts' 
between the Party and the `masses' since 1949 (Ding et al., 2002). The industrial 
relations normally involved a triangular relation between the state, employers and 
the trade unions (Warner, 2002: 390). Before the economic reform, when workers 
were called the `masters' of the country, they and management were held to have 
had the same interests. In line with this, the union have a legacy of co-operation 
with management and government. 
The Trade unions had been organised on vertical lines. The All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) has remained the apex organisation which 
integrates the constituent parts. There have been 15 major industrial unions and 31 
provincial trade union councils in recent years. They have over 103 million 
members in more than 586,000 primary trade union organisations (Ding et al., 
2002: 433). In general, the average level of unionisation in state-owned enterprises 
is probably around 90%, but in JVs (joint-venture enterprises) and FEEs (foreign- 
funded enterprises) it is generally much lower. Since the 1980s, the role of 
enterprise unions has become weaker as the role of the Party at the local level 
began to weaken in the enterprise (Ding et al., 2002: 434). 
The Chinese economic reforms, resulting in the dissolution of the socialist 
safety net for workers, have had fundamental implications for the nature of 
management-labour relations (Mok and He, 1999). Since 1992, the reforms of three 
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systems (the labour and personnel system, the wages system and the social 
insurance system) have caused a decline in workers status as a whole (Feng, 1996; 
Mok and He, 1999). This is reflected most markedly in reductions in real incomes, 
welfare benefits and job security. Workers in those enterprises suffered financial 
difficulty whilst workers lost their job in those enterprises which were bankrupted 
or merged. 
With the development of the market economy, the contradiction between 
managers and employees is growing at the enterprise level. On the one hand, 
managers pay more attention to making profits, so they look for some ways to 
achieve it, such as reducing employees or increasing workloads. On the other hand, 
employees would like to maintain their own interests, and they hope to have a 
steady job and to be fairly treated. The number of labour disputes has increased, 
although workers do not have the right to strike like in the Western countries. 
A new Labour Law was passed by the National People's Congress in 1994 
and the trade unions have requested a more important role in readjusting 
employment relations and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 
recognised the need to be an independent force acting on behalf of employees. A 
degree of bargaining has been introduced via collective contract, a means affecting 
some SOEs managers and private-sector employers to handle their personnel 
decision on downsizing and lay-off, pay freezes and wage cuts and the like with 
greater care and even greater restraint (Warner, 2002: 391). 
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The trade unions in the auto components companies in SAIC, like many 
unions in other companies, are realising the importance of protecting workers' 
interests but they are facing problems to make changes. In the next section, an 
examination will be made as to what the trade unions in SAIC did during the period 
of implementation of lean production. The evidence collected on the union's role in 
SAIC is consistent with the overall pattern. 
8.1.2 What the Trade Unions Do in the Auto Components Companies 
8.1.2.1. Supporting Lean Production 
In these auto components companies, the union officials had a tradition of working 
with management, they and the Party chose to adopt new management techniques. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, management paid more attention to the issue 
of employee involvement and employee commitment when lean production was 
emulated. Management hoped that the trade unions would make the application of 
lean production possible because the efficiency and prosperity of the company 
would benefit employees. As the deputy head of the manufacturing department in 
Auto-3 put it: 
The union supports lean production because it represents workers interests 
which we are taking care of. You see, we and the union have the same 
objective. The union leaders join the `Lean Production Leading Group' in our 
firm (who graduated from a university and in his early 30s). 
It is pretty clear that the union was in management's pocket. The trade union 
chairman Wang in Auto-1 expressed the same opinion: 
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The enterprise development is a big thing we need to consider. What our 
union officials do is to strive for the enterprises' central goal. We have 
participated in the introduction of lean production. We try to strengthen the 
cohesion of workers and to encourage workers to utilise modern technology 
and work practices. The union helps to implement lean production by ensuring 
the workers are subject to appropriate propaganda. 
The union mostly gets involved through team working-production group 
management. As a female union official, in her 40s, in Auto-3 said: 
The union launched a campaign to be an `excellent group' (you xiu ban zhu) 
and `flag group' (hong qi ban zhu). The union documented a standard which 
was in line with the requirements of lean production, including JIT 
production, quality control, equipment maintenance and cost reduction. 
Yang, who was in charge of production group management in the union 
headquarters in SAIC told me how union officials checked out production groups: 
The union officials often go to the shop floor to check on the following: (1) 
whether production groups follow the rules. (2) Whether there is an 
atmosphere of lean production, i. e. a blackboard bulletin which shows what 
the groups do. (3) Whether groups keep all records of team working. (4) 
Whether groups carry out team working. At the beginning of the application 
of 6S, it was difficult for workers to keep doing cleaning. Some workers only 
cleared the floor for the checking. The union officials went to the shop floor 
again and again until workers had good behaviour patterns. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, workers contributed many suggestions to 
management. It is worth noting that the union officials have made strenuous efforts 
to encourage workers to participate in the activities. Most firms have regular 
activities. For example, Auto-1 organises suggestion making in March and 
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September. Another union function was to organise the training of employee and 
production group leaders. 
When the unions participated in production group management, the union 
officials appeared to their members as part of management. The union chairman 
Chai in Auto-2 saw some uncooperative workers as a hindrance to the 
implementation of management's ideas for improvements in productivity: 
We have taken pains to apply lean production for six years. The biggest 
obstacle is the old customs of workers. Although management stipulated a lot 
of rules, workers would not strictly follow them if there was nobody to check 
them. Our union officials felt tired because we had to check three times in a 
month. Now workers have become accustomed to the new work practices. But 
the quality of workers still needs to be improved. 
This `we' used by Chai is significant. It is `we' who take pains to implement lean 
production, and `workers' who have been the problem. Zhou gave an example how 
the union supported management when a worker went absent: 
One operator in our assembly line was always absent without any reason. You 
know, each worker had a full workload and it was difficult to find someone to 
fit in. It caused chaos. A production manager gave this worker an official 
warning attempting to alter his behaviour. This did not work. The manager 
decided to ask the operator to leave his position. Then the worker was 
dissatisfied and looked for help from union. The union supported 
management. The worker left our assembly line and waited for a job. 
However, when considering the unions' contribution, the union chairman Zhang in 
Auto-5 pointed out, bluntly, the minor role of the unions: 
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During the process of adopting lean production, management has played an 
important role. The union only assists management. For example, we were 
asked to accompany a person in the department of manufacturing to check out 
the shop floor for quality standards. Out role is subsidiary. It is undeniable that 
management exercises an important influence over the way in which the trade 
union participates in the application of lean production. It will be wrong that 
you believe the union plays an important role in the application of lean 
production. 
8.1.2.2 Protecting Workers' Interests 
When harmony, mutual benefit and commitment to company success feature 
prominently in management's view of employment relations, is it necessary for 
unions to protect workers' interests? When asked how the unions represented 
workers' interests, most union leaders mentioned a collective contract with 
management on behalf of workers and staff members. As one of the union leaders 
said: 
Normally, the trade union in our company signs a collective contract with the 
top manager, which draws up employee's wages, benef its, working conditions 
and production targets. This is an important role for the trade unions. 
The workers' congress is still active. It has certain information and consultation 
powers but no real co-determination rights. As Zhou in Auto-5 suggested: 
The representative staff and workers' congress involve around 10% of the 
workforce as members. The congress in our company meets twice a year, but 
as a formality to discuss company policy, the previous year's performance and 
the plan for the next one. In theory, the major issues proposed by management 
will be endorsed by the congress. However, in fact, it does not take a direct 
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part in managerial decision-making. It is not consulted or asked for a 
judgement on major issues (a group leader on an assembly line). 
Most union officials mentioned training as an important channel to protect workers 
interests. The union's chairman Tang in the headquarters of SAIC explained his 
idea: 
During the process of auto industry development, we have persisted in the 
combination of `interests of state, enterprise and employee' whilst serving of 
employees' interests. Training has been a driver of protecting employees' 
development rights including employment rights and labour rights. Training 
not only protects workers long term's interests but also contributes to the 
union role in economic development. 
Although unions do not have an important influence in management decision- 
making, management does not enunciate a desire to avoid the union. This is the 
difference between China and the Western countries where management can 
express overtly their desire for an anti-union environment skewed toward corporate 
capitalism and against working class interests. 
The introduction of new management methods has caused a variety of 
changes on the shop floor. Labour saving implied a change in some workers jobs. 
The change is forced and ruthless and workers were severely affected. The 
application of lean production does lead to more intense work and more work 
related stress. But, there is little evidence of unions resisting these changes although 
union officials are sympathetic to the situations of the workers. 
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The incidence of industrial conflict in Chinese enterprises is still a sensitive 
issue, and the unions tend to gloss over both its existence and frequency. Several 
union chairmen indicated that there was no link between the application of lean 
production and union militancy in defence of workers' interests. They explained 
that some disputes were not caused by implementing lean production. This remark 
was a common one and was echoed by some workers. For example, Fan in Auto-5 
said there was no clash between management and the unions. Ru in Auto-3 shared 
the same view: 
There are no disputes over the application of lean production. Lean production 
is a good thing for workers. Management and workers have the same interests. 
Management treats workers right, and we don't need a union to speak for us. 
In fact, labour disputes did occur. The workers' main complaints were the 
dramatic increases in the work pace. Most workers believed they tended to work 
under stress whilst most managers were much more relaxed. These complaints were 
expressed in the comments respondents made to open-ended questions on the 
questionnaires. One worker was unhappy with rigid demands from management. 
Another worker complained that management enjoyed benefits and workers 
suffered from hard work. However, workers did not attempt to complain for fear of 
losing their jobs or being shifted to lower paying service jobs, as one worker put it: 
I feel unfairly treated but have nobody to complain to. Even if I talk to 
management, they are unresponsive to the problem. In the worst case, I will be 
sacked. Some of my co-workers have opposed viewpoints to management on 
the reforms, but they are unable to express their opinions. We believe the 
unions are useless. 
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During the period of the research, union officials mentioned some forms of interest 
representation with regard to grievances and working conditions, but not with 
regard to work intensity. Chen admitted the union's difficulty: 
I have responsibility for labour disputes. The union has not matched the 
requirements of the workers, namely, the union should not only have a good 
relationship with management but should also really represent the workers' 
interests. Some middle managers act as bosses to ask workers to do as they 
want, otherwise workers will risk the loss of their jobs. In the respect of 
workloads and work pace, workers are treated unfairly. We feel unable to cope 
with these problems. 
It is said that making profits is protecting worker's interests greatly. Trade 
unions have changed from fully following the management's will to protecting 
both the whole enterprises' interests and the individual interests of workers, 
but it is a very difficult thing. The trade union will lose its significance if it 
can't do something for workers (a union official in Auto-2). 
Union leaders complained that management policy made it impossible for 
unions to co-determine important corporate decisions, including product pricing 
and financial issues. In some cases managers saw the union as having no power at 
all, management had an indifferent attitude and ignored them. The union was 
perceived as too weak to be taken seriously. Zhang in Auto-5 expressed his 
helplessness: 
The union has no rights to influence management's decisions because the 
union is under the leadership of the Party whose power to limit management 
has declined. The role of party organisations in enterprises has been reduced 
to only a `political leadership', and their power over both enterprise 
management and workers is weakened (the union chairman in Auto-5). 
The union Chairman Wang added: 
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If we have a proposal, we need to report to the party first. We will fail if the 
party does not approve it (in Auto-1). 
It is argued that in some circumstance in the UK the role of unions might depend on 
the personal courage and ability of the union chairman to negotiate with 
management in the decision-making process (Alderton, 1998). In a joint-venture 
firm of SAIC, I was told that the union did speak for workers. A union official 
Wang told me about an incident: 
A worker believed that the work was too hard and that the management's 
work pace was too relaxed. When he spotted a defective item he refused to 
pick it up because he thought the quality inspect official should check it out. 
Unfortunately, the defective item was missed by the inspector and was found 
by SVW. This caused an assembly line stop for 2 hours and the assembling of 
60 cars was delayed. Management would dismiss this worker due to causing 
an accident. Our union chairman Gao kept this worker and punished him 
rather than dismissed him because the inspector should share accountability 
for accident. 
In the next sector, we will discuss workers' views on their pay. It will be seen 
that half the workers who satisfied with their pay are increasingly depending on 
management, rather than unions. Another half the workers who received their 
unfair pay complained that unions were weak in protecting their interests. 
8.2 Workers' Views on their Pay and Welfare 
8.2.1 Workers' Pay and Welfare 
Management at the headquarters of SAIC held promise for workers--a promise of a 
win-win outcome at the beginning of introducing lean production, namely 
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management got high productivity and high profits whilst workers got good pay 
and welfare benefits. According to a report of the chairman of the board of SAIC, 
employees' wages were at the higher municipal level in 1998. The average pay in 
SAIC was RMB 26,872, which was RMB 1,895 over the previous year and 
increased by 8%. As for state-owned firms in SAIC, it was RMB 22,478, which 
increased by RMB 1,278 (or 6%). However, the average wage of employees in 
Shanghai was RMB 11,918, which was RMB 494 over the previous year and 
increased by 4% (Speech by the chairman of board at the Employees 
Representative Congress of SAIC in 1999). 
The basic payment structure is the `post + performance + seniority (gang wei 
+ xiao yi + gong lin)'. There are 26 job grades in SAIC. Top management reaches 
the highest grade--26. Whilst middle management starts from grade 15, and the 
grade of lower management ranges from 8 to 18. Workers start on grade 1 and they 
will progress to grade 15, which is normally filled by senior technicians and group 
leaders. Small differences appear in the lower grades (for example, the pay 
difference between grade 2 to 3 is RMB 40). However, a big gap exists between 
higher grades. 
What is the general pay level in the components companies? The average 
annual level of employees' wages in Auto-1 in 2000 was between RMB 30,000 to 
RMB 40,000, the average wage of production workers was RMB 20,000. In the 
same year, the median pay of employees in Auto-2 was about RMB 30,000 in 
which performance pay made up almost the same amount as basic pay did. Workers 
on the production line supplying the Passat car components to SVW had the highest 
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performance pay of up to RMB 1,800 monthly. In Auto-3, there was not much 
difference in pay levels but a slightly different method of payment. Ru talked about 
his pay: 
In our firm, all workers like me get 80% performance pay monthly, the 
remainder of 20% will be paid me if our firm completes its production targets 
fully. Otherwise, I will lose it. I earn RMB 1,000 performance pay in the total 
monthly salary of RMB 2,200. A young worker earns RMB 500 performance 
pay in the monthly salary of RMB 1,500 (a man who has 28 years service, 
supervising group leaders and is under the supervision of the production 
manager). 
Whilst Auto-4 has the similar level of average annual pay, it is said that a 
group leader earns 20% more than production worker on average. 
Table 8.1 Benefits and Welfare (Staff Member with More than 30 Years 
Service). 
Subject Items Amount: RMB 
Accommodation rental benefit 4 
A. Company paid Subsidised meal benefit 120 
benefits Transport benefit 100 
Subsidised goods benefit 108 
B. Company contribution Pension insurance 212 
to basic welfare Housing accumulation fund 165 
(State stipulated) Medical insurance 30 
Unemployment insurance 40 
C. Company contribution Pension insurance 110 
to supplementary welfare 
(Company welfare) 
Housing accumulation fund 419 
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In SAIC, all employees have fringe benefits including an accommodation 
rental benefit, a subsidised meal benefit, transport benefit for employees who 
bought a company car (about 40% of employees in SAIC). The accommodation 
rental benefit is however very low, only RBM 4, because there is a fund for buying 
an apartment or a house. According to the state policy of social welfare reform, the 
company must pay for employees' basic old-age pension and housing accumulation 
fund. The longer the service is, the more the old-age pension an employee will 
receive. Table 8.1 shows the benefits according to a staff member who had more 
than 30 years service. 
The top management in SAIC provide supplementary welfare because they 
recognise that improved welfare may have beneficial effects on economic 
performance in the longer term. In the above case, the supplementary welfare cost 
of RMB 529 is more than the cost of the basic welfare items issued in the wake of 
the government's new welfare scheme. The six items are contributory, with the 
individual paying a similar sum to the insurance company. 
During the fieldwork, workers were asked how much they received in 
company welfare each month (sections B+C in Table 8.1). Ru who had 25 years 
service and supervised group leaders in Auto-3 gets about RMB 800. Xie, a group 
leader of Auto-4 was provided RMB 500. A worker in Auto-1 received RMB 400 
monthly. 
Until 1998, SAIC had provided supplementary old-age pension insurance 
contributions of RMB 240 million with, on average, each employee receiving an 
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employer's contribution to the retirement of RMB 9,980. SAIC paid a 
supplementary housing accumulation fund contribution of RMB 42.7 million. In 
addition, SAIC spent a supplementary benefit of RMB 12 million for 18,488 retired 
employees and RMB 2.9 million to alleviate the hardship of employees (a speech 
by the chairman of board at the Employees Representative Congress of SAIC in 
1999). It was an excellent welfare scheme compared with those of most companies 
in Shanghai. 
8.2.2 Management's Unilateral Determination on Pay and Welfare 
The trade unions in the auto components companies are under pressure to maintain 
workers' fair payment and welfare because management unilateral determination 
has been the most important source of resentment in the workplace. Wang, the 
union chairman in Auto-1, complained because unions had no rights to negotiate 
wage levels, as is normally the case in the Western countries: 
The management determines pay and welfare level alone. They should discuss 
workers pay with the union. The union has a right to negotiate and to make 
plans for the growth of pay. Our firm has made lots of profits since we 
adopted lean production. But, workers have not received what they should get 
compared to their hard work. Our union leaves workers without an effective 
collective voice on the shop floor to change management decisions. 
At the firm level, personnel managers decide basic pay. Production managers on 
the shop floor determine the performance pay of each work group depending on 
appraisal. In some cases, group leaders participate in giving appraisals to individual 
workers, as Yu elaborated: 
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We have six work groups with 132 people in our workshop. I am in charge of 
pay distribution in respect of performance. Each work group has a different 
total amount according to group outputs and product quality. Dispatches 
amongst individual workers are shown on a sheet. The mark I give is 50% of 
the total mark, the work group leader gives 40%, and the mark the `assessment 
committee' gives contributes 10%. A worker can enquire about his or her pay. 
In some cases, a worker's pay rises. This is usually because he or she resolved 
a technical problem (a production manager of No. 1 workshop in Auto-1). 
Most important, the individual performance related pay system was a useful 
aid for management control, as Pan introduced: 
Individualised pay systems enable management to reward co-operative 
workers (for example, who are listed in the top five on the management 
campaign table) and penalise uncooperative ones, including those who refuse 
dispatches or do not complete parts on time (a party secretary of No. 3 
workshop in Auto-1). 
There have been a variety of ways to evaluate workers' performance at 
different companies. Although there is difference in the measure scale, workers' 
behaviour and work effort are assessed in seven areas in all firms, including quality 
management, cost management, production target, material flow management, 
equipment maintenance, safety and health, absenteeism (both in job and training). 
Workers who do not follow the rule will be deducted in their performance pay. 
Take Auto-2 as an example, it is stipulated: 
(1) The worker who violates flow management rule will lose two grades in 
performance pay for a month. 
(2) The worker who does not fill out quality check and equipment check sheet 
will lose two grades pay for a month, and a worker who does not fill data 
on time will lost one grade. 
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(3) The worker who does not place containers and appliances in correct 
position will lose one grade pay for a month. 
(4) The worker who produces a defect or misses a defect will be taken off two 
grades performance pay for a month. 
A handful of individuals who did not cooperate with management about 
speed-up or multi-tasking were fined. Four workers were withdrawn bonus because 
they refused to attend training. Every firm stresses the importance of quality in the 
work of each employee. The punishment occurs mostly in the case of producing 
defective products. In a workshop of Auto-1, RMB 50 to RMB 100 will be 
deducted once a worker makes a defective product. A worker who makes a batch of 
defective products will be at risk of layoff. There is deduction of RMB 20 to RMB 
50 for each defect in Auto-4. In some firms, performance pay is related to the 
group's performance. The whole group of members will be punished if a defective 
produce left the workshop. A group leader in Auto-6 was cut bonuses for three 
months. A supervisor in Auto-3 was fined RMB 1,000 and left his position. 
The welfare system of each company varies considerably. The 
supplementary welfare is linked to company profitability and to the individual's 
post and years of service. Disparities between workers in the different companies 
and between managers and workers in the same company may be a source of 
conflict. 
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8.2.3 How Workers View Their Pay and Welfare 
Workers were asked if they were satisfied with their pay. In general, 2% and 42% 
of respondents respectively were very satisfied and satisfied with their pay. These 
results were also confirmed by interview. However, 51% and 6% of respondents 
seemed to be dissatisfied and very dissatisfied with their pay. 
The answers to this question from workers with different backgrounds are 
analysed in order to examine the feelings individuals had about their pay (Table 
8.2). It is found that workers without any college education were content with their 
pay; men were more likely to be happy about their pay than women. It is possible, 
but by no means certain, that men earned more than women simply because men 
worked in the heavier jobs. It is also possible that men were paid more than women. 
In addition, statistical tests on the results (Table 8.2) suggest that about one 
third of work group leaders thought their pay was satisfactory. One possible 
explanation is that group leaders felt their pay to be unfair since they took on so 
much more responsibility. Four-fifths of group leaders reported that their job made 
them work very hard. It is worth noting that group leaders were still listed in the 
workers' category, their pay had certain limits and their leader subsidies were 
restricted. A group leader in Auto-1 did not think that his leader subsidy of RMB 
60 monthly was fair in comparison with the management subsidy of about RMB 
several hundred monthly on average. 
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Table 8.2 Workers' Views on Their Pay by Different Backgrounds. 
Unit: 
Variable Satisfied Dissatisfied 
Gender Male 45 55 
(n=544) Female 39 61 
Age group <31 39 61 
(n=535) 31--40 38 62 
>40 52 48 
Education level High school 45 55 
(n=499) College 35 65 
University 39 61 
Job category Production worker 45 55 
(n=515) Maintenance worker 45 55 
Group leader 32 68 
Length of service 1--10 years 37 63 
(n=491) 11--20 years 39 61 
21--30 years 53 47 
The longer the service the more satisfaction workers felt with their pay. 
Workers who were over 40 years old and had above 20 years service were found to 
be most satisfied with their pay. This is confirmed by the result of Table 8.3, which 
only looks at production workers, and suggests that the older the production 
workers, the more satisfaction they felt with their pay. This may be explained by 
the possibility that older workers were more likely to make comparisons with the 
old days and feel more content with their present pay, as Shen in his 40s recalled: 
I still remember the year 1980 when I first got a bonus of RMB 5a month. 
How happy I was! The bonus grew to RMB 42 in 1992 and reached RMB 100 
later. Now, I can earn a RMB 1,000 bonus which is called performance pay. I 
am pleased with my pay although prices have increased in the same period (a 
group leader in the cool roll workshop in Auto-3). 
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Table 8.3 Production Workers' Views on Their Pay by Age Group. 
Satisfied Dissatisfied Total 
<31 40% 60% 100% 
% (N) (67) (102) (169) 
31--40 44% 56% 100% 
% (N) (43) (55) (98) 
>40 52% 48% 100% 
% (N) (75) (68) (143) 
Total % 45% 55% 100% 
(N) (185) (225) (410) 
The question arises, therefore, as to why about half the respondents were 
dissatisfied with their pay? It appears that the performance of the company was a 
key factor. In general, workers in the profitable firms were satisfied with their pay, 
whilst workers in enterprises that had financial problems were dissatisfied with 
their pay. In the surveyed firms, the average income of workers ranged from RMB 
30,000 to RMB 15,000. In reality, Auto-2, Auto-7, and Auto-3 are profitable firms 
whilst Auto-5 and Auto-6 have poor performances (see Table 8.4). Most workers' 
resentment comes from those companies with poor performances. Several workers 
criticised management's wrong decisions and indicated that management should 
encourage product diversification in order to reduce the risk of job losses. The 
average pay of employees in Auto-5 was low, the group leader Zhou gave his 
comments: 
Our performance pay is associated with the sale of products. Due to a 
misleading message, we lost some customers. We produced the products for 
those customers for a whole month, but we could not get performance pay. 
Now, we only get RMB 1,000 a month, we lost RMB 800 performance pay 
(he has been in this firm for 20 years and a group leader for 8 years). 
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Table 8.4 Workers' Views on Pay by Firm. 
Unit: % 
Firms Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 
Satisfied 25 66 55 48 21 31 67 39 28 
Total N=563 
Auto-1 is an exception. This firm made a profit of RMB 200 million in 1993 
and RMB 550 million in 1997. The level of average pay stood at RMB 30,000 in 
1999. Workers were unhappy not only because they compared their pay with the 
surplus value they produced, but also because their pay was much lower than the 
pay of workers doing similar jobs in the SVW of the same region. The significant 
difference is that SVW paid employees dividend equivalent to five-eight months 
pay compared to two months in Auto-1. When I interviewed workers there, they 
complained that their workloads were increased without a growth of pay. Several of 
them mentioned that they stayed at the same wage for three years and their pay did 
not rise in line with their work intensification. Workers also indicated that their pay 
was not tied to company profitability. The chairman of the union Wang had a 
complaint that the firm did not give high enough pay to workers due to the nature 
of the state-owned enterprise: 
There is a common feeling that workers in the majority state-owned 
companies are suffering from hardship. If Auto-1 offers very high pay to 
workers, this tends to disaffect the workers in poorer performing companies. 
The unions can do nothing about workers' pay. 
The most influential factor in respect of workers feelings about their pay was 
the enlarged pay disparity between managers and workers in the same firm. 
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Normally, managers' pay is set at up to 50% above the average level of incomes. In 
some firms, managers get additional subsidies. 
The gap was caused by the fact that, due to production fluctuations, workers 
were sent home without pay, most managers were not. For example, workers' pay 
was reduced by RMB 30 for every day off in Auto-1. During the summer of 1999, 
workers in Auto-2 were forced to stay at home for a week, and their pay was 
reduced by RMB 150 in respect of their post pay with a slight decrease in 
performance pay. The situation of the workers at Auto-5 was the worst of all. A 
worker expressed his own feelings and those of his colleagues: 
In the days of shutdown due to production fluctuations, we had five to ten 
days off a month with pay being deducted at RMB 27 a day. Managers and 
officials did not have any days off. On those days, we lost performance pay 
and we took home only RMB 500--600 (after taking away six items of 
insurance and the person fund). How can I cope with the expenses of my 
family? How could I compare my pay with that of managers in our firm? How 
could I compare my pay with those workers in other firms in SAIC? Most 
workers made complaints, but managers did not (in Auto-5). 
In those profitable companies, some workers also directly complained about the 
unfairness in their pay: 
The management is getting higher and higher pay, production workers are 
receiving lower pay and doing the hardest jobs. How can I take the initiative? 
(in Auto-1) 
Efficient management had led to a disparity of income between workers and 
management. It is difficult for workers and management to get along with 
each other (in Auto-2). 
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How could union leaders give workers a greater voice to achieve parity of 
pay? The chairman of the union in Auto-5 admitted to me that the unions had no 
authority to determine workers' pay and could not promote equal opportunities, nor 
could the union offer effective independent representation. Few trade unions in 
China negotiate with management about employee's pay like unions in the Western 
countries. 
Table 8.5 SAIC Managers' Views on Their Pay, Comparison with the Views of 
Managers in Other Companies. 
Unit: % 
SAIC Other companies Total 
Better 86 66 70 
Worse 4 19 16 
Stay the same 10 15 14 
Total N=763 
The survey of managers which I conducted in 1999 shows that 86% of 
respondents (managers) in SAIC felt their pay was better, being 20 percentage 
points higher that of managers in the other companies (Table 8.5). Workers 
assessed their pay as one criterion of employee relations. As we can see from Table 
8.6, those workers who were satisfied with their pay were more likely to rate the 
relationship between workers and managers as good and very good (52%). On the 
contrary, only 23% of workers who were dissatisfied their pay considered they had 
good employment relations. These perspectives were expressed in the comments 
respondents gave to open-ended questions. Asked the question `do you think 
workers face any particular problems with managers', one worker gave a general 
point of view: 
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The relationship between workers and managers can be epitomised by the 
relationship between responsibilities and remuneration. If the latter is 
reasonable, the relationship between workers and managers is harmonious (in 
Auto-9). 
Table 8.6 Workers' Views on Pay and the Relationship between Workers and 
Managers. 
Unit: % 
Views on pay Views on pay 
Satisfied Dissatisfied 
Views on Very good 82 
relationship 
Good 44 21 
Neither good or poor 45 64 
Poor 28 
Very poor 15 
Total N=540 
8.3 Workers' Views on Their Job security 
8.3.1 The Job Crisis in Perspective 
Management in the components companies fell into contradictions between cutting 
surplus workers caused by the application of lean production and enhancing the 
motivation of workers by providing secure jobs. 
At a time when these enterprises were in the rapid development stage, 
workers jobs were relatively secure because management made offers to re-deploy 
surplus workers. For example, output of the Santana car grew from 113,500 units in 
1994 to 254,000 units in 1999, with no significant increase in employees. The 
development of new products also created new posts for surplus workers. In 1999, 
the production of the Buick XSJ of SGM and the Passat car of SVW provided 
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opportunities for exploring new components in supply enterprises. 20 other new 
projects were put into production. All the firms transferred workers to new 
production lines. Management put significant emphasis upon making workers 
understand company practices and strategy, as Shen in Auto-3 put it: 
One strategy is to place workers in special training programmes. These 
workers still get part of their pay and are different from off--duty workers. Our 
director told workers on the training course that he would not like to send 
workers home like other enterprises outside of SAIC. He hoped workers to 
learn about new knowledge so as to suit them for new posts. These workers 
attending training without performance pay felt frustrated. However, they still 
have prospects of being assigned to new posts in the near future. 
A further step to relieve the problem of surplus workers was to gradually 
withdraw component production from outside of SAIC and to arrange for it to be 
conducted by firms inside SAIC. In SAIC, 600 workers were shifted in this way to 
a subsidiary company newly set up in Auto-2. Two hundred workers in Auto-4 
were switched over to a repairing firm. A number of redundant workers formed a 
group to deal with massive old inventories in Auto-5. Specific efforts were made to 
maintain full employment by eliminating overtime. Another way was to re-deploy 
workers to the tertiary, or service sector. 
With the strong competition in the market and the decrease in profits, 
management confronted difficulties coping with surplus employees. Roughly 
10,000 employees in SAIC were surplus to requirements (20% of the total 
workforce), this led to low productivity and lack of flexibility. Job security is 
increasingly difficult with the prospect of entering WTO. SAIC would lose 
protection from the state by being subject to a reduced car protective tariff (from 
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85% to 100% in 2000 down to 25% by 2005), and face various challenges to 
improve their global competitiveness. 
A labour and management meeting was held in November 1999, when 
several redundancy programmes were launched. Firstly, early retirement was 
offered for those people including men over 55 year old (both managerial staff and 
workers) and female workers over 45 year old (50 for managerial staff) who were 
unable to compete successfully for their posts. A specific programme was the 
Voluntary Termination of Employment Programme. The standard of compensation 
took into account their service length in SAIC and their average monthly pay in the 
previous 12 months. No additional benefits accounted for in excess of 12 years' 
service. But high seniority employees who entered SAIC before the introduction of 
the `labour contract system' could have up to 24 years service taken into account. 
On average, the payment ranges from about RMB 26,000 to RMB 52,000. 
Research conducted by Milkman (1997: 98) found that workers who opted for the 
buyout cease to be GM employees and received a lump-sum payment ranging from 
$10,000 to $55,000, depending on seniority. 
At the time this research was conducted, there was no information about 
voluntary termination of employment having occurred. The reason was that leaving 
SAIC would result in poorer pay levels and suffering from worse pay in the 
external labour market. A worker told me that: 
I have to stay here because I am in my 40s, it is difficult for me to find a job 
even a marginal poorly paid job now. 
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Employees in SAIC chose to stay at the company, which is the opposite to 
what workers of GM-Linden did, where Milkman carried out her research. In any 
event, off-duty employees were disappointed because they had contributed to 
productivity improvements and they got, in the end, redundancy as their reward. 
What do the unions do when workers get removed from their jobs? It is found 
that unions are likely to protect workers. Chai, a union chairman, in Auto-2 said: 
It is certain that our unions protect workers' interests. We need, however, to 
understand the word `protect' in a broad sense. If our enterprise loses profits 
due to the irrational deployment of employees, we cannot protect workers' 
interests by providing them with good wages and benefits. If we stay the way 
we are, eventually all of us will be out of jobs. Unions support labour saving. 
Of course, we would like to protect workers if management violates the law. 
We join meetings to discuss the redeployment of workers and to help workers 
to find jobs. Specifically, our union founded a subsidiary company which is a 
third line of production. We did our best to arrange for more redundant 
workers to be moved to our subsidiary companies. 
8.3.2 Workers' Views on Their Job Security 
Workers were asked if they agreed with the statement `my job is secure'. The 
answer could be `agree', `neither agree nor disagree' and `disagree'. The results for 
views on job security are set out in Table 8.7. In fact, about half the workers felt 
insecure in their job under the lean production system. The perceptions of job 
security varied with different backgrounds. Overall, women were less likely to feel 
secure than men. Indeed, women felt most vulnerable during the labour saving 
because some women were transferred from first line production positions to non- 
manufacturing positions. It was also evident that the older the people were the more 
298 
they felt their jobs were secure. In line with this, the longer the service was the 
more the workers felt job security. The young workers felt their job security 
uncertain because of their relatively low seniority. It is the case that older workers 
approaching the end of their working careers were less worried about their jobs 
than those with longer to work before retirement. This is confirmed by the 
interviews. One older worker said that he would not need to have so much security 
but he felt sorry for younger workers. 
Table 8.7 Workers' Answers on 'My Job is Secure' by Different Backgrounds. 
Unit: 
Variables Agree Disagree 
Gender Male 53 17 
(n=520) Female 47 20 
Age group <31 39 24 
(n=510) 31--40 49 21 
>40 66 10 
Education level High school 48 19 
(n=482) College 57 15 
University 50 17 
Job category Production worker 50 19 
(n=493) Maintenance worker 60 14 
Group leader 55 17 
Length of service 1--10 years 40 23 
(n=471) 11--20 years 51 19 
21--30 years 65 12 
Differences remain after taking into account job types. It is possible to 
conclude that more specialist workers have greater security. From Table 8.7, it is 
seen that the maintenance workers considered their job more secure than others. 
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The first line production workers experienced uncertainty. It was expected that the 
lower the education level was the less the job security workers felt. This was borne 
out in the results but it was only partially correct. Those workers who graduated 
from high schools reported that their jobs were more insecure than others. The 
percentage of workers who graduated from universities and believed their job to be 
secure (50%) was less than the percentage of workers who had graduated from 
colleges (57%) and believed their job to be secure. This might be because those 
workers who had graduated from universities knew more about the threat of their 
jobs caused by the application of lean production. Workers who had been to college 
would have more competition for jobs in the production workers' positions. 
Table 8.8 Workers' Views on Job Security by Firm. 
Unit: % 
Firms Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 
Satisfied 40 56 50 48 49 36 82 44 53 
Total N=536 
As Table 8.8 shows, the performance of firms affected workers' feelings on 
job security. Normally, workers in the high-performing firms were less worried 
about their job. For example, a higher percentage of workers in Auto-7, Auto2 and 
Auto-3 indicated their jobs were secure. The workers in Auto-6 had the lowest 
percentage because this firm had big losses. However, there is one exception that 
workers in Auto-1 were also worried about their jobs. The possible explanation 
might be that competition was acute and the workers had more awareness of their 
job insecurity there. 
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It is impossible to investigate if managers agreed with the statement that `my 
job is secure' from this data, but other data (collected from my first fieldwork) 
suggests that 54% of managers felt that their job security was getting worse (Table 
8.9). It is interesting to compare the managers' views on the change of job security 
in SAIC with other companies. There was a similar percentage for each answer 
amongst them all. 
Table 8.9 SAIC Managers' Views on Their Job Security, Comparison with the 
Views of Managers in Other Companies. 
Unit: % 
SAIC Other companies All 
Better 29 28 28 
Worse 54 56 56 
Stay the same 17 16 16 
Total 100 100 100 
Total N=733 
Table 8.10 Workers' Views on Job Security and Employment Relationship. 
Unit: 
Job is secure Job is insecure 
View on relationship Very good 92 
Good 38 20 
Neither good nor poor 48 68 
Poor 28 
Very poor 32 
Total N=517 
Table 8.10 shows a positive association between job security and 
employment relations. Workers having secure jobs were about twice as likely as 
those workers having insecure jobs to report that the relationship between managers 
and workers was good or very good (47% compared with 22%). Only 5% of 
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workers having securing jobs complained that the relationship was poor or very 
poor. SAIC offered more job security to their workforce than other companies, so 
there were only a few complaints about redundancies. 
This is one reason why a majority of workers (90%) agreed that lean 
production was good for workers compared with 5% of respondents who disagreed. 
Since the application of lean production, workers in SAIC had gained relatively 
high wages and better job security and were less worried about the mortgage for 
housing and paying for a car at the time I did this research. Outside the SAIC, there 
was a decline in wages and massive redundancy in the manufacturing sector. There 
is evidence that if the job is secure, a worker is more likely to accept lean 
production. It was also evident that the majority of workers (90%) would not let 
their sons or daughters to do the same jobs as them although nearly half of them 
thought their jobs were good. They might hope that their sons and daughters would 
have more intelligent occupations than an autoworker. 
8.4 Workers' Views on the Role of the Unions 
During the fieldwork, workers were asked a series of questions about the unions' 
role in the environment of lean production. Firstly, workers' views on the unions' 
involvement in lean production were analysed. Table 8.11 shows that most workers 
(87%) believed that union officials were `strongly supportive' or `supportive' of 
lean production. Only 11% of workers reported union officials were `undecided or 
indifferent', very, very few (1%) answered either `opposed' to lean production or 
`did not know' the answer. Although union officials were less likely than 
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management (91% senior managers, 90% middle managers and 88% junior 
managers) to advocate lean production, this was a very small difference, with the 
support of union officials being only 4% less than the senior managers. This is why 
workers' felt that trade unions in SAIC accepted management's win-win strategy. 
Most union officials co-operated with management to achieve success in the 
company. 
Table 8.11 Workers' Views on the Union Officials' Attitude towards Lean 










Senior 37 54 7 1 0 1 
managers 
(n=528) 
Middle 32 58 8 1 0 1 
managers 
(n=538) 
Junior 32 56 10 1 0 1 
managers 
(n=522) 
Union 31 56 11 1 0 1 
officials 
(n=521) 
Workers 29 57 13 0 0 1 
(n=522) 
As Table 8.12 illustrates, the unions' attitude is strongly linked to their 
behaviour. Most workers (77%) considered unions participated in lean production 
to some extent, which might be slightly lower than for management and workers. In 
fact, unions' participation was limited to suggestion making, team working and 
training. As shown in previous chapters, management was fully committed to 
production process control and changes in work organisation. In the view of 
workers, union officials themselves were also more committed to lean production. 
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Table 8.12 Workers' Views on the Degree of Union Officials Participation in 
Lean Production, Comparison with Management and Workers. 
Unit: % 
A lot Some A few None Do not know 
Senior managers 42 40 11 61 
(n=514) 
Middle managers 41 41 13 41 
(n=527) 
Junior managers 39 41 14 51 
(n=517) 
Union officials 37 40 15 71 
(n=515) 
Workers 45 38 11 41 
(n=522) 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the union officials claimed that one of the 
important roles of trade unions was to support employees' participation. Workers 
were asked to rate how well they thought unions and managers worked together in 
respect of three issues concerned with employee involvement: (1) keeping everyone 
up to date about proposed changes; (2) providing everyone with the chance to 
comment on proposed changes; (3) responding to suggestions from employees 
Looking at the three issues (see Table 8.13), at least 52% of workers believed 
that both unions and management did their best to keep employees informed of 
proposed changes. When assessing the performance of unions and managers in 
giving workers the chance to talk about changes, the percentage rate of good or 
very good responses dropped to 49%. Workers were least likely to rate both unions 
and managers as good at responding to their suggestions (47%). There was no 
304 
significant difference between union and managers at getting workers involved. 
The percentages are so similar that this might be that workers regarded union 
officials as if they were part of management. 
Table 8.13 Workers' Views on Support for Employee Participation, 




/cry good 14 
: nod 41 
(1) (2) (2) 
Unions Managers Unions 
(N=542) (N=538) (N=534) 
15 11 12 












Neither 33 31 35 34 35 34 
Poor 10 14 11 13 12 15 
Very poor 234444 
Note: (1) Keeping everyone up to date about proposal changes. (2) Providing everyone 
with the chance to comment on proposed changes. (3) Responding to suggestions From 
employees. 
In most firms, management talked directly to workers, giving explanations of 
the situation. Management offered workers opportunities to communicate their 
concerns directly to management. Newsletters were regularly distributed to all 
employees. Regular meeting between top management and selected workers was a 
channel of communication. In most cases, this kind of meeting was held twice a 
year. In one unusual case, top management in Auto-4 held meetings once a month. 
The internet was also a means of communication. In Auto-4, the intcrnet was used 
to spread information to the shop floor which had at least two computers. The 
matters of mutual interest and concern were markets, prices of products, workers 
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wages and welfare. One of the aims of management was to avoid any activity 
which interrupts the continuity of production. 
Table 8.14 Employees' Views on Management Support for Employee 
Participation, Comparison with China and UK. 
Unit: " 
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) 
UK China UK China UK China 
(22,463) (n=541) (22,099) (n=538) (21,703) (n=546) 
Very good 9 14 6 11 5 12 
Good 33 41 23 39 25 37 
Neither 27 33 30 35 33 35 
Poor 21 10 26 11 23 12 
Very poor 10 2 15 4 li 4 
vote: (1) Keeping everyo ne up to date about proposed ch ances. (2) Providing r\ eryone 
with the chance to comm ent on pr oposed changes. (3) Responding to suggestions from 
employees. 
Source: Cully et a/., 1999 : 176 and a uthor's survey data. 
Compared with research about management's support tier employee 
participation in the UK, Table 8.14 shows that the support of ('Iiinese mai1agenment 
for employee participation shares a similar trend as in the UK (the data was taken 
from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey)--managers do best at keeping 
them informed of proposed changes, but when it comes to consulting with them or 
taking their views into account, they pertörm less favourably. The data also 
indicates that Chinese employees were more likely to rate management good or 
very good at employee involvement than the UK counterparts. 55% in China 
compared to 42`/' in UK in regard to keeping them informed of'prod used changes, 
50`%0 in China compared with 29% in UK in providing employees with chance to 
306 
comment on proposed changes, 49% in China compared to 30% in UK in 
responding to suggestions from employees. 
In SAIC, the role of unions is limited partly because union are helpless. When 
workers were asked whom they would talk to when they felt unhappy about their 
work, three-fifth of workers said the managers, whilst only one-fifth of them said 
the unions and 13% said the Party (see Table 8.15). The union should be a 
grievance channel for workers but it appeared that, in this case, it was not. Some 
workers interviewed reported that they were obliged to talk to management simply 
because the unions were useless. 
Table 8.15 Whom Workers would Talk to when They Feel Unhappy. 
Unions Managers Party Others 
21% 62% 13% 4% 
Total N=539 
An examination was made, in general, of how workers viewed the role of 
unions. Table 8.16 shows that nearly half the workers considered the trade unions 
as neither good nor bad although two-fifths of them rated the unions as good and 
only one out of ten poor. Workers viewed unions as good because unions gave 
them encouragement to participate in new management practises, and the unions 
trained them to gain more skills, more competence and more knowledge. However, 
although much labour saving and intensification of labour have taken place at the 
expense of workers' long-term interests and health and safety, none of the 
information suggests that the trade unions are any obstacle to such changes. The 
low efficiency in representing workers is the main reason why about half the 
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workers were apathetic rating the role played by trade unions as neither good nor 
bad. 
Table 8.16 Workers' View of the Role of the Trade Unions. 
Very good Good Neither Poor Very poor 
7% 34% 48% 7% 4% 
Total N=561 
Table 8.17 shows how managers viewed the changes of unions' role. The 
proportion of managers in the SAIC who agreed that an increase had occurred in 
the unions' role is the same as that of managers in the other companies. This result 
suggests that there is not much difference in terms of the change in the unions' role 
between the companies adopting lean production and other companies. 
Table 8.17 SAIC Managers' Views on the Changing Role of the Unions, 
Comparison with the Views of Managers in Other Companies. 
Unit: % 
SAIC Other companies Total 
Increased 44 44 44 
Decreased 21 25 25 
Stay the same 35 30 31 
Total N=807 
Workers' opinions on employment relations are related to their view on lean 
production, as shown in Table 8.18. Amongst workers who believed employment 
relations were very good, all of them agreed that lean production was a good thing 
for workers. This is because management tried to build good relations by offering 
relatively higher pay and better job security. Some workers really benefited from 
this. As discussed in previous section of this chapter, workers had seen managers' 
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efforts to maintain good relations. For example, workers' pay had increased which 
linked to economic performance of their firm. Workers felt they were treated fairly. 
As another example, management in SAIC had made efforts to secure workers' 
jobs. Workers in SAIC were less likely to be redundant than those workers in most 
other companies. Workers saw the win-win outcome which managers had 
promised. However, amongst those workers who view employment relations as 
very poor, 71% of them still thought lean production was a good thing. 






Very good Good Neither Poor Very poor Total 
good nor 
poor 
LP is a good Yes 100 98 87 69 71 90 
thing 
No 73 29 5 




Traditionally, the roles of trade unions in China were to help management spur 
workers to fulfil production quotas and to help in allocation welfare assistance to 
the workforce. Any concept of collective bargaining or of unions as protectors of 
workers' rights barely existed. When the Chinese labour market was deregulated 
and management autonomy provided managers a free hand to deal with labour, the 
ACFTU imposed changes to act on behalf of workers' interests. However, unions 
faced problems to make change in the enterprise level. 
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The unions' role in the auto components companies reflected their identity as 
both `transmission belts' between management and workers and representatives of 
workers. Most union leaders saw their main task as organising production group 
management and to help workers by providing training. Unions helped workers to 
respond to flexible production and to change the pattern of work organisation. 
Unions also maintained some information and consultation rights at the workplace 
level. 
New management techniques have left unions with little power to influence 
economic decisions in enterprises and without a strong voice. There is no means of 
enunciating the workers' concern about work intensification and high stress levels. 
On the other hand, this does not mean that unions are irrelevant in the enterprise 
although unions are weak and marginal in SAIC in advancing workers' interests 
against management. 
Although management offered relatively higher wages and welfare, half the 
workers were dissatisfied with their pay. Several reasons can be identified. Firstly, 
there was a big gap between workers in profitable and non-profitable companies. It 
meant that poor profit, low bonus, and greater dissatisfaction. Moreover, workers 
felt unfairly treated when they compared their intensive labour with their lower pay. 
Furthermore, workers complained about the increased income polarisation between 
management and workers in terms both of pay and welfare benefits. Workers saw 
their pay as one criterion of the employment relations and management's unilateral 
pay determination had been the most important source of resentment in 
employment relations. 
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Management in the auto components companies faced problems to maintain 
job security during the process of implementing lean production. Only half the 
workers reported that their job was secure. There could be conflicts of interest 
between workers and managers. In addition, the nature of employment in China 
strongly affected the workers' psychology. This background made workers accept a 
stricter form of management control. 
In general, workers regarded the unions as weak. They believed that the trade 
union would lose its significance if it could not do something for employees. Some 
of the workers saw unions as part of management. The unions were expected to 




This thesis has investigated the implementation of global modern management 
techniques in the Chinese public sector and the concomitant changes in the labour 
process and work organisation. In particular, it examines the impact of lean 
production on workers in the auto components companies from the standpoint of 
the many individuals on the shop floor. Throughout, this thesis draws on several 
areas of academic interest, principally linking the analysis of China's political 
economy with the sociology of work. 
Part one is concerned with the impact of economic and managerial 
globalisation on managers in the Shanghai public sector. Chapter 2 has examined 
managers' social characteristics and their changing situations. In general, those 
male managers who come from workers' families and possess a diploma or first 
degree are dominant in Shanghai SOEs. But our investigation also tells us 
something about the broader picture, namely the way that the Cultural Revolution 
has affected the composition of management in China today. There is an increased 
proportion of young managers who have better education, and a decreased 
proportion of middle aged managers, some of them lost opportunities to study in 
universities in their 20s during the Cultural Revolution. When analysing changes 
taking place in China, Price and Fang observed, in a transforming economy, `career 
mobility and job security may depend ever more heavily on education' (2002: 426). 
It is also the case in managers' promotions. 
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Each of the three cohorts of managers (up to the age of 35, aged between 36 
and 50 inclusive, aged 51 and upwards) has different patterns of career 
development. Relatively well-educated young people enter managerial positions 
earlier than other age groups. Middle aged people have to work harder than young 
managers to develop their career because they experienced hardship which young 
managers did not experience and they returned to university and gained 
qualification after the Cultural Revolution. They are now occupying key managerial 
positions and playing important roles in the economic development. Old managers 
were most directly affected by the Cultural Revolution during which their career 
developments were interrupted. They are facing difficulty in being promoted and 
now face the threat of earlier retirement. 
Chapter 2 also shows that managers' situation in SOEs is undergoing 
significant changes under pressure from internal economic reforms and external 
economic globalisation. The senior management now has increased power to adopt 
new management regimes and to exercise management prerogatives over labour. In 
some cases, workers who fail to conform to what management wants are punished 
and face the threat of redundancy. 
Income disparity has increased between top managers and other managers 
within the same SOEs, whilst the differences in pay between top managers and 
workers are even larger. It seems likely that this will cause the resentment of 
workers and conflicts in employment relations. A further source of increasing 
inequality is that middle and junior managers in SOEs with financial difficulties 
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receive poor pay, and the situation of workers in these companies is even worse 
than those of managers. 
The job security of managers, as well as other employees, has been 
diminished in the SOEs, where `carrying surplus workers' is identified as inhibiting 
company profitability. During the enterprises reform of `downsizing employment 
and improving performance' (jian yuan zen xiao), some managers were removed 
from their managerial positions or made redundant. In an effort to restore 
profitability, managers who remained increased pressure on workers by intensifying 
work and reducing costs. This made workers very stressed. 
Chapter 3 explores the extent to which managers have knowledge of modern 
management techniques. It is shown that the new management techniques are 
implemented in a way that is `selective and variable' (Elger and Smith, 1994: 121) 
and that the best known techniques are TQM, HRM and team working. The survey 
finds that few managers in eight industries are familiar with JIT, Kaizen and 
Business Process Re-engineering. It is also seen that there are pronounced 
differences between sectors, so that 98 per cent of managers in the automobile 
industry are familiar with Lean Production, but only half the managers in 
Chemicals and very considerably fewer managers in all other industries. 
The individual backgrounds of managers and the social, technological and 
organisational variances within firms are also implicated in the adoption of new 
management techniques. It is seen that younger managers are more knowledgeable 
than older ones. The younger the managers are, the more they are in favour of 
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Western or Japanese values and assimilate new knowledge, and the less they are 
constrained by old traditions. Younger managers, entering managerial positions at a 
time of economic globalisation, have been more and more able to access new 
international management knowledge. The channels that facilitate this include the 
development of business teaching, the growth of joint-venture companies and new 
communication networks and web techniques. 
Company practices and training are found to be the most important sources of 
modern management knowledge. The driving force behind these practices comes 
from government advocacy at the national level and top managements' strategies at 
the company level. As is shown, the introduction of modern management 
techniques such as TQM was inspired by the government. 
In general, most Chinese managers, including younger ones, seem to see 
GMMTs as a `hard' variant which directly leads to improvements in efficiency. 
Some managers, for example those in the auto components companies, are 
increasingly looking to `soft' approaches to support rationalisation and 
development. But they are experiencing difficulties in adopting soft aspects of lean 
production such as team working. Warner has written that `it seems easier to 
transfer "hard" technology across frontiers than its "soft" counterpart' (Warner, 
1998). This suggests that the same thing may apply to management techniques. 
Most managers including younger ones point out that GMMT will need to be 
implemented with Chinese characteristics. When Chinese managers talk about 
GMMTs and Chinese characteristics, they are most concerned about presenting 
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employment in the wider society. On the one hand, managers feel that it is difficult 
for them to dismiss mass surplus workers. On the other hand, they fear redundancy 
themselves. However, when managers are faced with difficulty in survival, then 
they are likely to stress leanness and further convergence with Western or Japanese 
management practices, with the Chinese characteristics being less emphasised. 
At the time when the research was conducted, the application of new 
management techniques, including lean production, was not common in Shanghai 
SOEs. Some managers in companies suffering financial difficulties are particularly 
interested in selling products and paying employees' wages on time rather than 
learning new management techniques. They are less likely to pursue the promised 
long-term gains at the expense of short term profitability. They lack a long-term 
strategic vision and they tend to go for the quick-fix. Even though some managers 
have knowledge of new management techniques, they hesitate to experiment with 
untried techniques. Facing the pressure of market competition, they appear to be 
reluctant to put investment into risky flow management and supply chain 
techniques. They are also hesitant to form trust relationships between suppliers and 
producers, which is a prerequisite for the implementation of JIT. 
However, it has been seen that lean production is well known in the auto 
sector. Part two, the case study, outlined in Chapters 4 to 8, provides insight into 
the implementation of lean production and its impacts on workers in the Shanghai 
auto components companies. 
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In Chapter 4, we found that one clear, and direct, mechanism for the 
introduction of lean production is the existence of joint venture companies, which 
can impose high standards on its suppliers. The high standards derive from the joint 
venture company's practice in other countries. This is important because it 
underlines the importance of joint ventures in the transfer of managerial and 
organisational knowledge in developing economies. The joint venture customer's 
requirements are a direct factor that influences management's decisions because 
any failures may result in the loss of its position as a supplier. Danford (1998: 425) 
has indicated that, `managerial social action within supplier firms in the lean 
production chain is partly determined by the cost-reducing imperatives of the 
leading customer-assemblers'. This is very much the mechanism to be seen at work 
in China. 
Managers are the key figures in the diffusion of new management techniques. 
The key factor in respect of the managers' decision making processes is their 
cognition of market dynamics and their sense of crisis. Top management in the 
components companies understand the need to ensure the accumulation of profits in 
the market economy, and lean production is seen as a tool to achieve this goal by 
waste elimination. With the explicit purpose of facilitating the diffusion of ideas, 
managers have become enthusiastic advocates and participants in lean production 
practices. 
As we saw in Chapter 5, there is considerable evidence that some lean 
production practices, which are similar to techniques used in the developed 
countries, are emulated in the components companies in SAIC. Great efforts have 
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been made to eliminate waste by reducing work-in-progress inventories, dropping 
defective products and shortening lead time. However, there are uneven lean 
production practices both amongst different companies and even on different shop 
floors within one company. The workshops or firms which act as suppliers to SVW, 
a joint venture company, have significantly better practices than others because 
SVW has forced their suppliers to adopt new management techniques. 
GVW, the German partner of SVW, plays an important role in imposing 
management changes. GVW not only introduces international quality management 
measures but also provides training, advice and technology for Chinese components 
companies in order to meet the standards. German managers on site also rigorously 
remind workers to apply lean production techniques and use punishment techniques 
for those workers who violate the new rules. It is a painful process for the 
employees in SVW, and its components companies, to change their old ways of 
thinking and doing things. In the planned economy, workers had lacked both 
incentives and responsibilities. Now, workers are asked to keep the `customer 
priority' principle in mind, and to be individually accountable for the production of 
components. 
Chapter 6 discloses the progressive intensification of the labour process 
which is in some ways similar to that reported in some sectors of developed 
capitalist societies (Garrahan and Stewart, 1992; Eiger and Smith, 1994; Danford, 
1999; Delbridge, 1998). It seems that `market dynamics are likely to lead 
employers to intensify work effort ...... '(Gallie et al., 1999: 624). The 
implementation of lean production inevitably has led to the intensification of labour 
318 
and increases in stress. It is the case that more than two-thirds of workers report that 
their jobs made them work very hard; about one quarter of workers think they never 
seem to have enough time to get their job done; and two-fifths of workers are 
worried a lot about their work outside working hours. Under the lean production 
system, operators have to run two or three machines rather than one, and the work 
pace is being continually speeded up. Central to the intensification of labour is `that 
the porosity of the working day is closed up as more labour gets squeezed into it' 
by increasing the objective cooperation between workers or increasing their 
`functional flexibility' (Nichols, 1991: 573). In these plants extra wages have not 
been paid to operatives for the extra work entailed in checking the status of their 
machines nor for their performing extra maintenance work that used to be done by 
maintenance workers. Moreover, when the demand for auto components declined, 
management did not reduce the work pace of workers. Workers were still required 
to work very hard when at work and they were then sent home without pay. 
There is a degree of ambivalence towards lean production within the 
workforce. On the one hand, workers complain about the intensification of labour 
but, on the other hand, some workers have a more positive stance towards the 
perceived benefits of lean production. The fear of job loss is a key reason behind 
this. Fierce market competition has led to an increase in unemployment. In 
Shanghai, about 413,000 laid-off workers registered in the re-employment service 
centre in 1999 alone (Shanghai Economy Year Book, 2000: 283). These 
redundancies are partly due to enterprise bankruptcies. Auto components workers 
believe what management has said and hope that lean production is the best, or 
indeed only, way to survive. 
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Another reason for workers' ambivalence towards lean production is that 
workers are increasingly dependent on management for relatively high wages and 
welfare benefits at a time when the old welfare benefits have gone and the new 
social security system is not yet well-developed. Shanghai is a city of relative 
prosperity with a high cost of living compared to those of other cities in China. The 
average wage of employees in state-owned firms in SAIC is about double the 
average wage of employees in other Shanghai SOEs. That is one reason why they 
are proud of working in SAIC. 
As has been pointed out with respect to similar factories in Turkey, `the social 
meaning of working in these factories is in some ways similar to that reported in 
some sectors of developed capitalist societies' (Nichols et al., 2002: 83), and 
workers in developed societies can also have ambivalent perceptions of lean 
production. Rinehart et al., in their analysis of the CAMI car plant in Canada, point 
out that the relatively high wages and job security of such plants represent `a last 
best hope for many to enjoy the "middle class" lifestyle that forms the basis of full 
citizenship in much of Canada and the United States' (Wells, 1995; cited in 
Rinehart et al., 1997: 170). The `last chance' exists in the context of `widespread 
joblessness, underemployment, the absence or erosion of a state social security net, 
growing wage polarisation, and, as a consequence, employment insecurity' 
(Rinehart et al., 1997: 170). Although operating at a different level, these are 
similar conditions to those that apply to these workers in China. 
Chapter 7 addresses the changes taking place in work organisation. The team 
concept was introduced into the firms, and QCs and `production group 
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management' were carried out. Whilst there are considerable changes taking place 
in the firms, it is by no means a fact that all goals have been achieved. In her study 
of Subaru-Isuzu, Graham suggests that: 
Even though the intra-organisational structures of Japanese management are 
present, the manner in which those structures are manipulated by workers does 
not indicate the direct transference assumed by Florida and Kenney (Graham, 
1996: 66). 
There is a similar position in SAIC. It is the case, as discussed in Chapter 7, 
that workers in SAIC do not believe that they have successfully carried out team 
working. Although team working is carried out on the former production group 
which is now held accountable for output, quality and material handling, workers 
feel much more peer pressure. The supposed egalitarianism of management and 
workers is hard to find. Workers have no sense of either being integrated in the 
`same team' with management or having any control over their work tasks. 
My research shows that the effects of team working are in line with other 
findings on this topic. For example, new team working practices are often 
associated with `high surveillance' production regimes designed to secure 
employees' compliance with management objectives rather than increase their 
involvement in problem solving and decision making (Graham, 1995; Rinehart et 
al., 1997; Delbridge, 1998; Danford, 1999). This flexibility leaves workers with 
little power and often entails movement to other departments or plants. 
It is evident that `kaizen from above' (Helper, 1995: 270) fits the Chinese 
case very well. All changes on the shop floor were initiated by management. The 
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whole process of Kaizen was controlled by management or engineers even when 
workers were encouraged to make suggestions. Workers finally found that they had 
no right to make final decisions. As discussed in Chapter 7, the outcomes of kaizen 
in the auto components companies in SAIC are, for workers, participation without 
determination and involvement without control, and, for management, new types of 
control with a mixture of coercion and consent. There was little evidence of worker 
empowerment in the labour process and human fulfilment as Womack et al. and 
Kenney and Florida have claimed. 
Kaizen inevitably intensifies the labour process. Kaizen is used to squeeze 
more and more work out of workers. Workers have definitely got exhausted 
because work is increased every time the line is re-balanced. Workers also become 
more and more stressed as Kaizen targets for saving costs become higher and 
higher. For the future, workers will have no easy way to make reductions in costs. 
Training of employees has also made progress in that workers are being 
increasingly trained. However, in China as in some studies in developed countries, 
`in practice, skill enhancement has been accomplished through an increase in job 
tasks per worker which in turn has paved the way for the intensification of effort 
across the plant' (Stewart and Martinez Lucio, 1998: 74). 
Chapter 8 discusses the trade unions' role in the new environment. The 
unions' role in the auto components companies reflects the legacy of co-operation 
with management. Workers believe that the union is playing more of a management 
role. When management decided to introduce lean production, the Party and unions 
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developed a supportive stance towards the new management system by heightening 
workers' loyalty to lean production objectives and realigning employees' interests 
with those of the company. The unions organised team working--'production group 
management', suggestion making and training with important influences by 
management. 
At the national level, the ACFTU emphasised to act on behalf of workers' 
interests during the economic transition. At the enterprise level, however, trade 
unions faced problems in representing workers' interests whilst, at the same time, 
they supported management's prerogatives to run the economics of the enterprise. 
Other writers have observed of the 1980s and 1990s that `the role of grass-roots 
Chinese trade unions became weaker as the political role of the Party at the local 
level began to weaken, at least relatively, in the enterprise' (Ding, Goodall and 
Warner, 2002: 434). The consequence of this is clear to be seen in the auto 
components companies. 
In general, workers view the role of the unions as weak. And they believe that 
the trade union will lose its significance if it can not do something for employees. 
Much labour saving and intensification of labour have taken place at the expense of 
workers' long-term interests, and health and safety. Trade unions may well be 
aware of the need to protect workers' interests but, at the present time, they feel 
impotent to deter more excessive work intensification and to influence workers' 
pay and employment conditions. 
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Management in SAIC promised a win-win outcome at the beginning of the 
introduction of lean production. However, the exercise of management prerogative 
has been such that management unilaterally sets workers' pay without any 
bargaining with unions. As a result, half the workers are dissatisfied with their pay, 
partly because of their unfair pay, compared with either the high profitability of the 
company or their hard work; and partly because of the big gap between managers 
and workers. Resentment about pay amongst the workers I interviewed and the 
survey results do little to support the claims made by Womack and his colleagues. 
The biggest contradiction is in calling for a commitment to continuous 
improvement from workers participating in lean production which is an essential 
ingredient to its success. It is clearly unreasonable to expect workers to cooperate 
fully in the process if this cooperation will lead to the loss of their jobs or the jobs 
of their fellow workers (Conti and Warner, 1994: 99). It is the case that workers 
who escape job loss can benefit financially. But continuous improvement may 
mean that their turn will come. A lack of output growth over time will tend to 
create a growing fear amongst the work force that further improvements will 
ultimately increase to the point where employment security will be abandoned. 
Workers in SAIC have seen such redundancies when the early retirement 
programme was carried out and some workers were relocated to other plants. In 
essence, management's wish to maximum profit conflicts with the interests of 
workers during the process towards a market economy. 
Workers in CAMI in Canada have responded to lean production by staging 
strikes (Rinehart et al., 1997). But it is also found that workers in the developed 
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society have sometimes used alternative means of resistance rather than an 
industrial action in the harsh economic environment (Graham, 1995; Danford, 
1999; Alderton, 1998). As Rinehart et al. put it: `Transplant stability as measured 
by the absence of strikes and a low level of unionisation can be attributed not to the 
supposed consensus-producing features of lean production but to a number of other 
factors including prevailing economic and political conditions' (1996: 119). 
In China, we found several instances of resistance towards the new work 
practices, the intensification of labour and unfair pay. Individual disquiet and 
dissonance took the form of direct confrontation, such as refusals to test the work 
pace; refusals to operate two or three machines; and refusals to fill in the form on 
the notice-board to show the number of defects. The other pattern of individual 
resistance is to keep silent and to ignore the new rules made by management. For 
example, a worker refused to clear up after the buzzer and left the team leader to do 
it. Sabotage has also resulted in defective products. The third pattern of resistance 
adopted by workers is to raise their grievances and unfair wages with management 
and trade unions. This resistance did work at the beginning of introduction of lean 
production. As an example, some workers were given extra pay for operating two 
machines. But workers' resistance has declined because of the fear of job loss as 
they have become increasingly aware of poor labour market conditions outside of 
the auto industry. In any case, individual resistance cannot amount to collective 
challenge to management prerogatives. 
My research was conducted at a time when China just joined the WTO, and 
this is likely to ensure an increasing diffusion of global modern management 
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techniques in China. This is because Chinese managers are likely to be under 
extreme pressure to implement modern management techniques and to improve the 
competitive capacity of their firms. China is a relatively new entrant into world 
markets and its domestic industries may be affected once tariff and non-tariff 
barriers come down. For example, China will cut its tariffs on auto imports from the 
present 70 to 80 per cent level to 25 per cent by mid-2006 according to a Sino-US 
WTO agreement, and this will attract more and more foreign car makers and 
components enterprises into China. 
However, the redundancies of employees will be aggravated further if 
`leanness' and labour saving techniques are applied. Unemployment will be the 
biggest challenge facing China, and it may have the potential to generate conflict 
between management and workers. The workers' futures are extremely uncertain 
and they are aware of the fact that they remain vulnerable to such changes. It is 
hard to say whether it is possible to retain production levels and stability if this 
happens. 
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Appendix A: Research Methodology 
1. General 
The thesis explores the extent to which global modem management techniques have 
been implemented in the Chinese public sector and analyses the resultant changes in 
the labour process and work organisation. This research project aims to address the 
above issues from the perspective of industrial sociology. It not only seeks to 
examine how social relations mediate the implementation of new management 
techniques, but also focuses upon the impact of these techniques upon workers. As 
indicated in Chapter 1, there has been an enormous amount of academic research 
into the transferability of Japanese management practices, particularly lean 
production, into North American and European settings. In contrast, there is a lack 
of research on lean production in the developing countries, particularly China. This 
research project tries to fill this lacuna by providing many first-hand stories of how 
managers implemented these techniques and the way in which workers and trade 
union officials responded. It contributes to research on social and economic 
development in China. 
The thesis utilises both qualitative and quantitative research methods. A 
survey was conducted amongst 24 companies in 8 industries with 1,012 managers 
cross Shanghai. Case studies were conducted in the several auto components 
companies, where 582 workers responded to questionnaires, and managers, workers 
and union officials were interviewed. Three fieldwork trips took place between 
August 1998 and November 2000. 
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According to Weber (1949), all forms of social science must achieve both an 
understanding and an explanation of the particular phenomena under investigation. 
Accordingly, sociology is defined as `a science which attempts the interpretive 
understanding of social action in order to arrive at a causal explanation of its cause 
and effects' (Weber, cited in Delbridge, 1997: 13). For the purpose of this research 
project, to explore and understand the changes in labour process and organisation 
resulting from the implementation of lean production, a research methodology 
which facilitates the exploration and understanding of complex social relations and 
their context is key (Delbridge, 1997: 14). Fieldwork is so important since the 
social context in China is different from those in the developed countries. This 
research project can not depend on assumptions that come from the research 
settings of developed countries and literatures alone. I therefore completed three 
fieldwork trips to China in order to explore what happened there, then to understand 
and explain it. 
The reason why Shanghai was chosen as the fieldwork site is that it is the 
most important industrial and financial centre in China. It is also the largest Chinese 
city with a population of 13 million containing 8 million employees. Since 1992, 
the emphasis of Chinese economic development has shifted towards Shanghai. 
Over ten thousand joint ventures or foreign-funded companies have been 
established there. In order to compete with these non state-owned companies, the 
state-owned companies have to some extent adopted modern management 
techniques in recent years. The facts revealed in Shanghai may be used to inform 
thinking about the future of Chinese industrial management. 
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The auto industry is taken as the main empirical reference for the case studies. 
The reasons can be identified as follows. Firstly, `the study of manufacturing 
organisations in economies has been exemplified by the attention paid to the auto 
sector' (Stewart and Garrahan, 1997: 225). The auto industry `has been a laboratory 
for innovation in mass production and lean production' (Berggern, 1993; Babson, 
1995). `Many of new approaches to work organisation found their first application 
in the auto industry, and the accumulation of case histories therefore offers the best 
opportunity for investigating the impact of lean production on workers' (Babson, 
1995: 21). Furthermore, Womack and his colleagues in The Machine that Changed 
the World (1990: 268) claimed China to have an automobile industry that evidenced 
a `disastrous combination'- the largest in the world in terms of employment and one 
of the smallest in terms of output. This makes it important to consider what has 
happened to this industry since 1990 and what the effects of modern management 
methods, notably Lean Production, have been on Chinese shop floors. 
Several auto components companies in the Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corporation (Group) (SAIC) were chosen for the case studies, because SAIC it is 
one of the largest auto manufacturing groups in China, consisting of over 50 
enterprises including whole-vehicle manufacturing companies and component 
supply enterprises, and the products of SAIC made up 45% of the domestic market. 
The management in SAIC claimed that it introduced lean production in 1993. It is 
very interesting to look into management experiences from the perspectives of 
managers, workers and trade union officials. 
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Having developed the research framework, three areas of research were 
carried out. (1) A pilot study. (2) A survey of managers and modem management 
techniques in the Shanghai public sector. (3) A case study in the auto components 
companies in SAIC. These were completed in three fieldwork trips which lasted for 
eight months in total. 
2. Pilot Study 
The pilot study took place in the period August to October 1998. Gaining access to 
interview managers and workers in a Chinese company by a person living abroad is 
difficult even though the visit does not involve any sensitive topics. Several 
scholars and friends who were contacted confronted obstacles in obtaining access 
because some managers had been reluctant to allow research, particularly in those 
companies suffering from economic hardship. Managers did not reveal their real 
reasons and they merely said they were struggling against financial losses and could 
not allow time for the research. In a silk company, a middle manager in the import 
and export department met me and gave a brief introduction to the company, but he 
failed to get permission from the top managers for access. A similar response came 
from another company in the textile industry where the party secretary had been 
worried that the research would be reported in the public domain. It took a month 
waiting for the arrangements to be made in Shanghai. During this period, pilot 
interviews were conducted in several state-owned textile companies in the city of 
Nantong. Some experience of talking to managers was obtained and the 
questionnaires were tested. 
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It was fortuitous that support was obtained from a high ranking trade union 
leader in Beijing and his two colleagues in Shanghai. At first, they also found 
difficulty because the managers questioned my identity when they attempted to 
introduce me to them. In some cases, I was rejected because I had studied abroad. 
These union leaders then chose some managers and union leaders who had been to 
the UK in order to let me more easily get access to their companies. A union 
chairman in a textile company had been trained in a Business School in Manchester 
for three weeks. lie understood what I would like to do and introduced me to 
management in his firm. A director of a firm in the chemical industry had also been 
trained in the University of Warwick and gave me full help. 
I went to ten state-owned companies by making use of trade union and 
management contacts in later months. Amongst them, three were in the chemical 
industry, one each in the electric and construction industries, two in the textile 
industry, two in the transportation industry and one in the public services. I talked 
to 8 directors and 6 party secretaries, 6 trade union chairmen and 30 middle 
managers and 16 junior managers. Most interviews were tape-recorded. Each 
interview lasted I to 2 hours. Various documents and statistics were collected. In 
addition, I visited 3 experts from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and 2 
scholars from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 4 professors from the 
School of Economic Management, Jiaotong University. I also talked to several 
persons from the Shanghai Municipal Trade Union Council. 
My study focused mainly upon managers and modern management techniques 
in state-owned companies in Shanghai. It concerned the following questions: (1) 
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what kinds of situations had managers occupied during the period of enormous 
change since the economic reforms? How did particular managers think and feel 
about their situations? (2) What was the extent to which modem management 
techniques were capable of being transferred to Chinese companies? How were 
managers influenced by modern Western management techniques? It is these 
interviews that provided the background that sharpened the structure of the second 
interview stage and the survey. 
3. Survey of Managers and Modern Management Techniques in State-Owned 
Companies 
The survey of managers and management strategy was undertaken during my 
second trip from June to August 1999. Based on the pilot study, I designed the 
questionnaire on similar themes to focus not only on the social characteristics of 
managers but also on the managers' knowledge of modem management techniques. 
Broadly, these subjects were covered: 
" The background of management 
" Their knowledge of modem management techniques 
". The sources of knowledge of modern management techniques 
" Their attitude to modem management techniques 
9 Impacts of implementation of new management techniques on management 
change and performance 
Major efforts were made to get access to companies through contacting with 
trade union leaders, managers and professors. Several companies appeared to ignore 
my requests completely whilst several companies politely refused using various 
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excuses. As a case in point. in the morning when I was leaving for a company, I 
received a phone call frone a union official who told me that the appointment would 
be cancelled. Ile explained that the top managers in his company did not agree with 
the research because they feared it might bring trouble. I was very disappointed. 
However, I kept contacting the people I used to know both by phone and personal 
visits to seek support. Most help came from trade union leaders. 
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As a result of this arduous process, 24 companies in 8 sectors eventually 
Part. Ih. ºtCd 111 nº% ur% c% (gee Fº urc : A. 1). Amongst them, the seven companies 
th. ºt took pall ºn tlhC plot stud\ in 1998 \\ere traced to observe any changes. I had 
no difficulty º; aºmm a:: r: " to these companies due to the previous contact. In order 
to compare different companies in one sector, five or six firms were chosen from 
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each of the key sectors which contain big companies or groups. In each sample 
company, I talked to senior managers and the union chairmen about the objectives 
of the research and requested permission for a survey. They helped me to distribute 
the questionnaires. I tried to ensure that the survey covered managers at different 
levels. In the biggest company with 9,000 employees, I distributed 100 
questionnaires to managers and received 67 returns. In the smallest company with 
609 employees, I distributed 30 questionnaires that yielded 26 responds. The 
questionnaires completed by managers in the different sectors are summarised in 
Table A. 1 in more detail. 
Table A. 1 First Survey Outcomes. 
Sectors Companies (N) Valid Total Valid response 
responses questionnaires valid rate (%) 
(N) distributed (N) 
Automotive 5 200 300 67 
Electric 5 225 270 83 
Chemical 2 136 160 85 
Public services 2 90 120 75 
Construction 2 62 100 62 









Total 24 1,012 1,318 77 
In the chemical industry, 136 managers answered questionnaires, representing 
the highest response rate (85%), followed by the textile industry (84%). The lowest 
response rate (62%) was found in the construction industry. Thus 1,012 replies were 
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received from 1,318 questionnaires issued, giving an overall valid response rate of 
77%. 
The survey focused on big companies in Shanghai. Table A. 2 shows the sizes 
of the 24 companies in terms of the number of their employees. The highest 
proportion (42%) of participating companies is for those companies with 3,001 to 
5,000 employees. Companies with 1,001 to 3,000 people constituted the next 
largest category (26%). Those who employed 1,000 and less or 5,000 and more 
workforce each formed 16% of the total. At the time of my research (1999) in 
Shanghai, the workforce was 8.12 million and there were 1,810 state-owned 
industrial enterprises (Shanghai Economy Year Book, 2000: 316). However, it was 
very difficult to know exactly how many employees there were in SOEs because 
SOEs were being changed to joint venture companies or closed down and 
employees would leave. I tried to conduct surveys in 24 big SOEs in different 
locations in order to create the opportunity for some generalisations. 
Table A. 2 Companies in the Sample by Size of Workforce. 






5,001 and more 
employees 
16% 26% 42% 16% 
In addition to the survey, I interviewed top managers or middle managers in 
each company in order to obtain background information about their companies, 
information on personal details such as their pay, their job and what they had done, 
and their perspectives on the transformation of modern management techniques. 
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Each interview was conducted individually. Analysis of the results of the interviews 
is presented in Chapters Two and Three. At the same time, I visited 12 scholars of 
social science in order to exchange ideas and gain information from them. 
By keeping to a strict timetable I was able to complete the survey within the 
planned schedule. The large scale survey programme was actually completed during 
a very hot summer in Shanghai. Although it was hard work, I got lots of 
encouragement from the managers and union leaders I interviewed. A top manager 
in the chemical industry gave support because he was practising lean production in 
his firm and he had a common research theme. The encouragement given is also 
reflected in the high quality of the questionnaire responses and the comments 
respondents wrote to open-ended questions, as a middle manager in Cons-1 put it: 
This is the best questionnaire I have read. It does not just ask me to tick but it 
makes me think a lot. When I finished the questionnaire, I felt very depressed 
because I knew so little of modern management techniques. 
A similar feeling was expressed by a junior manager in the light industry: 
Filling in this questionnaire made me appreciate the importance of modem 
enterprise management. Chinese managers should learn modem management 
techniques which we can use to compete in the world. 
4. The Case Study in the Auto Components Companies in SAIC 
The case study looked at the implementation of lean production in the auto 
components companies in SAIC. The fieldwork was accomplished in two periods. 
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The first fieldwork was conducted during June to August 1999 when I conducted 
the survey of managers and modern management techniques across Shanghai. I 
focused upon management's attitudes towards lean production and exactly how 
they implemented it. I completed both surveys and interviews at this stage. The 
second period of fieldwork was carried out in SAIC from September to October 
2000.1 concentrated upon how the application of lean production impacted upon 
workers and how workers and trade unions responded to it. 
Gaining access to SAIC was easier than I had imagined it would be. There are 
three main reasons for this. Firstly, a union leader at municipal level asked the 
union leaders in the headquarters of SAIC to support me. The union leaders in 
SAIC were enthusiastic and helpful. Moreover, the managers and employees in 
SAIC had many opportunities to be trained abroad. They believed they should learn 
modem management techniques, so they allowed researchers from abroad to enter 
their companies. They trusted those who would objectively analyse what happened 
in their company. In addition, management recognised that workers were satisfied 
with the economic benefits from adopting lean production and they needed not 
worry about any problems being exposed. In general, the fieldwork was carried out 
smoothly. Only one thing interrupted my research schedule--the vacation shutdown 
of companies. I spent a good deal of time contacting enterprise union chairmen. It 
was not easy to make appointments. Sometime I had to cancel my plans. 
During the first period of fieldwork, I investigated managers amongst five 
state-owned component companies, that is, companies in which the state had a 
majority holding. I distributed 300 questionnaires to managers which yielded 200 
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responses, a 68% valid return rate. Although I used questionnaires in the same way 
as with the survey managers in other industries, I gained most information from 
first hand interviews. I interviewed 8 heads of department in the manufacturing, 2 
managers in quality control sections, 6 production managers and 16 union officials. 
Both semi-structured interviews and open ended discussions were conducted on an 
individual basis and in groups. Each interview lasted two hours on average and was 
tape-recorded. 
The interviews were concerned with management strategies, the process and 
characteristics of the application of lean production. In particular, I examined the 
degree to which certain management techniques were being used. I looked at the 
reduction of work-in-progress inventories, Kanban, zero defects, JIT, Kaizen, team 
working, TPAM. I investigated performance results in the reduction of inventory and 
lead time, cost cutting, achievement in gross output value and sales value. I listened 
to managers' voices on the possibility of transferring lean production methods to 
China. 
Besides empirical observations in the firms, I collected many books and 
references, internal documents and reports. I had a tour of two big joint-venture car 
manufacturing companies SVW and SGM, and a Japanese joint venture 
components company. 
The second period of fieldwork focused upon the views of workers instead of 
the managers surveyed in the previous year. It is useful to compare both 
perspectives for, as Nichols (1986: 260) points out, a study which `systematically 
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samples both managers and workers is always likely to provide at least some 
snippets of information that rarely surface in other accounts and to suggest different 
lines of interpretation'. Furthermore, the fieldwork captured changes over a period 
of time. These changes included the new challenges confronted in the auto industry 
and the new practices of lean production in SAIC. There was also new information 
about how Chinese managers were learning modem management techniques. 
Interviews and surveys were related to the impacts of management control on 
workers, the changes in organisation and employment relations. I addressed the 
following questions: did workers work harder than before? Was team working 
efficient? What were workers' views on Kaizen? What did workers' training 
consist of? What were workers' views on the changes to their pay and job security? 
What was the role of the trade unions? Should Chinese SOEs apply lean 
production? 
In order to take a general view of workers in SAIC, I conducted surveys in 9 
companies of which five firms had been involved in the previous survey (1999). 1 
distributed 900 questionnaires in total and received 659 responses (amongst them 
77 were trade union officials who all agreed to participate in survey) with the help 
of a union leader from headquarters who urged the enterprise union chairmen to 
collect questionnaires. I tried to ensure that the survey mainly covered assembly 
workers and operatives. The return rates of the questionnaires are highlighted in 
TablcA. 3. 
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Table A. 3 Second Survey Results. 







Rate of return 
(%) 
Auto-1 100 72 0 72 
Auto-2 180 109 18 71 
Auto-3 100 78 2 80 
Auto4 80 26 21 59 
Auto-5 100 66 9 75 
Auto-6 100 85 0 85 
Auto-7 80 58 0 73 
Auto-8 80 44 14 73 
Auto-9 80 44 13 71 
Total 900 582 77 73 
Of the total of 582 workers surveyed, 66% were male and 34% were female. 
As for their age distributions, 38% of workers were found to be over 40. Those 
under 31 years old constituted the next largest group in the sample, occupying 38%. 
The group from 31 to 40 )-ears old was 24%. More than half the workers (56%) 
came from families in which their fathers are also manual workers. Their education 
levels were not high; one in five graduated from college or university, others 
received education only from high school or middle-level polytechnic school. 
The majority (82%) of surveyed workers were direct production workers who 
either operated various machines or worked on assembly lines. The others were 
maintenance workers (10%) and group leaders (8%). 35% of respondents had 
worked for the company over 20 years, 28% between 11 to 20 years and 37% 
between 1 to 10 years. Workers had varying duration of contracts. Amongst them, 
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19% held indefinite contacts (>10 years), 66% long-term (<10 years, >5 years) 
contracts, 14% short-term (<5 years, >1 year) contracts and only 0.2% temporary 
(<1 year) contacts. Two in three workers (68%) had not changed their job type since 
the beginning of their careers. Thus this sample which was composed mainly of 
experienced workers (four-fifth, who had worked in SAIC more than five years) is 
very appropriate for assessing the new management techniques introduced recently. 
During the period of research at SAIC, about 40 employees from, in the main, 
6 companies were interviewed. I spent three or four days in each company. I talked 
to 3 heads of department of production and 3 production managers, 2 supervisors, 
22 shop floor workers and 10 union officials. Additional questions varied in 
accordance with the interviewee's occupation. For example, I asked heads of 
department of production about cost savings and team leaders about the activities of 
their teams. Workers and union officials were able to talk freely to me and told their 
own stories about their ambivalent feelings towards the changes in their working 
lives. Whilst they expressed common feelings that they did benefit economically 
from the application of lean production, they were also disaffected with intensified 
work and the disparity in pay between managers and workers. Their own words are 
valuable and are quoted in the chapters. Besides interviews and surveys, I also had 
opportunities to observe the one-piece flow of materials, cells, Kanban, the team 
information board and how workers did their work. 
Fieldwork was a very arduous task. On the day of the survey or interviews, I 
caught the company bus at the 6: 00am and began my research at 7: 00am when the 
shift started. I had lunch with workers, managers and union officials. I was able to 
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obtain information about many things beyond the outlines of the interviews. I left 
the companies at 4: 00pm and took the journey back which lasted an hour. If I 
missed the chance to travel by the company bus, I had to spend four hours in travel. 
Each night, I sorted out the notes, listened to the tapes and prepared the different 
interview themes. This successful fieldwork built a foundation for the in-depth 
research and analysis. The survey data were entered into computer and the SPSS 
programme was used for data processing and statistical analysis. The results of the 
case study are represented in Chapters 4,5,6,7 and 8. The outline of interview in 
the pilot fieldwork and two survey questionnaires are reproduced in Appendices B, 
C and D. 
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Appendix B: Outline of Managers Interview in the Pilot Fieldwork 
1. Where were you born? 
2. How old are you? 
3. What did your father do? 
4. When did you enter primary school? When did you leave high school? 
5. Have you studied in a college or university? If yes, when and at which university 
did you study? Which discipline did you study? 
6. What qualifications do you have? 
7. Are you married? If yes, what does your spouse do? 
8. Whom do you live with? How about their employment situation? 
9. When did you start to work? How many jobs have you done? 
10. How did you enter this company? What was your first job? 
11. How long have you been engaged in management? How many times have you 
been promoted? 
12. How did you get this position? 
13. Are you a Party member? If yes, when did you join the party? 
14. Have you got any position in the Party? If yes, what have you been in charge of? 
15. Do you have any knowledge of modern management methods? If yes, where did 
you learn from? 
16. Have you learnt about the theory and practice of Japanese management? 
17. Do you know what the terms of TQM, HRM, JIT and Lean Production mean? 
18. Have you applied or developed these management theories to your management 
practice? If yes, how did you do it? 
19. What are most important Japanese and Western management techniques you 
need to learn from? 
20. Have you taken any managerial training? If yes, what were they? 
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21. What have you learnt by training? 
22. What are the main changes in management since 1992 in this company? 
23. What management decisions has the top manager made since 1992? How 
effective were they? 
24. What was the hardest decision you ever had to make, and how did you handle 
it? 
25. How do you increase the quality consciousness of workers? 
26. Does this company have a good culture? 
27. Have there been any changes in your wage system? 
28. How do you motivate people? What is the best way to incentive and rewards? 
29. Have you practised team work? 
30. What changes have taken place since the introduction of the `Director 
Responsibility System'? Is it a good thing? What do you think it needs to 
improve? 
31. Do you think that you have more power since 1992? If yes, in what respects and 
to what extent have you increased responsible autonomy? 
32. How are workers' interests taken account of? 
33. What decision have you made without discussing with the Party secretary? How 
about the result? 
34. What should be the relationship between you and the Party secretary? why? 
35. What difficulties have you encountered in management? How have you 
resolved them? 
36. What has caused you the most problems in management? 
37. To what extent is good relationship (guang xi) important for you in 
management? 
38. What is the real impact of the change from the `iron rice bowl' to the labour 
contract system? 
39. When did you start to sign contracts with workers? 
40. Do you think that workers need to be more skilled? Have you developed any 
training program for workers? 
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41. How did you decide to lay off a worker? On what basis did you lay off them? 
Do you know of any resentful workers? 
42. What difficulties did laid-off workers experience? How did you resolve these 
problems? 
43. How do you reduce number of worker laid off? 
44. Do you worry that you will be laid off? How do you try to keep your current 
job? 
45. Who gives you an assessment of your performance? 
46. What is necessary to make the company achieve more profits? What are the 
challenges involved in achieving high productivity? 
47. Do you think that the implementation of modern management techniques is a 
good way for company to make more profits? 
48. Is reducing employee number the only way to make more profits? 
49. Is it important to rely on the working class in your company? 
50. How has the role of the Trade Unions changed? 
51. What part should the Trade Union play in the implementation of modem 
management techniques? 
52. What issues should trade union participate in the discussion of? 
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Appendix C: Management and Modern Management Techniques 
Questionnaire 
1. Basic Information 
(1) date of birth 
(3) gender 
(2) place of birth 
(4) father's occupation 
(5) schooling (tick level) 
secondary school college 
university (specify subject) postgraduate school (specify subject) 
(6) marriage (tick) 
married single 
if married, what is your spouse's occupation? 
(7) Are you a Party member? (tick) yes no 
if yes, 
when did you join the Party? 
(8) Have you had any experience of the Cultural Revolution? How has the Culture 
Revolution affected you? 
2. Brief information on your career and your present job 
(1) position department 
(2) How did you get this position? 
by advertisement by appointment 
by election others (specify) 
(3) How long have you held your present position? 
(4) How many people are you responsible for? 
(5) Is this your first job? yes no 
If not, how many firms/ organisations have you been employed in during your 
career? 
(6) When did you get your first job? 
(7) Have you ever worked in the private sector? yes no 
If yes, how many years? 
3. Management Training 
(1) Have you attended any management training in the last 12 months? 
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tick one box only. 
none less than 1 day 1 to less than 2 days 
2 to less than 5 days 5 to less than 10 days 10 days or more 
(2) Have you attended any management training? 
in company in section abroad others no 
If you have received no training ignore the next question 
(3) Please specify content of training and tick appropriate box on the right: 
Content of training Very Useful Not very useful Not at all useful 
useful 
4. Views on Modern Management Techniques 
(1) How familiar are you with the following management methods? 










LP=Lean Production, QCs=Quality Circles, JIT=Just-in-Time, BPR=Business Process 
Reengineering, FP=Flexible Production, TQM=Total Quality Management, HRM=Human 
Resource Management. 
2) How do you know about the following management methods? 











LP=Lean Production, QCs=Quality Circles, JIT=Just-in-Time, BPR=Business Process 
Reengineering, FP=Flexible Production, TQM=Total Quality Management, HRM=Human 
Resource Management. 
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(3) How do you rate these methods for use in China? (Please tick each box that is 
appropriate) 











LP=Lean Production, QCs=Quality Circles, JIT=Just-in-Time, BPR=Business Process 
Reengineering, FP=Flexible Production, TQM=Total Quality Management, HRM=Human 
Resource Management 
(4) In which respects have you participated in management? 
product design technical innovation production 
investment market sale personnel 
(5) Compared to 1992, how have things changed for you in the following respects? 
Better Worse Stay the same Don't know 








(6) Compared to 1992, how have things changed in your company in the following 
respects? 
Increase Decrease Same Don't know 




Protection of employee's interest 
Role of the unions 
Co-operation of the Party secretary 
and director 
348 
(7) What is your view on the following employment aspects? 






(3) Labour saving 
(4) wage system 
(5) Social 
insurance system 
(8) What is important for state-owned companies to avoid loss? Please tick. 
a. reforming property right b. adjusting structure of production. 
c. increasing investment d. improving management 
e. open account to public f. government support 
g. rely on working class h. others 
(9) Do you think that state-owned companies should be privatised? Please list three 
best things and three worst things about privatisation. 
(10) In management, what is the biggest difficulty which you are facing? 
(11) Do you think that the union is necessary? Why? 
(12) In general, how would you describe relations between managers and employees 
here? 
Very good Good Neither good nor bad Poor Very poor 
(13) Do you think managers face any particular problems with employees in China? 
Please state. 
(14) What is your view on using modem management techniques? Why? 
(15) What constitute a good management? 
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(16) In general, do you think modern management techniques have any significance 
for society? 
Thank you for filling in the questionnaire. 
Please use this page and the next to comment on any of the above matters at greater 
length. There is only so much that can be compressed into a questionnaire and your 
personal comments will be greatly valued. 
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Appendix D: Worker Questionnaire in SAIC 
Workers and Modern Management Techniques Questionnaire 
1. Date of birth 
2. Gender: male female 
3. Father's occupation 
4. Schooling (tick level) 
secondary school 
university (specify subject) 
5. Marriage (please tick) 
married 
college 
postgraduate school (specify subject) 
single 
If you are married, what is your spouse's occupation? 
6. Your job type 
7. Workshop 
8. What's your status in the firm? 
permanent short term contract 
9. When did you start to work? 
10. How long have you held your present job? 
11. Is this your first job? yes no 
If not, how many firms/ organisations have you worked for? 
12. Have you ever been `off duty'? yes no 
temporary 
13. How long does it normally take before new workers are able to do the job as 
well as more experienced workers already working here? 
14. How satisfied have you been with the following? 
Very Satisfied Dissatisfied Very 
satisfied dissatisfied 
Your usual take home pay 
The people you work with 
Your work prospects 
Physical working conditions 
The way your section is run 
The way your abilities are used 
The interest and skill involved 
in your job 
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15. How familiar are you with the following management techniques? 










LP=Lean Production, QCs=Quality Circles, JIT=Just-in-Time, BPR=Business Process 
Reengineering, FP=Flexible Production, TQM=Total Quality Management, HRM=Human 
Resource Management. 
16. How do you know about the following management techniques? 
In each case please tick one or more. 











LP=Lean Production, QCs=Quality Circles, JIT=Just-in-Time, BPR=Business Process 
Reengineering, FP=Flexible Production, TQM=Total Quality Management, HRM=Human 
Resource Management. 
17. To what extent do you use these following techniques? 













18. How do you rate these methods for workers? 












19. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your job? 
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strong 
agree disagree 
My job made me work very hard 
I never seem to have enough 
time to get my job done 
I feel my job is secure 
in this workplace 
I worry a lot about my 
work outside working hours 
20. Since your firm applied lean production, how many things have changed for you 
in the following respects? 
Better Worse Stay the same 






Health and safety 
Job security 
Job prospects 
21. Do you work in a team? 
yes no 
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If yes, do you agree following opinions? 
Agree Disagree 
Team working has given me new job skill 
Team working has give me more tasks to do but no real skill 
I believe that all managers and employees should be members 
of the same `company team' 
I think that management here believe they are in a separate 
team to the employees. 
Working in a team helps me feel like I am part of the company 
Working in a team gives me a say over how my job is done 
Working in a team is a way to get us to work hard 
Working in a team gets us all pressuring one another 
22. Have you attended any training in the last 12 months? Tick one box only. 
More than 31-40 days 21- 30 days 11-20 days 1-10 days None 
40 days 
23. Which training courses did you attend? How useful were the courses that you 
attended? 
Training Very useful Useful Not very useful Not at all useful 
content 
24. In your opinion, what is the attitude of following people to lean production? 
Strongly Supportive Undecided or Opposed Strongly Do not 











25. In your opinion, to what degree do following people participate in lean 
production? 






26. What are barriers in applying lean production in your company? Please tick the 
biggest three. 
old idea old mechanism management style 
employees' motivation lack of knowledge relationship 
27. What is the biggest difficulty for your company to apply lean production? 
28. What are your general opinions of lean production? 
29. In general, how would you describe relations between managers and employees 
here. 
very good good neither good nor bad poor very poor 
30. How good would you say managers here are at: 
Very Good Neither Poor Very 
good poor 
Keeping everyone up to date 
about proposed changed 
providing everyone with the chance 
to comment on proposed changes 
responding to suggestions 
from employees 
31. How good would you say the trade union here is at: 
Very Good Neither Poor Very 
good poor 
Keeping everyone up to date 
about proposed changed 
providing everyone with the chance 
to comment on proposed changes 
responding to suggestions 
from employees 
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32. Would you like your son/ daughter to do this job? 
yes no 
33. Do you think this is a good job for someone like you? 
yes no 
34. If you had a grievance at work whom would you go to first in order to try and do 
something about it? 
Trade union management party 
35. Do you think workers face any particular problems with managers in China? 
36. What is your view on the trade union in the firm? 
very good good neither good nor bad poor very poor 
37. What should Trade union be like? 
38. Do you think team leaders should be elected? 
yes no 
39. Who benefits from teamwork? 
40. Which of the following do you most agree with? 
[1] lunch break is a good time for us to get together as a team to go over things and 
solve problems 
[2] lunch break is our personal time, it shouldn't be a time for company business 
[3] disagree with both of them 
41. In the last month how often have you worked with physical pain or discomfort? 
[1] everyday [2] most days [3] half the time [4] a few days [5] never 
42. In the last month how often has dust in the air led to physical discomfort ( eyes, 
breathing)? 
[1] everyday [2] most days [3] half the time [4] a few days [5] never 
43. In the last month how often has air temperature led to physical discomfort ( too 
hot, too cold)? 
[1] everyday [2] most days [3] half the time [4] a few days [5] never 
44. In the last month how often has noise led to physical discomfort (hearing 
problems, headache)? 
[1] everyday [2] most days [3] half the time [4] a few days [5] never 
45. Could you work at the pace of your current job until you are 55 or retirement? 
46. Do you work shifts? 
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47. If you found a way to do your job that was easier or faster than the specified 
way, what would you do? 
[1} keep it to yourself [2] share it with no one other than a few co-workers 
[3] tell the team leader [4] submit a suggestion [5] other 
48. How do you describe yourself, apart from being a citizen of China? 
`- - 
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Picture 1. The City of Shanghai. 
Picture 2. Auto- I is Situated in a Suburb of Shanghai--Jia Ding. 
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Picture 3. Key Machines in Auto- I Were Imported from Advanced Countries. 











Picture 5. Subassembly Workshop in Auto-6. 
Source: Booklet in Auto-6. 
Picture 6. One Kind of Kanban Used in Auto-3. 
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Picture 7. Cellular manufacturing in Auto-2. 
Source: Booklet in Auto-2. 
Picture S. One-firer F1ovv in Auto-3. 
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Pirturc W. l)i, Eýlay of Quality Chart in Auto-4 
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Picture 1 1. The Number of Implemented Suggestion, as Displayed in Auto-4. 
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Picture 12.1 raining, Programmes for Individual Workers, as Displayed in Auto-3. 
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